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arXiv:2501.09984 · Physical Review A

Quantifying the upper limit of backflash attack in quantum key distribution

Jialei Su, Junxuan Liu, Zihao Chen, Mingyang Zhong, Qingquan Peng, Jiangfang Ding, Yijun Wang, Anqi Huang, Ying Guo

Published Jan 13, 2026• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially passive attacks that are inherently difficult to detect. In this study, we experimentally and theoretically investigate the upper limit of the backflash attack-a representative passive side-channel threat. Using a fully equipped fiber-based QKD receiver, we demonstrate the feasibility of the attack and reveal its limited capability in distinguishing quantum states. We further develop a theoretical framework to quantify the maximum distinguishability achievable by an eavesdropper, taking into account the broadband spectral nature of backflash photons. The analysis shows that Eve can extract effective key information from at most 95.7% of the backflash photons. Based on these findings, we evaluate the secure key rate of a decoy-state BB84 QKD system under backflash attack. Our results provide a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of QKD systems to backflash emissions and offer a general methodology to evaluate the practical security of QKD systems.

DOI
10.1103/xn8h-961f

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides information-theoretic security grounded in the fundamental laws of physics. Nevertheless, practical imperfections can introduce side channels that expose QKD systems to quantum hacking, especially passive attacks that are inherently difficult to detect. In this study, we experimentally and theoretically investigate the upper limit of the backflash attack-a representative passive side-channel threat. Using a fully equipped fiber-based QKD receiver, we demonstrate the feasibility of the attack and reveal its limited capability in distinguishing quantum states. We further develop a theoretical framework to quantify the maximum distinguishability achievable by an eavesdropper, taking into account the broadband spectral nature of backflash photons. The analysis shows that Eve can extract effective key information from at most 95.7% of the backflash photons. Based on these findings, we evaluate the secure key rate of a decoy-state BB84 QKD system under backflash attack. Our results provide a quantitative assessment of the vulnerability of QKD systems to backflash emissions and offer a general methodology to evaluate the practical security of QKD systems.
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises information theoretic secure key as long as the device performs as assumed in the theoretical model. One of the assumptions is an absence of information leakage about individual photon detection outcomes of the receiver unit. Here we investigate the information leakage from a QKD receiver due to photon emission caused by detection events in single-photon detectors (backflash). We test commercial silicon avalanche photodiodes and a photomultiplier tube, and find that the former emit backflashes. We study the spectral, timing and polarization characteristics of these backflash photons. We experimentally demonstrate on a free-space QKD receiver that an eavesdropper can distinguish which detector has clicked inside it, and thus acquire secret information. A set of countermeasures both in theory and on the physical devices are discussed.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is increasingly recognized as a robust solution to the vulnerabilities posed by quantum computing to classical encryption systems. This paper presents a comprehensive investigation of the BB84 protocol, the foundational QKD scheme, through simulated quantum communication using IBM’s Qiskit framework. The study models quantum key exchange under both ideal and adversarial conditions, including channel noise and intercept-resend attacks. The Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) was measured as a function of noise intensity and eavesdropping, confirming that QBER increases predictably in compromised channels. A threshold of 11% QBER was used to determine the viability of secure key generation. Final key retention rates were analyzed across multiple channel scenarios, revealing BB84’s sensitivity to both photon loss and adversarial interference.\n\nSecurity vulnerabilities such as photon-number-splitting and detector blinding were assessed, and countermeasures including decoy-state protocols and authenticated classical channels were proposed. Four key performance graphs were generated to visualize system behavior under realistic operational conditions. The results support BB84’s theoretical advantage in ensuring information-theoretic security while acknowledging real-world limitations in transmission range and hardware reliability. The paper concludes by addressing future improvements in QKD systems, including satellite-based distribution, quantum repeaters, and device-independent implementations. Through simulation-driven analysis, this study validates BB84 as a practical defense against quantum-enabled attacks and underscores the need for continued development and standardization in post-quantum cryptographic infrastructure.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.