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arXiv:2411.00529 · ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)

A General Quantum Duality for Representations of Groups with Applications to Quantum Money, Lightning, and Fire

John Bostanci, Barak Nehoran, Mark Zhandry

Published Jun 15, 2025• 3 citations
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Abstract

Aaronson, Atia, and Susskind (2020) established that efficiently mapping between quantum states $|ψ\rangle$ and $|ϕ\rangle$ is computationally equivalent to distinguishing their superpositions $|ψ\rangle \pm |ϕ\rangle$. We generalize this insight into a broader duality principle, wherein manipulating quantum states in one basis is equivalent to extracting their value in a complementary basis. This general duality principle states that the ability to implement a unitary representation of a group is computationally equivalent to the ability to perform a Fourier subspace extraction from its irreducible representations. Building on our duality principle, we present the following applications: * We extend the construction of publicly-key quantum money of Zhandry (2024) from Abelian group actions to a construction of quantum lightning from non-Abelian group actions, and eliminate Zhandry's reliance on a black-box model for justifying security. Instead, we prove a direct reduction to a computational assumption -- the pre-action security of cryptographic group actions. Our construction is realizable with symmetric group actions, including those implicit in the McEliece cryptosystem. * We provide an alternative quantum lightning construction from one-way homomorphisms, with security holding under certain conditions. This scheme shows equivalence among four security notions: quantum lightning security, worst-case and average-case cloning security, and security against preparing a canonical state. * We formalize the notion of quantum fire, states that are efficiently clonable, but not efficiently telegraphable. These states can be spread like fire, provided they are kept alive quantumly and do not decohere. The only previously known construction relied on a unitary quantum oracle, whereas we present the first candidate construction of quantum fire using a classical oracle.

DOI
10.1145/3717823.3718195

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Aaronson, Atia, and Susskind (2020) established that efficiently mapping between quantum states ∣ψ⟩|ψ\rangle∣ψ⟩ and ∣ϕ⟩|ϕ\rangle∣ϕ⟩ is computationally equivalent to distinguishing their superpositions ∣ψ⟩±∣ϕ⟩|ψ\rangle \pm |ϕ\rangle∣ψ⟩±∣ϕ⟩. We generalize this insight into a broader duality principle, wherein manipulating quantum states in one basis is equivalent to extracting their value in a complementary basis. This general duality principle states that the ability to implement a unitary representation of a group is computationally equivalent to the ability to perform a Fourier subspace extraction from its irreducible representations. Building on our duality principle, we present the following applications: * We extend the construction of publicly-key quantum money of Zhandry (2024) from Abelian group actions to a construction of quantum lightning from non-Abelian group actions, and eliminate Zhandry's reliance on a black-box model for justifying security. Instead, we prove a direct reduction to a computational assumption -- the pre-action security of cryptographic group actions. Our construction is realizable with symmetric group actions, including those implicit in the McEliece cryptosystem. * We provide an alternative quantum lightning construction from one-way homomorphisms, with security holding under certain conditions. This scheme shows equivalence among four security notions: quantum lightning security, worst-case and average-case cloning security, and security against preparing a canonical state. * We formalize the notion of quantum fire, states that are efficiently clonable, but not efficiently telegraphable. These states can be spread like fire, provided they are kept alive quantumly and do not decohere. The only previously known construction relied on a unitary quantum oracle, whereas we present the first candidate construction of quantum fire using a classical oracle.
Our main result is a quantum polynomial-time reduction from the group action discrete logarithm (DLP) problem to a specific cloning problem. A consequence of this result is that the public-key quantum money scheme proposed by Zhandry (2024), which is based on abelian group actions, is secure in the generic group action model. Specifically, our result shows that breaking the quantum money scheme is equivalent, under quantum polynomial-time reductions, to solving the group action DLP. An immediate implication of our result concerns the relationship between cloning and preparing Fourier states: our main theorem shows that the problem of cloning group action Fourier states is equivalent to the problem of preparing them.
We give a construction of public key quantum money, and even a strengthened version called quantum lightning, from abelian group actions, which can in turn be constructed from suitable isogenies over elliptic curves. We prove security in the generic group model for group actions under a plausible computational assumption, and develop a general toolkit for proving quantum security in this model. Along the way, we explore knowledge assumptions and algebraic group actions in the quantum setting, finding significant limitations of these assumptions/models compared to generic group actions. 62 pages. This is the TheoretiCS journal version
Quantum fire is a recently introduced cryptographic primitive consisting of efficiently preparable quantum states, called \emph{flames}, that admit efficient cloning but resist efficient telegraphing, namely reconstruction via classical communication without preshared entanglement. In all prior constructions of quantum fire, cloning is a public operation that requires no separate key and every holder of a flame state can clone it. For applications to access control, however, an issuer may wish to delegate cloning to designated quantum servers while withholding this capability from other flame holders. To address this, we introduce \emph{delegatable quantum fire}, in which cloning requires a separate key. We give two constructions in the classical-oracle model. Our first construction uses a classical secret key which enables cloning, and any user with the entire key may clone successfully. Our second construction, which we call \emph{torch-fire}, uses quantum cloning keys, called \emph{torches}, which enable cloning while remaining unaffected in the process but cannot otherwise be split or delegated to enable additional cloning. An efficient adversary given mmm torches cannot, except with negligible probability, enable more than mmm noncommunicating parties to each clone a fresh, independently issued challenge flame. The adversary may jointly process its resources before separating the parties and distribute arbitrarily entangled registers among them. Both constructions are in the oracle model, relying on public classical oracles that allow queries in quantum superposition.
We give a construction of public key quantum money, and even a strengthened version called quantum lightning, from abelian group actions, which can in turn be constructed from suitable isogenies over elliptic curves. We prove security in the generic group model for group actions under a plausible computational assumption, and develop a general toolkit for proving quantum security in this model. Along the way, we explore knowledge assumptions and algebraic group actions in the quantum setting, finding significant limitations of these assumptions/models compared to generic group actions.
Public verification of quantum money has been one of the central objects in quantum cryptography ever since Wiesner's pioneering idea of using quantum mechanics to construct banknotes against counterfeiting. So far, we do not know any publicly-verifiable quantum money scheme that is provably secure from standard assumptions. In this work, we provide both negative and positive results for publicly verifiable quantum money. **In the first part, we give a general theorem, showing that a certain natural class of quantum money schemes from lattices cannot be secure. We use this theorem to break the recent quantum money scheme of Khesin, Lu, and Shor. **In the second part, we propose a framework for building quantum money and quantum lightning we call invariant money which abstracts some of the ideas of quantum money from knots by Farhi et al.(ITCS'12). In addition to formalizing this framework, we provide concrete hard computational problems loosely inspired by classical knowledge-of-exponent assumptions, whose hardness would imply the security of quantum lightning, a strengthening of quantum money where not even the bank can duplicate banknotes. **We discuss potential instantiations of our framework, including an oracle construction using cryptographic group actions and instantiations from rerandomizable functional encryption, isogenies over elliptic curves, and knots.
Quantum fire consists of quantum states that can be efficiently functionally cloned but cannot be transmitted using one-way classical communication. Whereas all previous quantum-fire constructions with proven untelegraphability are relative to an oracle, ours, based on one-shot signatures, is in the standard model. Our construction achieves two further notions that we introduce: (a) keyless untelegraphability, a strengthening of untelegraphability; and (b) conversability, meaning that a flame, though not telegraphable via one-way classical communication, can be transmitted via classical interaction. Hence one-way and two-way classical communication differ qualitatively in their power to transmit this quantum fire. We use these two novel properties of quantum fire, along with its clonability, to give one of the first cryptographic applications of quantum fire. Keyless untelegraphability forces the distribution of serial numbers of valid flames to have high min-entropy, while conversability and clonability allow the corresponding flame to be cloned and transferred using only classical communication. We present two variants of our conversable quantum-fire construction. The first, based on one-shot signatures (instantiable from subexponential iO, subexponentially secure one-way functions, and LWE), supports polynomially many flames, and super-logarithmic min-entropy of the serial-number distribution. The second, under the stronger assumption of exponentially unforgeable one-shot signatures (instantiable relative to a classical oracle), supports exponentially many flames, and linear min-entropy.