Relational quantum mechanics (RQM) is an interesting alternative to the standard responses to the measurement problem in quantum mechanics. But it suffers from a distinctive kind of epistemic solipsism: an observer can’t in principle know anything beyond their immediate present experience. This makes RQM self-undermining: it takes away the evidence we have for believing in quantum mechanics in the first place. Recently, Adlam and Rovelli have proposed a solution to this problem in the form of a new postulate they call cross-perspective links. Here I argue that this postulate does indeed solve the skeptical problem, but it also removes those aspects of RQM that make it distinctively relational. Nevertheless, the result of equipping RQM with cross-perspective links is an interesting interpretation in its own right.
Convivial Solipsism is easily misunderstood. Because it denies the absoluteness of observed events while preserving the universality of quantum mechanics, it invites objections that are often formulated in a classical, non-perspectival language. Such objections appear powerful only because they smuggle back into the discussion the very assumptions that Convivial Solipsism rejects. This article reconstructs a family of misunderstandings that arise in discussions of Convivial Solipsism, especially in connection with Wigner's friend and extended Wigner's friend scenarios. The aim is not merely defensive. The objections are useful because they identify the conceptual discipline required by any interpretation that takes non-absolute facts seriously. The central claim is that observational facts must be indexed to perspectives. A statement such as "the friend saw outcome A" is not a complete factual statement within Convivial Solipsism. It must be reformulated as "from the friend's perspective, the friend saw outcome A" or "from Wigner's perspective, the friend reported outcome B." The mistake consists in removing these indices and then treating the resulting expressions as if they belonged to a single global factual domain. This leads to apparent contradictions and to false dilemmas concerning consciousness, communication, other minds, and intersubjectivity. When that is taken into account, it appears that Convivial Solipsism is not a retreat into psychological solipsism, but a discipline of perspectival discourse. It is also shown that perspectival logic stands to classical logic as the quantum calculus of probability stands to Kolmogorovian probability theory.
I show how the quantum paradoxes occurring when we adopt a standard realist framework (or a framework in which the collapse implies a physical change of the state of the system) vanish if we abandon the idea that a measurement is related (directly or indirectly) to a physical change of state. In Convivial Solipsism, similarly to Everett’s interpretation, there is no collapse of the wave function. However, contrary to Everett’s interpretation, there is only one world. This also allows us to get rid of any non-locality and to provide a solution to the Wigner’s friend problem and its more recent versions.