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arXiv:2404.17079

Improving device-independent weak coin flipping protocols

Atul Singh Arora, Jamie Sikora, Thomas van Himbeeck

Published Apr 25, 2024• 0 citations
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Abstract

Weak coin flipping is the cryptographic task where Alice and Bob remotely flip a coin but want opposite outcomes. This work studies this task in the device-independent regime where Alice and Bob neither trust each other, nor their quantum devices. The best protocol was devised over a decade ago by Silman, Chailloux, Aharon, Kerenidis, Pironio, and Massar with bias $\varepsilon \approx 0.33664$, where the bias is a commonly adopted security measure for coin flipping protocols. This work presents two techniques to lower the bias of such protocols, namely self-testing and abort-phobic compositions. We apply these techniques to the SCAKPM '11 protocol above and, assuming a continuity conjecture, lower the bias to $\varepsilon \approx 0.29104$. We believe that these techniques could be useful in the design of device-independent protocols for a variety of other tasks. Independently of weak coin flipping, en route to our results, we show how one can test $n-1$ out of $n$ devices, and estimate the performance of the remaining device, for later use in the protocol. The proof uses linear programming and, due to its generality, may find applications elsewhere.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2404.17079

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Weak coin flipping is the cryptographic task where Alice and Bob remotely flip a coin but want opposite outcomes. This work studies this task in the device-independent regime where Alice and Bob neither trust each other, nor their quantum devices. The best protocol was devised over a decade ago by Silman, Chailloux, Aharon, Kerenidis, Pironio, and Massar with bias ε≈0.33664\varepsilon \approx 0.33664ε≈0.33664, where the bias is a commonly adopted security measure for coin flipping protocols. This work presents two techniques to lower the bias of such protocols, namely self-testing and abort-phobic compositions. We apply these techniques to the SCAKPM '11 protocol above and, assuming a continuity conjecture, lower the bias to ε≈0.29104\varepsilon \approx 0.29104ε≈0.29104. We believe that these techniques could be useful in the design of device-independent protocols for a variety of other tasks. Independently of weak coin flipping, en route to our results, we show how one can test n−1n-1n−1 out of nnn devices, and estimate the performance of the remaining device, for later use in the protocol. The proof uses linear programming and, due to its generality, may find applications elsewhere.
Coin-flipping is a fundamental task in two-party cryptography where two remote mistrustful parties wish to generate a shared uniformly random bit. While quantum protocols promising near-perfect security exist for weak coin-flipping -- when the parties want opposing outcomes -- it has been shown that they must be inefficient in terms of their round complexity, and it is an open question of how space efficient they can be. In this work, we consider a variant called cheat-penalised weak coin-flipping in which if a party gets caught cheating, they lose ΛΛΛ points (compared to 000 in the standard definition). We find that already for a small cheating penalty, the landscape of coin-flipping changes dramatically. For example, with Λ=0.01Λ=0.01Λ=0.01, we exhibit a protocol where neither Alice nor Bob can bias the result in their favour beyond 1/2+10−81/2 + 10^{-8}1/2+10−8, which uses 242424 qubits and 101610^{16}1016 rounds of communication (provably 10710^{7}107 times better than any weak coin-flipping protocol with matching security). For the same space requirements, we demonstrate how one can choose between lowering how much a malicious party can bias the result (down to 1/2+10−101/2 + 10^{-10}1/2+10−10) and reducing the rounds of communication (down to 25,18025,18025,180), depending on what is preferred. To find these protocols, we make two technical contributions. First, we extend the point game-protocol correspondence introduced by Kitaev and Mochon, to incorporate: (i) approximate point games, (ii) the cheat-penalised setting, and (iii) round and space complexity. Second, we give the first (to the best of our knowledge) numerical algorithm for constructing (approximate) point games that correspond to high security and low complexity. Our results open up the possibility of having secure and practical quantum protocols for multiparty computation.
This note presents a quantum protocol that demonstrates that weak coin flipping with bias ≈ 0.239, less than 1/4, is possible. A bias of 1/4 was the smallest known, and followed from the strong coin flipping protocol of Ambainis [2]. Protocols with yet smaller bias ≈ 0.207 have independently been discovered [4, 10]. We also present an alternative strong coin flipping protocol with bias 1/4 with analysis simpler than that of [2]. 1 Quantum weak coin flipping Often in applications based on this primitive, coin-flipping is used to choose one of two competing parties as the “winner”. In the classic example from [5], Alice and Bob are getting a divorce, and would like to decide who gets the car. They decide to toss a coin for that purpose, but don’t trust each other. In such a scenario, they could instead play any fair game to decide the issue. Motivated by this, we consider the following weaker version of coin-flipping. A weak coin flipping protocol with bias ǫ, is a two-party communication game in the style of [11], in which the players start with no inputs, and compute a value cA,cB ∈ {0,1} respectively or declare that the other player is cheating. The protocol is deemed successful if Alice and Bob agree on the outcome, i.e. cA = cB.
We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias є if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than 1/2+є. While it is known that all classical protocols have є=1/2, Mochon showed in 2007 that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the former best known explicit protocol has bias 1/6 (also due to Mochon, 2005). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below 1/6. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias down to 1/10. To go lower, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.
In the distrustful quantum cryptography model the parties have conflicting interests and do not trust one another. Nevertheless, they trust the quantum devices in their labs. The aim of the device-independent approach to cryptography is to do away with the latter assumption, and, consequently, significantly increase security. It is an open question whether the scope of this approach also extends to protocols in the distrustful cryptography model, thereby rendering them "fully" distrustful. In this Letter, we show that for bit commitment-one of the most basic primitives within the model-the answer is positive. We present a device-independent (imperfect) bit-commitment protocol, where Alice's and Bob's cheating probabilities are ≃0.854 and 3/4, which we then use to construct a device-independent coin flipping protocol with bias ≲0.336.
We investigate weak coin flipping, a fundamental cryptographic primitive where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit. A cheating player can try to bias the output bit towards a preferred value. For weak coin flipping the players have known opposite preferred values. A weak coin-flipping protocol has a bias ϵ\epsilonϵ if neither player can force the outcome towards their preferred value with probability more than 12+ϵ\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon21​+ϵ. While it is known that all classical protocols have ϵ=12\epsilon=\frac{1}{2}ϵ=21​, Mochon showed in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114] that quantumly weak coin flipping can be achieved with arbitrarily small bias (near perfect) but the best known explicit protocol has bias 1/61/61/6 (also due to Mochon, 2005 [Phys. Rev. A 72, 022341]). We propose a framework to construct new explicit protocols achieving biases below 1/61/61/6. In particular, we construct explicit unitaries for protocols with bias approaching 1/101/101/10. To go below, we introduce what we call the Elliptic Monotone Align (EMA) algorithm which, together with the framework, allows us to numerically construct protocols with arbitrarily small biases.
Weak coin flipping (WCF) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive for two-party secure computation, where two distrustful parties need to remotely establish a shared random bit whilst having opposite preferred outcomes. It is the strongest known primitive with arbitrarily close to perfect security quantumly while classically, its security is completely compromised (unless one makes further assumptions, such as computational hardness). A WCF protocol is said to have bias ϵ\epsilonϵ if neither party can force their preferred outcome with probability greater than 1/2+ϵ1/2+\epsilon1/2+ϵ. Classical WCF protocols are shown to have bias 1/21/21/2, i.e., a cheating party can always force their preferred outcome. On the other hand, there exist quantum WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias, as Mochon showed in his seminal work in 2007 [arXiv:0711.4114]. In particular, he proved the existence of a family of WCF protocols approaching bias ϵ(k)=1/(4k+2)\epsilon (k)=1/(4k+2)ϵ(k)=1/(4k+2) for arbitrarily large kkk and proposed a protocol with bias 1/61/61/6. Last year, Arora, Roland and Weis presented a protocol with bias 1/101/101/10 and to go below this bias, they designed an algorithm that numerically constructs unitary matrices corresponding to WCF protocols with arbitrarily small bias [STOC'19, p.205-216]. In this work, we present new techniques which yield a fully analytical construction of WCF protocols with bias arbitrarily close to zero, thus achieving a solution that has been missing for more than a decade. Furthermore, our new techniques lead to a simplified proof of existence of WCF protocols by circumventing the non-constructive part of Mochon's proof. As an example, we illustrate the construction of a WCF protocol with bias 1/141/141/14.