The election, a cornerstone of democracy, is one of the best-recognizable symbols of democratic governance. Voters' confidence in elections is essential, and these days, we can watch practically in live broadcast what consequences distrust in the fairness of elections may have. From the times of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, it is well-known in the social-choice community that most voting systems are vulnerable to the efforts of various players to influence elections. Luckily for us, computing such influence to affect election outcomes is a hard problem from the computational complexity perspective. This intractability is regarded as a ``complexity shield'' that secures voting rules against this malicious behavior. In this work, we consider quantum computers to be a new threat to the complexity shield described above, as they break out of standard computing paradigms and unlock additional computational resources. To this end, we provide an overview of possible attacks on election, discuss the abilities of quantum computing, and chart possible directions for future research in this area.
The election, a cornerstone of democracy, is one of the best-recognizable symbols of democratic governance. Voters' confidence in elections is essential, and these days, we can watch practically in live broadcast what consequences distrust in the fairness of elections may have. From the times of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, it is well-known in the social-choice community that most voting systems are vulnerable to the efforts of various players to influence elections. Luckily for us, computing such influence to affect election outcomes is a hard problem from the computational complexity perspective. This intractability is regarded as a ``complexity shield'' that secures voting rules against this malicious behavior. In this work, we consider quantum computers to be a new threat to the complexity shield described above, as they break out of standard computing paradigms and unlock additional computational resources. To this end, we provide an overview of possible attacks on election, discuss the abilities of quantum computing, and chart possible directions for future research in this area.
In the realm of algorithmic economics, voting systems are evaluated and compared by examining the properties or axioms they satisfy. While this pursuit has yielded valuable insights, it has also led to seminal impossibility results such as Arrow's and Gibbard-Satterthwaite's Impossibility Theorems, which pose challenges in designing ideal voting systems. Enter the domain of quantum computing: recent advancements have introduced the concept of quantum voting systems, which have many potential applications including in security and blockchain. Building on recent works that bypass Arrow's Impossibility Theorem using quantum voting systems, our research extends Quantum Condorcet Voting (QCV) to counter the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem in a quantum setting. To show this, we introduce a quantum-specific notion of truthfulness, extend ideas like incentive compatibility and the purpose of onto to the quantum domain, and introduce new tools to map social welfare functions to social choice functions in this domain.
Electronic voting (e-voting) has emerged as a transformative technology in the modern digital era. Many countries across the world are using e-voting systems in different types of elections, from political to non-political. One of the primary goals of e-voting is ensuring both verifiability and privacy simultaneously, which we refer to as security. Verifiability is a security feature that guarantees voters can confirm their vote is reflected in the final election result, while privacy guarantees that no one is able to link a vote to the voter who cast it. Verifiability needs to hold only for the duration of the election, whereas privacy needs to extend beyond the election period, even decades after the election. This property, known as everlasting privacy in the literature, ensures that even computationally unbounded adversaries cannot compromise voter privacy, securing elections against future advances in computing, including quantum computing. Researchers have proposed a wide variety of protocols to achieve this ambitious goal in secure e-voting, however, these protocols differ significantly, making the analysis and state-of-the-art complicated. In this thesis, we first address this fragmentation by systematically analyzing all existing e-voting protocols designed to ensure everlasting privacy. We map out the relationships and dependencies among these protocols, evaluate their security and efficiency under realistic assumptions, and identify unresolved challenges in the field. Our work provides a foundational reference for researchers aiming to design secure e-voting systems with everlasting privacy, paving the way for privacypreserving elections in the post-quantum era. Building on these insights, we propose a novel e-voting system that integrates the best practices from prior research while addressing their limitations. Leveraging the Hyperion scheme as a foundation, we develop an enhanced protocol that not only guarantees everlasting privacy but also introduces everlasting receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation. Unlike existing systems like Selene and Hyperion, which rely on computational assumptions for privacy, our protocol offers privacy even against adversaries with unlimited computational power. In secure electronic voting systems with everlasting privacy, the focus is on futureproofing privacy, while sometimes election verifiability relies on the computational soundness of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKP), which are vulnerable to quantum adversaries. Therefore, a key technical challenge is designing e-voting systems with efficient post-quantum cryptographic primitives to secure both privacy and verifiability against quantum attacks. In this thesis, we advance the state of post-quantum ZKPs by focusing on the ZKPs proposed by Jain et al., which are based on the conservative Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption. We optimize the efficiency of these ZKPs, achieve formal security verification using EasyCrypt, and uncover flaws in existing implementations, demonstrating their vulnerability to malicious provers. Additionally, we construct the first code-based ZKP of shuffle, enabling a verifiable and privacy-preserving e-voting protocol with mixing-based tallying. Our e-voting system ensures both verifiability and vote privacy through the computational difficulty of decoding random linear codes, marking it as the first verifiable code-based e-voting system.
Developments in quantum computing may jeopardize the security of internet voting. Such developments could compromise important electoral requirements, including integrity, eligibility, or the secrecy of the vote. Even the contents of a vote cast online today, when quantum computers are not yet known to be available, could be revealed tomorrow. Countries are already working on a post-quantum setting, but elections seem to remain an exception. In this paper, we explore the existing strategies to mitigate the quantum threat or their lack thereof, as well as the views of different stakeholders on these matters. To do so, we have conducted a mix of desk research as well as interviews with 24 experts in different fields, from electoral administrations to cybersecurity agencies, vendors, and academia. We assess their perceptions about quantum computing, its impact on internet voting, and on transitioning towards quantum-resistant cryptography, as well as on interagency cooperation and trust issues. Whereas we initially assumed that elections were an exception in regards to the transition towards post-quantum cryptography, this research shows that the electoral field is neither alone nor the most adequate one to start the implementation of this kind of cryptography.
Ensuring the security and integrity of voting systems is crucial for maintaining democratic processes. With the rise of cyber threats targeting electronic voting, traditional cryptographic methods are proving inadequate in safeguarding against sophisticated attacks. Quantum cryptography, particularly Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), offers a promising solution to enhance the security of voting systems by leveraging the principles of quantum mechanics. This research explores the application of quantum cryptography in secure voting, highlighting its potential to address vulnerabilities in current systems. The study examines the technological, practical, and legal challenges of implementing quantum-based voting systems, including infrastructure requirements and public acceptance. Furthermore, it assesses how quantum cryptography ensures voter privacy, prevents tampering, and provides robust protection against future quantum computing threats. While significant hurdles remain, the integration of quantum cryptographic techniques presents a transformative opportunity to create more secure and transparent voting processes. This paper outlines the roadmap for adopting quantum cryptography in voting systems and its potential impact on electoral integrity.
Quantum information protocols offer significant advantages in properties such as security, anonymity, and privacy for communication and computing tasks. An application where guaranteeing the highest possible security and privacy is critical for democratic societies is electronic voting. As computational power continues to evolve, classical voting schemes may become increasingly vulnerable to information leakage. In this work, we present the experimental demonstration of an information-theoretically secure and efficient electronic voting protocol that, crucially, does not rely on election authorities, leveraging the unique properties of quantum states. Our experiment is based on a high-performance source of Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states and realizes a proof-of-principle implementation of the protocol in two scenarios: a configuration with four voters and two candidates employing privacy enhancement techniques and an election scenario supporting up to eight voters and sixteen candidates. The latter is particularly well-suited for secure board-level elections within organizations or small-scale governmental contexts.
Recent research in 2024 emphasizes post- quantum security techniques to safeguard voting systems from future quantum-based attacks. At the same time, improvements in deep learning-based face authentication have enhanced the accuracy and reliability of voter verification under real-world conditions. Hybrid security models that combine cryptographic methods with face authentication provide stronger protection against unauthorized access and fraud. These systems focus on essential properties such as voter anonymity, data integrity, and end-to-end verifiability.However, challenges including high computational cost, scalability, and real-time implementation continue to be important areas for further research.Moreover, researchers are exploring optimized algorithms to reduce processing time and improve system efficiency. Efforts are also being made to enhance dataset management for accurate face storage and retrieval. Cloud-based implementations are being considered to support large-scale voting environments. These advancements indicate the growing importance of developing practical and scalable secure voting solutions