The distinctive features of quantum mechanics, which set it apart from other physical theories, challenge our notions of realism. Recovering realism from purely philosophical grounds, a quantitative and operational criterion was proposed in the past, but solely for the context of quantum mechanics. We use a framework of generalized probabilistic theories to expand the notion of realism for a theory-independent context, providing a criterion uniquely based on the probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes. More so, using robustness and the Kullback-Leibler divergence, we propose quantifiers for the realism of arbitrary physical properties given a particular state of a generic physical theory. These theory-independent quantifiers are then employed in quantum mechanics and we investigate their relation with another well-established irrealism measure.
The distinctive features of quantum mechanics, which set it apart from other physical theories, challenge our notions of realism. Recovering realism from purely philosophical grounds, a quantitative and operational criterion was proposed in the past, but solely for the context of quantum mechanics. We use a framework of generalized probabilistic theories to expand the notion of realism for a theory-independent context, providing a criterion uniquely based on the probabilities assigned to measurement outcomes. More so, using robustness and the Kullback-Leibler divergence, we propose quantifiers for the realism of arbitrary physical properties given a particular state of a generic physical theory. These theory-independent quantifiers are then employed in quantum mechanics and we investigate their relation with another well-established irrealism measure.
The debate instigated by the seminal works of Einstein, Podolsky, Rosen, and Bell put the notions of realism and nonlocality at the core of almost all philosophical and physical discussions underlying the foundations of quantum mechanics. However, while experimental criteria and quantifiers are by now well established for nonlocality, there is no clear quantitative measure for the degree of reality associated with continuous variables such as position and momentum. This work aims at filling this gap. Considering position and momentum as effectively discrete observables, we implement an operational notion of projective measurement and, from that, a criterion of reality for theses quantities. Then we introduce a quantifier for the degree of irreality of a discretized continuous variable which, when applied to the conjugated pair position-momentum, is shown to obey an uncertainty relation, meaning that quantum mechanics prevents classical realism for conjugated quantities. As an application of our formalism, we study the emergence of elements of reality in an instance where a Gaussian state is submitted to the dissipative dynamics implied by the Caldirola-Kanai Hamiltonian. In particular, at equilibrium, we make some links with the measurement problem and identify aspects that can be taken as the quantum counterpart for the notion of rest.
The article examines the controversial relation of scientific realism with quantum mechanics. To this end, two distinct discussions are invoked: the discussion about ‘realism’ in the context of quantum mechanics and the discussion about ‘scientific realism’ in the context of the general philosophy of science. The aim is to distinguish them in order, first, to argue that the former—revolving around ‘local realism’ and the theorems of Bell and Kochen–Specker—unjustifiably identifies realism with features of a particular worldview, and thereby fosters the impression that the failure of ‘local realism’ in quantum experiments constitutes a failure of scientific realism too; and, second, in light of the latter discussion, to claim that scientific realism and quantum mechanics can be compatible—there is ground for dealing with quantum measurement simply as a physical mind-independent interaction. Therefore, a realist approach to the theory is possible despite its notorious measurement problem, even if the issue of its interpretation is still disputed.
ABSTRACT The paper aims to bridge the history of quantum theory with its philosophical implications. The focus is not only on the scientific underpinnings of quantum mechanics (these theories emerged as ‘ad hoc’ responses to experimental anomalies) but also on the philosophical ramifications of its probabilistic nature and indeterminacy, which differ from classical realism. The paper examines Dirac's, Bell's, and modern views, focusing on how quantum mechanics (QM) challenges traditional notions of causality, objectivity, and truth while embracing epistemological and metaphysical perspectives. Debates over collapse theories and hidden variables are discussed, as well as Putnam's philosophical outlook, which includes his trenchant involvement with realism, logic, and the measurement problem. Finally, the paper proposes that QM represents a philosophical revolution that renews our understanding of reality, knowledge, and scientific explanation, rather than simply serving as a physical theory for assessing the prospects of quantum philosophy by connecting it to broader aspects such as relativity, causality, and scientific realism.
The emergence of an objective reality in line with the laws of the microscopic world has been the focus of longstanding debates. Recent approaches seem to have reached a consensus at least with respect to one aspect, namely, that the encoding of information about a given observable in a physical degree freedom is a necessary condition for such an observable to become an element of the physical reality. Taking this as a fundamental premise and inspired by quantum information theory, here we build an axiomatization for quantum realism---a notion of realism compatible with quantum theory. Our strategy consists of listing some physically motivated principles able to characterize quantum realism in a ``metric'' independent manner. We introduce some criteria defining monotones and measures of realism and then search for potential candidates within some celebrated information theories---those induced by the von Neumann, R\'enyi, and Tsallis entropies. We explicitly construct some classes of entropic quantifiers, among which some are shown to satisfy all the proposed axioms and hence can be taken as faithful estimates for the degree of reality (or definiteness) of a given physical observable. Hopefully, our framework may offer a formal ground for further discussions on foundational aspects of quantum mechanics.
The notion of macroscopic realism has been used in attempts to achieve consistency between physics and everyday experience and to locate some boundary between the realms of classical mechanics and quantum meachanics. Its ostensibly underlying conceptual components, realism and macroscopicity, have most often appeared in the foundations of physics in relation to quantum measurement: reality became a prominent topic of discussion in quantum physics after the notion of element of reality was defined and used by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen in that context, and macroscopicity is often explicitly assumed to be an essential property of any measuring apparatus. However, macroscopicity turns out to be a rather vaguer and less consistently understood notion than typically assumed by physicists who have not explicitly explored the notion themselves. For this reason, it behooves those investigating the foundations of quantum mechanics from a realist perspective to look for alternative notions for grounding quantum measurement. Here, the merits of treating the measuring instrument as a ‘natural kind’ as a means of avoiding anthropocentrism in the foundations of quantum measurement are pointed out as a means of advancing quantum measurement theory.
Dualities in physics have challenged traditional forms of scientific realism by undermining the idea that theories describe a unique underlying ontology. In this paper, we develop a new perspective on scientific realism that responds to this challenge. We argue that while realist commitment remains appropriate at the level of a theory's full formal structure, ontological commitment should be treated as tied to specific empirical contexts rather than to a fixed, real ontology. Our proposal draws inspiration from Dennett's notion of a "compression algorithm" as a defining criterion of a scientific theory. On this basis, we separate realism from ontological commitment. To clarify the stakes of this distinction, we contrast our approach with common core realism, which locates ontology in the invariant structure shared by dual models. Focusing on dualities in quantum mechanics and string theory, we show how our view accommodates ontological pluralism while preserving a robust form of structural realism.