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arXiv:2402.06663

Explainable Adversarial Learning Framework on Physical Layer Secret Keys Combating Malicious Reconfigurable Intelligent Surface

Zhuangkun Wei, Wenxiu Hu, Zhang, Junqing, Guo, Weisi, McCann, Julie

Published Feb 6, 2024• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) can both help and hinder the physical layer secret key generation (PL-SKG) of communications systems. Whilst a legitimate RIS can yield beneficial impacts, including increased channel randomness to enhance PL-SKG, a malicious RIS can poison legitimate channels and crack almost all existing PL-SKGs. In this work, we propose an adversarial learning framework that addresses Man-in-the-middle RIS (MITM-RIS) eavesdropping which can exist between legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob. First, the theoretical mutual information gap between legitimate pairs and MITM-RIS is deduced. From this, Alice and Bob leverage adversarial learning to learn a common feature space that assures no mutual information overlap with MITM-RIS. Next, to explain the trained legitimate common feature generator, we aid signal processing interpretation of black-box neural networks using a symbolic explainable AI (xAI) representation. These symbolic terms of dominant neurons aid the engineering of feature designs and the validation of the learned common feature space. Simulation results show that our proposed adversarial learning- and symbolic-based PL-SKGs can achieve high key agreement rates between legitimate users, and is further resistant to an MITM-RIS Eve with the full knowledge of legitimate feature generation (NNs or formulas). This therefore paves the way to secure wireless communications with untrusted reflective devices in future 6G.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2402.06663

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Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) can both help and hinder the physical layer secret key generation (PL-SKG) of communications systems. Whilst a legitimate RIS can yield beneficial impacts, including increased channel randomness to enhance PL-SKG, a malicious RIS can poison legitimate channels and crack almost all existing PL-SKGs. In this work, we propose an adversarial learning framework that addresses Man-in-the-middle RIS (MITM-RIS) eavesdropping which can exist between legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob. First, the theoretical mutual information gap between legitimate pairs and MITM-RIS is deduced. From this, Alice and Bob leverage adversarial learning to learn a common feature space that assures no mutual information overlap with MITM-RIS. Next, to explain the trained legitimate common feature generator, we aid signal processing interpretation of black-box neural networks using a symbolic explainable AI (xAI) representation. These symbolic terms of dominant neurons aid the engineering of feature designs and the validation of the learned common feature space. Simulation results show that our proposed adversarial learning- and symbolic-based PL-SKGs can achieve high key agreement rates between legitimate users, and is further resistant to an MITM-RIS Eve with the full knowledge of legitimate feature generation (NNs or formulas). This therefore paves the way to secure wireless communications with untrusted reflective devices in future 6G.
Reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) can both help and hinder the physical layer secret key generation (PL-SKG) of communications systems. Whilst a legitimate RIS can yield beneficial impacts, including increased channel randomness to enhance PL-SKG, a malicious RIS can poison legitimate channels and crack almost all existing PL-SKGs. In this work, we propose an adversarial learning framework that addresses Man-in-the-middle RIS (MITM-RIS) eavesdropping which can exist between legitimate parties, namely Alice and Bob. First, the theoretical mutual information gap between legitimate pairs and MITM-RIS is deduced. From this, Alice and Bob leverage adversarial learning to learn a common feature space that assures no mutual information overlap with MITM-RIS. Next, to explain the trained legitimate common feature generator, we aid signal processing interpretation of black-box neural networks using a symbolic explainable AI (xAI) representation. These symbolic terms of dominant neurons aid the engineering of feature designs and the validation of the learned common feature space. Simulation results show that our proposed adversarial learning- and symbolic-based PL-SKGs can achieve high key agreement rates between legitimate users, and is further resistant to an MITM-RIS Eve with the full knowledge of legitimate feature generation (NNs or formulas). This therefore paves the way to secure wireless communications with untrusted reflective devices in future 6G.
The development of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RIS) has recently advanced the research of physical layer security (PLS). Beneficial impacts of RIS include but are not limited to offering a new degree-of-freedom (DoF) for key-less PLS optimization, and increasing channel randomness for physical layer secret key generation (PL-SKG). However, there is a lack of research studying how adversarial RIS can be used to attack and obtain legitimate secret keys generated by PL-SKG. In this work, we show an Eve-controlled adversarial RIS (Eve-RIS), by inserting into the legitimate channel a random and reciprocal channel, can partially reconstruct the secret keys from the legitimate PL-SKG process. To operationalize this concept, we design Eve-RIS schemes against two PL-SKG techniques used: (i) the CSI-based PL-SKG, and (ii) the two-way cross multiplication based PL-SKG. The channel probing at Eve-RIS is realized by compressed sensing designs with a small number of radio-frequency (RF) chains. Then, the optimal RIS phase is obtained by maximizing the Eve-RIS inserted deceiving channel. Our analysis and results show that even with a passive RIS, our proposed Eve-RIS can achieve a high key match rate with legitimate users, and is resistant to most of the current defensive approaches. This means the novel Eve-RIS provides a new eavesdropping threat on PL-SKG, which can spur new research areas to counter adversarial RIS attacks.
Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) is acknowledged as a promising technique in improving physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG) performance by enhancing the randomness of radio electromagnetic environment. However, RIS can also be adopted by illegal eavesdropper to destroy the channel reciprocity between key-sharing parties. Thus, there is a tradeoff between the enhanced randomness and the decreased channel reciprocity with the application of RIS. This paper aims to answer the question that whether the adversarial RIS is harmful to SKG by studying the SKG performance in the RIS scenario where Alice and Eve each applies a RIS. To this end, the closed-form expression for the upper bound of secret key rate (SKR) and expressions for the autocorrelation coefficients of two probing channel samples within a coherent duration are provided. Results show that the relative positions of Eve and adversarial RIS to Alice and Bob play a key role in determining whether the adversarial RIS is harmful or beneficial to the PHY SKG system.
Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) has been shown as a promising technique to increase the channel randomness for secret key generation (SKG) in low-entropy channels (e.g., static or line-of-sight (LoS)), without small-scale fading. In this letter, we show that even with the aid of RIS, collaborative eavesdroppers (Eves) can still estimate the legitimate Alice-Bob channel and erode their secret key rates (SKRs), since the RIS induced randomness is also reflected in the Eves’ observations. Conditioned on Eves’ observations, if the entropy of RIS-combined legitimate channel is zero, Eves are able to estimate it and its secret key. Leveraging this, we design a multi-Eve scheme against the RIS-secured LoS dominated scenarios, by using the multiple Eves’ observations to reconstruct the RIS-combined legitimate channel. We further deduce a closed-form secret key leakage rate under our designed multi-Eve scheme, and demonstrate the results via simulations.
Physical-layer security (PLS) is superior to classical cryptography techniques due to its notion of perfect secrecy and independence to an eavesdropper's computational power. One form of PLS arises when Alice and Bob (the legitimate users) exchange signals to extract a common key from the random common channels. The drawback of extracting keys from wireless channels is the ample dependence on the dynamicity and fluctuations of the radio channel. However, some radio channels are constant such as line-of-sight (LoS) and can be estimated by Eve (an illegitimate user), or can be quite static in behavior due to the presence low-mobility users thus restricting the amount of randomness. This in turn lowers the secret key rate (SKR) defined as the number of bits of key generated per channel use. In this work, we aim to address this challenge by using a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) to produce random phases at certain carefully curated intervals such that it disrupts the channel in low-entropy environments. We propose an RIS assisted key generation method, study its performance, and compare with benchmarks to observe the benefit of using an RIS while considering various important metrics such as key mismatch rate and average secret key throughput. Simulations are made to validate our theoretical findings showing an improvement in performance when an RIS is deployed.
Reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) has been widely studied as a promising approach in improving secret key rate (SKR) for physical layer (PHY) secret key generation (SKG). Existing RIS-assisted PHY SKG studies mainly focus on improving the SKR by optimizing RIS phase. However, RIS can also be exploited by active attackers to contaminate the channel probing. As a result, there is a trade-off between the increased randomness and the improved correlation between legitimate channels and eavesdropping channels in a RIS-assisted SKG system under channel contamination. In this paper, we study the impact of RIS on PHY SKG by analyzing the SKR performance. A closed-form expression for the lower-bound of secret key capacity is obtained. Theoretical analysis shows that gains of legitimate channel, eavesdropping channel, and RIS-induced channels are key parameters in determining whether the assisting RIS is beneficial or harmful to the PHY SKG. Further, a SKR maximization problem under channel contamination is proposed and solved. Results show that the assisting RIS is definitely harmful to the SKG when the gain ratio of legitimate channel and eavesdropping channel is reduced with the leverage of RIS, while it can significantly improve the SKR with an optimized RIS phase when the gain ratio is improved with the help of RIS.