Quantum communications are based on the law of physics for information security and the implications for this form of future information security enabled by quantum science has to be studied. Physics-based vulnerabilities may exist due to the inherent physics properties and behavior of quantum technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), thus resulting in new threats that may emerge with attackers exploiting the physics-based vulnerabilities. There were many studies and experiments done to demonstrate the threat of physics-based attacks on quantum links. However, there is a lack of a framework that provides a common language to communicate about the threats and type of adversaries being dealt with for physics-based attacks. This paper is a review of physics-based attacks that were being investigated and attempt to initialize a framework based on the attack objectives and methodologies, referencing the concept from the well-established MITRE ATT&CK, therefore pioneering the classification of Indicator of Compromises (IoCs) for physics-based attacks. This paper will then pave the way for future work in the development of a forensic tool for the different classification of IoCs, with the methods of evidence collections and possible points of extractions for analysis being further investigated.
Quantum communications are based on the law of physics for information security and the implications for this form of future information security enabled by quantum science has to be studied. Physics-based vulnerabilities may exist due to the inherent physics properties and behavior of quantum technologies such as Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), thus resulting in new threats that may emerge with attackers exploiting the physics-based vulnerabilities. There were many studies and experiments done to demonstrate the threat of physics-based attacks on quantum links. However, there is a lack of a framework that provides a common language to communicate about the threats and type of adversaries being dealt with for physics-based attacks. This paper is a review of physics-based attacks that were being investigated and attempt to initialize a framework based on the attack objectives and methodologies, referencing the concept from the well-established MITRE ATT&CK, therefore pioneering the classification of Indicator of Compromises (IoCs) for physics-based attacks. This paper will then pave the way for future work in the development of a forensic tool for the different classification of IoCs, with the methods of evidence collections and possible points of extractions for analysis being further investigated.
Recent advances in quantum technology and the potential that practical quantum computers may become a reality in the future have led to renewed interest in developing cryptographic technologies that are secure against conventional and quantum attacks. Currently, virtually all asymmetric cryptographic schemes in use are threatened by the potential development of powerful quantum computers. Post-quantum cryptography is one of main the ways to combat this threat. Its security is based on the complexity of mathematical problems that are currently considered unsolvable efficiently, even with the help of quantum computers. The security of information systems is ensured through protection against various threats that use system vulnerabilities. Security protocols are the building blocks of secure communication. They implement security mechanisms to provide security services. Security protocols are considered abstract when analyzed, but may have additional vulnerabilities in implementation. This work contains a holistic study of security protocols. Basics of security protocols, taxonomy of attacks on security protocols and their implementation are considered, as well as various methods and models of protocol security analysis. In particular, the differences between information-theoretic and computational security, computational and symbolic models are specified. In addition, an overview of the computational security models for Authenticated Key Exchange (AKE) and Password Authentication Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols is provided. The most important security models for the AKE and PAKE protocols were also described. With the emergence of new technologies that may have different security requirements, as well as with increased opportunities for competition, there is always a need to develop new protocols. Thus, the purpose of this article is to review, classify, analyze, and research the vulnerabilities of information systems from classical, quantum, and special attacks, performed taking into account the forecast regarding the possibilities of attacks on post-quantum cryptographic transformations; studying security assessment models for existing cryptographic protocols, as well as reviewing and benchmarking security models and providing suggestions for protection against existing potential attacks.
The integration of quantum computing into governmental and business processes has raised concerns about potential threats to these systems. To address this, we introduce a novel extension of the MITRE ATT&CK framework, QATT&CK, which provides an extended taxonomy for classifying adversarial Tactics and Techniques in quantum cybersecurity. Our adapted framework bridges the definitions of traditional cybersecurity with a focus on quantum computing infrastructure, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of adversarial behavior in this domain. To evaluate our proposed framework, we leverage current and ongoing research in quantum cyber threats, mapping real-world attacks to our taxonomy to demonstrate its effectiveness in identifying and categorizing emerging quantum-specific threats. This evaluation highlights the utility of QATT&CK in addressing the unique challenges posed by quantum computing, ensuring organizations are better equipped to defend against adversarial actions targeting these advanced systems.
Abstract This paper presents a formal adversarial methodology, Quantum Adversarial Physics (QAP), for red teaming quantum communication systems, with a focus on Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) and related quantum protocols. Rather than treating quantum mechanical principles as immutable security guarantees, QAP operationalises them as adversarial variables: coherence times, entanglement correlations, and entropy flows are each reframed as exploitable attack surfaces. The methodology introduces a structured red team lifecycle, a formally grounded threat model, a phase-by-phase attack taxonomy with feasibility assessment, an attack–defence correspondence table, and a principled vulnerability scoring system. This work provides practitioners with a repeatable, physics-aware process for assessing the real-world resilience of quantum systems.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) promises secure communication by leveraging quantum principles. Although there has been significant theoretical research conducted in the field of QKD. However, it is still an emerging frontier in the realm of practical implementation. The absence of standardization exposes several vulnerabilities in both quantum and classical spectrums. In this paper, we present a comprehensive review of the Q KD vulnerabilities and attack models published from the past decade and classify them within a taxonomy. By bridging theory and practice, we aim to improve the practical security of Q KD against threats and pave the way for robust quantum communication.
Abstract: Abstract. This study investigates how Quantum Key Distribution serves as a novel cryptographic methodology utilizing quantum physics principles to counter contemporary cybersecurity challenges. QKD's intrinsic characteristics provide exceptional resistance to conventional intrusion methods while delivering encryption strength that cannot be mathematically compromised. Our analysis examines QKD protocol behavior under diverse threat conditions within mod ern digital ecosystems. We concentrate on implementation-level weaknesses, especially those targeting physical elements like photon detection systems, to identify security gaps and develop mitigation approaches. Furthermore, we investigate the complexity of integrating QKD with legacy communication systems, analyzing vulnerabilities at the intersection of quantum and classical technologies while recommending protective mechanisms for these transitional zones.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a new way of sharing secret cryptographic keys with unconditional security by means of encoding of secret bits in quantum particles like photons. There are various potential security holes in the practical implementations of QKD, which may be exploited by the adversary to attack the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the scheme. This paper is an attempt to present various constraints, possible attacks and countermeasures on practical QKD systems. The paper classifies the already known attacks strategies and shows how these attacks may compromise the security QKD, while utilizing it as part of secure communication scheme in practice.