Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a method of ensuring security using the laws of physics, avoiding the risks inherent in cryptosystems protected by computational complexity. Here, the authors investigate the feasibility of satellite‐based quantum key exchange using low‐cost compact nano‐satellites. The first prototype of system level quantum key distribution aimed at the Cube satellite scenario is demonstrated. It consists of a transmitter payload, a ground receiver and simulated free space channel to verify the timing and synchronisation (T&S) scheme designed for QKD and the required high loss tolerance of both QKD and T&S channels. The transmitter is designed to be deployed on various up‐coming nano‐satellite missions in the UK and internationally. The effects of channel loss, background noise, gate width and mean photon number on the secure key rate (SKR) and quantum bit error rate (QBER) are discussed. The authors also analyse the source of QBER and establish the relationship between effective signal noise ratio (ESNR) and noise level, signal strength, gating window and other parameters as a reference for SKR optimisation. The experiment shows that it can tolerate the 40 dB loss expected in space to ground QKD and with small adjustment decoy states can be achieved. The discussion offers valuable insight not only for the design and optimisation of miniature low‐cost satellite‐based QKD systems but also any other short or long range free space QKD on the ground or in the air.
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) provides a method of ensuring security using the laws of physics, avoiding the risks inherent in cryptosystems protected by computational complexity. Here, the authors investigate the feasibility of satellite‐based quantum key exchange using low‐cost compact nano‐satellites. The first prototype of system level quantum key distribution aimed at the Cube satellite scenario is demonstrated. It consists of a transmitter payload, a ground receiver and simulated free space channel to verify the timing and synchronisation (T&S) scheme designed for QKD and the required high loss tolerance of both QKD and T&S channels. The transmitter is designed to be deployed on various up‐coming nano‐satellite missions in the UK and internationally. The effects of channel loss, background noise, gate width and mean photon number on the secure key rate (SKR) and quantum bit error rate (QBER) are discussed. The authors also analyse the source of QBER and establish the relationship between effective signal noise ratio (ESNR) and noise level, signal strength, gating window and other parameters as a reference for SKR optimisation. The experiment shows that it can tolerate the 40 dB loss expected in space to ground QKD and with small adjustment decoy states can be achieved. The discussion offers valuable insight not only for the design and optimisation of miniature low‐cost satellite‐based QKD systems but also any other short or long range free space QKD on the ground or in the air.
Abstract Satellite-based quantum terminals are a feasible way to extend the reach of quantum communication protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to the global scale. To that end, prior demonstrations have shown QKD transmissions from airborne platforms to receivers on ground, but none have shown QKD transmissions from ground to a moving aircraft, the latter scenario having simplicity and flexibility advantages for a hypothetical satellite. Here, we demonstrate QKD from a ground transmitter to a receiver prototype mounted on an airplane in flight. We have specifically designed our receiver prototype to consist of many components that are compatible with the environment and resource constraints of a satellite. Coupled with our relocatable ground station system, optical links with distances of 3–10 km were maintained and quantum signals transmitted while traversing angular rates similar to those observed of low-Earth-orbit satellites. For some passes of the aircraft over the ground station, links were established within 10 s of position data transmission, and with link times of a few minutes and received quantum bit error rates typically ≈3%–5% , we generated secure keys up to 868 kb in length. By successfully generating secure keys over several different pass configurations, we demonstrate the viability of technology that constitutes a quantum receiver satellite payload and provide a blueprint for future satellite missions to build upon.
Abstract The quantum communication channel is considered to be eavesdropped when the signal Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) exceeds a defined theoretical limit and is thus considered a figure of merit parameter for assessing the security of a quantum channel. This work presents a general mathematical model considering device imperfections and various sources of errors for estimating signal QBER in polarisation encoded satellite‐based QKD systems. QBER performance for satellite‐to‐ground downlink scenarios has been investigated for multiple sky brightness conditions (day time and night time operations), two operating wavebands: 800 and 1550 nm as well as for different quantum transmitter and quantum receiver architectures. Further, a novel QBER estimation analysis for inter‐satellite QKD links has also been presented. The estimation results obtained from the developed model have been validated against and found in good agreement with the measured results of the only reported satellite‐to‐ground QKD experiments till date. The presented QBER modelling and analysis will aid in system engineering and efficient design of future satellite‐based QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables tap-proof exchange of cryptographic keys guaranteed by the very laws of physics. One of the last remaining roadblocks on the way towards widespread deployment of QKD is the high loss experienced during terrestrial distribution of photons, which limits the distance between the communicating parties. A viable solution to this problem is to avoid the terrestrial distribution of photons via optical fibers altogether and instead transmit them via satellite links, where the loss is dominated by diffraction instead of absorption and scattering. First dedicated satellite missions have demonstrated the feasibility of this approach, albeit with relatively low secure key rates. In order for QKD to become commercially viable, the design of future satellite missions must be focused on achieving higher key rates at lower system costs. Current satellite missions are already operating at almost optimal system parameters, which leaves little room for enhancing the key rates with currently deployed technology. Instead, fundamentally new techniques are required to drastically reduce the costs per secret bit shared between two distant parties. Entanglement-based protocols provide the highest level of security and offer several pathways for increasing the key rate by exploiting the underlying quantum correlations. In this contribution, we review the most relevant advances in entanglement-based QKD which are implementable over free-space links and thus enable distribution of secure keys from orbit. The development of satellite missions is notoriously lengthy. Possible candidates for a new generation of quantum payloads should therefore be scrutinized as early as possible in order to advance the development of quantum technologies for space applications.
ABSTRACT Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows the generation of cryptographic keys beyond the computational hardness paradigm and is befitting for secure data transmission requiring long‐term security. The communication distance of fiber‐based QKD, however, is limited to a few hundred kilometers due to the exponential scaling of signal attenuation. Satellite QKD (SatQKD) can instead leverage free‐space optical links to establish long‐range connections and enable global‐scale QKD. In this work, we review the manifold of design choices that concur to form the set of possible SatQKD architectures. These include the choice of the QKD protocol and its physical implementation, but also the satellite orbit, the optical link direction, and whether or not to use trusted‐node relays. The possible SatQKD architectures are then evaluated in terms of key generation throughput, latency and maximum reachable communication distance, but also system‐level security and implementation complexity. Given the technical challenges of realizing SatQKD systems, it is paramount, for near‐future satellite missions, to adhere to the simplest possible architecture that still allows to deliver the QKD service. We thus identify as advisable options the use of low‐Earth orbit satellites as trusted nodes for prepare‐and‐measure discrete‐variable QKD downlinks with weak laser pulses. The decoy‐state version of BB84 is found to be the most promising QKD protocols due to the maturity of the security proofs, the high key generation rate, and low system complexity. These findings are confirmed by the multitude of current and planned SatQKD missions that are adopting these architectural choices.
Abstract The authors present a novel approach to Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) research, emphasising cost‐effectiveness and practicality using a single photon polarisation‐encoded system employing mainly commercial off‐the‐shelf components. This study diverges from previous high‐cost, high‐end setups by exploring the viability of QKD in more accessible and realistic settings. Our approach focuses on practical measurements of the signal‐to‐noise ratio by analysing polarisation‐encoded photonic qubits over various transmission scenarios. The authors introduce a simplified evaluation method that incorporates experimental measurements, such as noise sources and losses, into a semi‐empirical theoretical framework. This framework simulates the standard DS‐BB84 protocol to estimate Secure Key Rates (SKRs), offering an alternative approach on the evaluation of the practical implementation of QKD. Specifically, the authors examine the feasibility of QKD over a 2.2 km intra‐campus fibre link in coexistence scenarios, identifying optimal Wavelength‐Division Multiplexing allocations to minimise Raman noise, achieving an expected SKR of up to 300 bps. Additionally, the authors’ study extends to 40 m indoor and 100 m outdoor Free‐Space Optical (FSO) links using low‐cost components, where the authors recorded Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) values below 3.2%, allowing for possible SKRs up to 600 bps even in daylight operation. The converged fibre/FSO scenario demonstrated robust performance, with QBER values below 3.7% and an expected SKR of over 200 bps. Our research bridges the gap between high‐end and economical QKD solutions, providing valuable insights into the feasibility of QKD in everyday scenarios, especially within metropolitan fibre based and FSO links. By leveraging cost‐effective components and a simplified single photon exchange setup, the authors work paves the way for the effortless characterisation of deployed infrastructure, highlighting its potential in diverse settings and its accessibility for widespread implementation.
Information security is a growing concern in our modern world, where almost everything can be done online. To protect security, classical encryption protocols, such as RSA, are used. These encryption protocols are almost always based on mathematical problems that are computational difficult. Therefore, the security is only valid under limited computational resources, and therefore do not provide provable security. An exception is the one-time pad protocol, which is provably secure but requires an existing shared key that is as long as the information it must encrypt. The exchange of such a key can be challenging, often requiring the two partied to physically meet to exchange the key or the use a trusted courier to physically carry the key on a hard drive. \n \nQuantum key distribution (QKD) offers a solution by utilizing quantum mechanics to grow a secure cryptographic key shared between two distant parties. The quantum nature of the particles used in the exchange ensure that any eavesdropper would leave signs of their presence, allowing the users to precisely quantify the security of the key that is produced. This allows secure generation of a random key which can be used for the one-time pad encryption protocol which, unlike most encryption protocols, does not rely on computational assumptions, and is secure regardless of available computational power. \n \nCurrent implementations of QKD are limited to a single link distance of ≈200 km, preventing implementation of QKD on a global scale, or even between distant cities within a single country, without some additional techniques. One promising solution is the use of orbiting low Earth orbit satellite platforms as trusted nodes in a quantum communications network. The main purpose of this work has been to show the viability of this solution, trough theoretical performance modeling and experimental demonstrations. \n \nThorough numerical simulations have been developed to evaluate the performance and challenges in implementing QKD using a low Earth orbit satellite platform and determine an optimal approach to its implementation. The simulations include a realistic satellite orbit analysis, all expected loss mechanisms, estimates of background contributions and realistic simulation of quantum optical processes. This work addresses the questions of optimal wavelength and beam waist, the effect of the telescope design and pointing error, and the impact of detector degradation due to exposure to radiation in the space environment. The simulation is used to determine the length of secure key for QKD and the performance of fundamental quantum optics experiments such as Bell tests and quantum teleportation. We compare the advantages and disadvantages of uplink and dowlink scenarios, and show that an uplink, despite having reduced performance compared to a downlink, offers more scientific freedom, by allowing changes to the quantum source, and benefits from a simpler satellite design with reduced pointing requirement. This work provides a theoretical foundation for ongoing design and development of quantum systems for satellite implementation of QKD. \n \nIn addition to theoretical analyses, experiments where developed and conducted corresponding to the challenges likely to be faced by a satellite uplink. Two main challenges where identified and experimentally overcome. First, the difficulty of operating in the high loss regime of a satellite uplink, which typically experience losses in the range of 40-50 dB when above 40° of elevation from the horizon, an elevation only reached by half of the satellite passes. This challenge was addressed by demonstrating full QKD protocols at losses exceeding 50 dB. Also, the ability to perform full QKD during the short duration of a satellite pass was shown by replicating the varying loss of archetypal passes and successfully extracting secure keys. Secondly, the difficulty of accurately tracking and pointing to a receiver platform traveling at the high angular speed of a satellite was overcome by successfully exchange quantum signals to a truck traveling at angular speeds exceeding that of a low Earth orbit satellite. This required the design, construction, and implementation of a transmitter system and a quantum receiver system capable of active pointing using a custom pointing system. \n \nAn additional experiment was also performed where we experimentally investigate the feasibility of performing QKD using light scattered by a diffusive screen. A system capable of doing so could be used to create QKD hot-spots, where a QKD source could be aimed at a diffusive screen to allow multiple users to simultaneously exchange secure keys with the source without the need for high precision pointing. \n \nThrough these analyses and experimental demonstrations we evaluated the performance of QKD using a satellite and have shown its technological readiness to be implemented. Implementation of such a system would allow QKD to be performed on a global scale, enabling communications security that is not based on computational assumptions without the need to physically transport the key from one party to the other.