Macro-realistic description of systems is based majorly on two basic intuitions about the classical world, namely, macrorealism per se, that is, the system is always in a distinct state, and non-invasive measurements, that is, measurements do not disturb the system. Given the assumption of no-signaling in time, one utilizes Leggett–Garg inequalities to observe a violation of macroscopic realism, which requires at least three measurements. In this work, we show that if one has access to shared randomness, then one can observe a violation of macroscopic realism using a single measurement even if no signaling in time is satisfied. Interestingly, using the proposed scheme one can also rule out a larger class of models, which we term macroscopic no-signaling theories that cannot violate the no-signaling in time conditions. We further construct a witness to observe the violation of macroscopic no-signaling.
Macro-realistic description of systems is based majorly on two basic intuitions about the classical world, namely, macrorealism per se, that is, the system is always in a distinct state, and non-invasive measurements, that is, measurements do not disturb the system. Given the assumption of no-signaling in time, one utilizes Leggett–Garg inequalities to observe a violation of macroscopic realism, which requires at least three measurements. In this work, we show that if one has access to shared randomness, then one can observe a violation of macroscopic realism using a single measurement even if no signaling in time is satisfied. Interestingly, using the proposed scheme one can also rule out a larger class of models, which we term macroscopic no-signaling theories that cannot violate the no-signaling in time conditions. We further construct a witness to observe the violation of macroscopic no-signaling.
Macroscopic realism is the thesis that macroscopically observable properties must always have definite values. The idea was introduced by Leggett and Garg (1985), who wished to show a conflict with the predictions of quantum theory, by using it to derive an inequality that quantum theory violates. However, Leggett and Garg's analysis required not just the assumption of macroscopic realism per se, but also that the observable properties could be measured non-invasively. In recent years there has been increasing interest in experimental tests of the violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality, but it has remained a matter of controversy whether this second assumption is a reasonable requirement for a macroscopic realist view of quantum theory. In a recent critical assessment Maroney and Timpson (2014) identified three different categories of macroscopic realism, and argued that only the simplest category could be ruled out by Leggett-Garg inequality violations. Allen, Maroney, and Gogioso (2016) then showed that the second of these approaches was also incompatible with quantum theory in Hilbert spaces of dimension 4 or higher. However, we show that the distinction introduced by Maroney and Timpson between the second and third approaches is not noise tolerant, so unfortunately Allen's result, as given, is not directly empirically testable. In this paper we replace Maroney and Timpson's three categories with a parameterization of macroscopic realist models, which can be related to experimental observations in a noise tolerant way, and recover the original definitions in the noise-free limit. We show how this parameterization can be used to experimentally rule out classes of macroscopic realism in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or higher, without any use of the non-invasive measurability assumption. Even for relatively low precision experiments, this will rule out the original category of macroscopic realism, that is tested by the Leggett-Garg inequality, while as the precision of the experiments increases, all cases of the second category and many cases of the third category, will become experimentally ruled out.
Macroscopic realism is a set of assumptions about how we experience the world at a classical level. While the Leggett-Garg inequalities are temporal correlations that are violated by quantum systems not obeying such macrorealism, the no-signaling in time condition is also a necessary condition. This compares measurement outcomes with and without prior measurements. As dynamics and correlations play a central role in these measures, this paper explores the effects of regular versus chaotic dynamics on the violations of macroscopic realism. We observe a close connection between a 3 point out-of-time-order correlator and the conditional probabilities of measurement, and we find unmistakable imprints of chaos on the violations of macrorealism. We provide qualitative semiclassical reasoning for the numerical results involving a kicked top, and for two important initial states that behave very differently.
Macroscopic realism, the classical world view that macroscopic objects exist independently of and are not influenced by measurements, is usually tested using Leggett-Garg inequalities. Recently, another necessary condition called no-signaling in time (NSIT) has been proposed as a witness for nonclassical behavior. In this paper, we show that a combination of NSIT conditions is not only necessary but also sufficient for a macrorealistic description of a physical system. Any violation of macroscopic realism must therefore be witnessed by a suitable NSIT condition. Subsequently, we derive an operational formulation for NSIT in terms of positive operator-valued measures and the system Hamiltonian. We argue that this leads to a suitable definition of ``classical'' measurements and Hamiltonians, and we apply our formalism to some generic coarse-grained quantum measurements.
Abstract The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequalities were introduced, as a temporal parallel of the Bell inequalities, to test macroscopic realism – the view that a macroscopic system evolving in time possesses definite properties which can be determined without disturbing the future or past state. The original LG inequalities are only a necessary condition for macrorealism, and are therefore not a decisive test. We argue, for the case of measurements of a single dichotomic variable Q, that when the original four three-time LG inequalities are augmented with a set of twelve two-time inequalities also of the LG form, Fine’s theorem applies and these augmented conditions are then both necessary and sufficient. A comparison is carried out with the alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for macrorealism based on no-signaling in time conditions which ensure that all probabilities for Q at one and two times are independent of whether earlier or intermediate measurements are made. We argue that the two tests differ in their implementation of the key requirement of non-invasive measurability so are testing different notions of macrorealism, and these notions are elucidated.
While quantum theory has been tested to an incredible degree on microscopic scales, quantum effects are seldom observed in our everyday macroscopic world. The curious results of applying quantum mechanics to macroscopic objects are perhaps best illustrated by Erwin Schrödinger's famous thought experiment, where a cat can be put into a superposition state of being both dead and alive. Obviously, these quantum predictions are in stark contradiction to our common experience. Even with plenty of theoretical explanations put forward to explain this discrepancy, a large number of questions about the frontier between the quantum and the classical world remain unanswered. To distinguish between classical and quantum behavior, two fundamental concepts inherent to classical physics have been established over the years: The world view of local realism limits the power of classical experiments to establish correlations over space, while the world view of macroscopic realism (or macrorealism) restricts temporal correlations. Necessary conditions for both world views have been formulated in the form of Bell and Leggett-Garg inequalities, and Bell inequalities have been shown to be violated by quantum mechanics through increasingly conclusive experiments. Furthermore, many challenging steps towards convincing violations of macrorealism have been taken in a number of recent experiments. In the first part of this thesis, conditions for macrorealism are analyzed in detail. Two necessary conditions for macrorealism, the original Leggett-Garg inequality and the recently proposed no-signaling in time condition, are presented. It is then shown that a combination of no-signaling in time conditions is not only necessary but also sufficient for the existence of a macrorealistic description. Finally, an operational formulation of no-signaling in time, in terms of positive-operator valued measurements and Hamiltonians, is derived. In the next part, we argue that these results lead to a suitable definition of classical behavior. In particular, we provide a formalism to judge the classicality of measurements and time evolutions. We then proceed to apply it to a number of exemplary measurement operators and Hamiltonians. Finally, we argue for the importance of spontaneously realized Hamiltonians in our intuition of classical behavior. Next, differences between local realism and macrorealism are analyzed. For this purpose, the probability polytopes for spatially and temporally separated experiments are compared, and a fundamental difference in the power of quantum mechanics to build both types of correlations is discovered. This result shows that Fine's theorem, which states that a set of Bell inequalities is necessary and sufficient for local realism, is not transferable to macrorealism. Thus, (Leggett-Garg) inequalities are in principle not well-suited for tests of macrorealism, as they can never form a necessary and sufficient condition, and unnecessarily restrict the violating parameter space. No-signaling in time is both better suited and more strongly motivated from the underlying physical theory. In the final part of this thesis, a concrete experimental setup for implementing quantum experiments with macroscopic objects is proposed. It consists of a superconducting micro-sphere in the Meißner state, which is levitated by magnetic fields. Through its expelled magnetic field, the sphere's center-of-mass motion couples to a superconducting quantum circuit. Properly tuned, ground state cooling can be realized, since the sphere's motion is extremely well isolated from the surrounding environment. This setup therefore is a promising candidate for the observation of quantum effects in macroscopic systems.
Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.