Quantum digital signature (QDS) is the quantum version of its classical counterpart and can offer security against attacks of repudiation, signature forging, and external eavesdropping on the basis of quantum-mechanical no-go principles. Here we propose a QDS scheme based on quantum counterfactuality, which leverages the concept of interaction-free measurement. Employing the idea behind twin-field cryptography, we show how this two-way protocol can be turned into an equivalent noncounterfactual, one-way protocol that is both more practical and also theoretically helpful in assessing the experimental feasibility of the first protocol. The proposed QDS protocol can be experimentally implemented with current quantum technology. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Quantum digital signature (QDS) is the quantum version of its classical counterpart and can offer security against attacks of repudiation, signature forging, and external eavesdropping on the basis of quantum-mechanical no-go principles. Here we propose a QDS scheme based on quantum counterfactuality, which leverages the concept of interaction-free measurement. Employing the idea behind twin-field cryptography, we show how this two-way protocol can be turned into an equivalent noncounterfactual, one-way protocol that is both more practical and also theoretically helpful in assessing the experimental feasibility of the first protocol. The proposed QDS protocol can be experimentally implemented with current quantum technology. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Digital signatures guarantee the authenticity and transferability of messages and are widely used in modern communication. The security of currently used classical digital signature schemes, however, relies on computational assumptions. In contrast, quantum digital signature (QDS) schemes offer information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. We present two QDS protocols which have the same experimental requirements as quantum key distribution, which is already commercially available. We also give a security proof for the presented QDS schemes against coherent forging attacks.
Digital signature is a key technique in information security, especially for identity authentications. Compared to classical correspondence, quantum digital signatures (QDSs) provide a considerably higher level of security. At present, its performance is limited by key generation protocols, which are fundamentally limited in terms of channel capacity. Based on the idea of twin-field quantum key distribution, this Letter presents a twin-field QDS protocol and details a corresponding security analysis. In its distribution stage, a specific key generation protocol, the sending-or-not-sending twin-field protocol, has been adopted. Besides, we present a systematic model to evaluate the performance of a QDS protocol and compare the performance of our protocol to other typical QDS protocols. Numerical simulation results show that the new protocol exhibits outstanding security and practicality compared to other existing protocols. Therefore, our protocol paves the way toward real-world applications of QDSs.
Quantum digital signatures (QDS) are able to verify the authenticity and integrity of a message in modern communication. However, the current QDS protocols are restricted by the fundamental rate-loss bound and the secure signature distance cannot be further improved. We propose a twin-field quantum digital signature (TF-QDS) protocol with fully discrete phase randomization and investigate its performance under the two-intensity decoy-state setting. For better performance, we optimize intensities of the signal state and the decoy state for each given distance. Numerical simulation results show that our TF-QDS with as few as six discrete random phases can give a higher signature rate and a longer secure transmission distance compared with current quantum digital signatures (QDSs), such as BB84-QDS and measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS). Moreover, we provide a clear comparison among some possible TF-QDSs constructed by different twin-field key generation protocols (TF-KGPs) and find that the proposed TF-QDS exhibits the best performance. Conclusively, the advantages of the proposed TF-QDS protocol in signature rate and secure transmission distance are mainly due to the single-photon interference applied in the measurement module and precise matching of discrete phases. Besides, our TF-QDS shows the feasibility of experimental implementation with current devices in practical QDS system.
Quantum digital signatures (QDSs) allow the sending of messages from one sender to multiple recipients, with the guarantee that messages cannot be forged or tampered with. Additionally, messages cannot be repudiated--if one recipient accepts a message, she is guaranteed that others will accept the same message as well. While messaging with these types of security guarantees are routinely performed in the modern digital world, current technologies only offer security under computational assumptions. QDSs, on the other hand, offer security guaranteed by quantum mechanics. All thus far proposed variants of QDSs require long-term, high quality quantum memory, making them unfeasible in the foreseeable future. Here, we present a QDS scheme where no quantum memory is required, which also needs just linear optics. This makes QDSs feasible with current technology.
Digital signatures play an important role in software distribution, modern communication, and financial transactions, where it is important to detect forgery and tampering. Signatures are a cryptographic technique for validating the authenticity and integrity of messages, software, or digital documents. The security of currently used classical schemes relies on computational assumptions. Quantum digital signatures (QDS), on the other hand, provide information-theoretic security based on the laws of quantum physics. Recent work on QDS Amiri et al., Phys. Rev. A 93, 032325 (2016); Yin, Fu, and Zeng-Bing, Phys. Rev. A 93, 032316 (2016) shows that such schemes do not require trusted quantum channels and are unconditionally secure against general coherent attacks. However, in practical QDS, just as in quantum key distribution (QKD), the detectors can be subjected to side-channel attacks, which can make the actual implementations insecure. Motivated by the idea of measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD), we present a measurement-device-independent QDS (MDI-QDS) scheme, which is secure against all detector side-channel attacks. Based on the rapid development of practical MDI-QKD, our MDI-QDS protocol could also be experimentally implemented, since it requires a similar experimental setup.
Guaranteeing nonrepudiation, unforgeability as well as transferability of a signature is one of the most vital safeguards in today's e-commerce era. Based on fundamental laws of quantum physics, quantum digital signature (QDS) aims to provide information-theoretic security for this cryptographic task. However, up to date, the previously proposed QDS protocols are impractical due to various challenging problems and most importantly, the requirement of authenticated (secure) quantum channels between participants. Here, we present the first quantum digital signature protocol that removes the assumption of authenticated quantum channels while remaining secure against the collective attacks. Besides, our QDS protocol can be practically implemented over more than 100 km under current mature technology as used in quantum key distribution.