Could there be quantum superpositions of conscious states, as suggested by the Wigner's friend thought experiment? Mathematical theories of consciousness, notably integrated information theory (IIT), make this question more precise by associating physical systems with both quantitative amounts of consciousness and structural characterizations of conscious states. Motivated by a recent proposal that ties wave-function collapse to integrated information, we construct a simple quantum circuit that would, on that proposal, place a minimal system-a feedback dyad-into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states. This "Schrödinger's dyad" provides a controlled setting for evaluating a central desideratum of consciousness-based collapse models: that collapse rates depend on how different the experiences in the superposition are. We prove a structural constraint on collapse dynamics of a standard (Lindblad) type: if collapse is governed by too few collapse operators, collapse rates cannot in general be made to depend solely on qualitative differences between conscious states. Avoiding this limitation requires introducing many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for very simple systems. This proliferation bears directly on claims that IIT-based collapse theories may be especially experimentally tractable, since the required dynamics becomes highly complex. More generally, the difficulty is not specific to IIT: any Wigner-style collapse theory that distinguishes experiences using rich internal organization (such as neural connectivity in addition to neural state) will face a comparable explosion in dynamical complexity.
Could there be quantum superpositions of conscious states, as suggested by the Wigner's friend thought experiment? Mathematical theories of consciousness, notably integrated information theory (IIT), make this question more precise by associating physical systems with both quantitative amounts of consciousness and structural characterizations of conscious states. Motivated by a recent proposal that ties wave-function collapse to integrated information, we construct a simple quantum circuit that would, on that proposal, place a minimal system-a feedback dyad-into a superposition of states that differ in their associated conscious states. This "Schrödinger's dyad" provides a controlled setting for evaluating a central desideratum of consciousness-based collapse models: that collapse rates depend on how different the experiences in the superposition are. We prove a structural constraint on collapse dynamics of a standard (Lindblad) type: if collapse is governed by too few collapse operators, collapse rates cannot in general be made to depend solely on qualitative differences between conscious states. Avoiding this limitation requires introducing many commuting operators, leading to a rapid proliferation of collapse terms even for very simple systems. This proliferation bears directly on claims that IIT-based collapse theories may be especially experimentally tractable, since the required dynamics becomes highly complex. More generally, the difficulty is not specific to IIT: any Wigner-style collapse theory that distinguishes experiences using rich internal organization (such as neural connectivity in addition to neural state) will face a comparable explosion in dynamical complexity.
Abstract: There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer–Ranchin, Chalmers–McQueen and Okon–Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers–McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information theory” (IIT) of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers–McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions, namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers. In defence of Chalmers–McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form of any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.
Abstract There has been an upsurge of interest lately in developing Wigner’s hypothesis that conscious observation causes collapse by exploring dynamical collapse models in which some purportedly quantifiable aspect(s) of consciousness resist superposition. Kremnizer–Ranchin, Chalmers–McQueen and Okon–Sebastián have explored the idea that collapse may be associated with a numerical measure of consciousness. More recently, Chalmers–McQueen have argued that any single measure is inadequate because it will allow superpositions of distinct states of equal consciousness measure to persist. They suggest a satisfactory model needs to associate collapse with a set of measures quantifying aspects of consciousness, such as the “Q-shapes” defined by Tononi et al. in their “integrated information theory” (IIT) of consciousness. I argue here that Chalmers–McQueen’s argument against associating a single measure with collapse requires a precise symmetry between brain states associated with different experiences and thus does not apply to the only case where we have strong intuitions, namely human (or other terrestrial biological) observers. In defence of Chalmers–McQueen’s stance, it might be argued that idealized artificial information processing networks could display such symmetries. However, I argue that the most natural form of any theory (such as IIT) that postulates a map from network states to mind states is one that assigns identical mind states to isomorphic network states (as IIT does). This suggests that, if such a map exists, no familiar components of mind states, such as viewing different colours, or experiencing pleasure or pain, are likely to be related by symmetries.
This chapter asks whether consciousness-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics can help interactive dualism even if they do not solve the conservation problem. It begins by explaining why consciousness-collapse theories are often considered vague or mysterious, especially because consciousness seems difficult to integrate into precise physical dynamics. This chapter then examines the proposal that consciousness can be connected to quantum theory through a physical correlate of consciousness and through superposition-resistant properties. On this approach, consciousness or its physical correlate resists quantum superposition and thereby contributes to wave function collapse. This chapter considers the strengths of this strategy, especially its promise of a lawful mind-matter connection, but also stresses major difficulties. Absolute superposition resistance faces the quantum Zeno problem, while weaker collapse models remain speculative. This chapter further argues that making consciousness-collapse dynamics precise may endanger libertarian freedom by placing conscious action under impersonal mathematical rules. It concludes that consciousness-collapse quantum mechanics is an intriguing research program, not a settled solution.
Integrated Information Theory (IIT) has emerged as one of the leading research lines in computational neuroscience to provide a mechanistic and mathematically well-defined description of the neural correlates of consciousness. Integrated Information (Φ) quantifies how much the integrated cause/effect structure of the global neural network fails to be accounted for by any partitioned version of it. The holistic IIT approach is in principle applicable to any information-processing dynamical network regardless of its interpretation in the context of consciousness. In this paper we take the first steps towards a formulation of a general and consistent version of IIT for interacting networks of quantum systems. A variety of different phases, from the dis-integrated (Φ=0) to the holistic one (extensive logΦ), can be identified and their cross-overs studied.
This paper presents the Conscious Collapse Theory (CCT), an interdisciplinary framework proposing that quantum branching is real but temporary, emerging during conscious deliberation and resolving through conscious choice. The theory proposes a solution to the quantum measurement problem and offers a resolution to the identity and accountability challenges commonly associated with the Many-Worlds Interpretation (MWI) through the Uniqueness Principle, according to which the universe returns to a single timeline following each decision event. Formally, CCT is grounded in a hybrid First-Passage Continuous Spontaneous Localization (FP-CSL) mechanism that links the deliberation interval to neural accumulator models and the temporal structure identified in Libet’s readiness potential experiments. The framework further introduces an informational-thermodynamic account of conscious collapse based on Landauer’s Principle, predicting a thermodynamic cost proportional to the von Neumann entropy reduction associated with decision formation. Extending the theory beyond anthropocentric formulations, CCT adopts an Integrated Information Theory (\Phi) threshold condition to define the class of systems capable of inducing branching and collapse dynamics. The framework generates four quantitatively testable predictions involving neural-quantum correlations, collapse timing, consciousness-dependent decoherence signatures, and quantum-computing-based collapse experiments. By combining concepts from quantum foundations, cognitive neuroscience, information theory, and the philosophy of mind, CCT provides a mathematically structured and empirically falsifiable approach to investigating the relationship between consciousness and quantum state reduction.
We discuss the implications for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience in two gedanken experiments from quantum mechanics (QM). In particular, we discuss Wigner's friend and the delayed choice quantum eraser experiment with a twist. These are both cases (experiments) where quantum phenomena, or at least allegedly possible quantum phenomena/experiments, and the content/efficacy of conscious experience seem to bear on one another. We discuss why these two cases raise concerns for the determinateness and intersubjective consistency of conscious experience. We outline a 4D-global constraint-based approach to explanation in general and for QM in particular that resolves any such concerns without having to invoke metaphysical quietism (as with pragmatic accounts of QM), objective collapse mechanisms or subjective collapse. In short, we provide an account of QM free from any concerns associated with either the standard formalism or relative-state formalism, an account that yields a single 4D block universe with determinate and intersubjectively consistent conscious experience for all conscious agents. Essentially, the mystery in both experiments is caused by a dynamical/causal view of QM, e.g., time-evolved states in Hilbert space, and as we show this mystery can be avoided by a spatiotemporal, constraint-based view of QM, e.g., path integral calculation of probability amplitudes using future boundary conditions. What will become clear is that rather than furiously seeking some way to make dubious deep connections between quantum physics and conscious experience, the kinds of 4D adynamical global constraints that are fundamental to both classical and quantum physics and the relationship between them, also constrain conscious experience. That is, physics properly understood, already is psychology.