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arXiv:2308.16211 · WORLD SCIENTIFIC eBooks

THE ELIMINATION OF METAPHYSICS THROUGH THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS: LESSONS (UN)LEARNED FROM METAPHYSICAL UNDERDETERMINATION

Raoni Wohnrath Arroyo, Jonas R. Becker Arenhart, Décio Krause

Published Oct 1, 2023• 3 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.

DOI
10.1142/9789811283598_0011

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This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.
This chapter argues that the general philosophy of science should learn metaphilosophical lessons from the case of metaphysical underdetermination, as it occurs in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Section 2 presents the traditional discussion of metaphysical underdetermination regarding the individuality and non-individuality of quantum particles. Section 3 discusses three reactions to it found in the literature: eliminativism about individuality; conservatism about individuality; eliminativism about objects. Section 4 wraps it all up with metametaphysical considerations regarding the epistemology of metaphysics of science.
The existence of ontologically different but empirically indistinguishable versions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of metaphysical underdetermination. I argue that this problem is unlikely to disappear when we turn to the next more fundamental theory, namely relativistic quantum field theory. The problem is merely overshadowed by yet another interpretational controversy, but it persists regardless of the outcome of this latter debate. I further argue that one should not be too optimistic about transferring ontological lessons learned in the context of one physical theory to the context of a more fundamental theory.
One of the most famous metaphysical problems in the philosophy of quantum mechanics concerns the individuality status of quantum entities: are they individuals, or non-individuals? The typical approach to the problem consists in defending one of the options by appealing directly to features of quantum mechanics with the addition, eventually, of theoretical virtues the favoured proposal may have. In this paper, we argue that this strategy is inappropriate, because the problem of individuality is ill formulated in the case of quantum mechanics. In a nutshell, our point is that considerations exclusively from quantum mechanics are too general and generic to grant the level of particularity required for providing for a principle of individuality. Problems of individuality appear only at the level of particular applications of the theory in specific contexts, and in these cases, we shall argue, search for a metaphysical notion of individuality may be substituted by an epistemic notion of individuation. The approach also has the benefits of dissolving the problems created by metaphysical underdetermination on this front. This article is part of the theme issue 'Identity, individuality and indistinguishability in physics and mathematics'.
One recent debate in philosophy of physics has centered whether quantum particles are individuals or not. The received view is that particles are not individuals and the standard methodology is to approach the question via the structure of quantum theory. I challenge both the received view and the standard methodology. I contend not only that the structure of quantum theory is not the right place to look for conditions of individuality that quantum particles may or may not satisfy, but also that there is an important role for traditional metaphysics to play. Consequently, my work brings together the philosophy of physics and traditional metaphysics literatures to shed new light on the debate over the individuality of quantum particles. I defend a set of conditions of individuality and argue that quantum particles satisfy these conditions thereby defending the view that particles are individuals in opposition to the received view. I also challenge a second feature of the standard methodology insofar as I challenge the significance of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in terms of which much discussion in the philosophy of physics literature is framed. My work is significant in a number of additional ways as well. My work implies that the dominant explanation for quantum statistics in terms of non-individuality is incorrect and it also undermines the ontic-structural realists metaphysical underdetermination challenge to the scientific realist.
Abstract Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (QM) works perfectly well for all practical purposes. Once one admits, however, that a successful scientific theory is supposed not only to make predictions but also to tell us a story about the world in which we live, a philosophical problem emerges: in the specific case of QM, it is not possible to associate with the theory a unique scientific image of the world; there are several images. The fact that the theory may be compatible with distinct ontologies, and that those ontologies may themselves be associated with a plurality of metaphysical approaches, gives rise to the problem of metaphysical underdetermination. This paper concludes that the available metametaphysical criteria fail to deliver objectivity in theory choice, and it puts forward its own criterion based on a tension between two methods of metaphysical inquiry: one that is closely related to science and another that is not.
Abstract This chapter discusses the concepts of indistinguishability, individuality, and non-individuality in the quantum context. It is argued that the above view of particles as non-individuals is not a necessary consequence of the physics, and that quantum particles can be taken to be individuals, subject to certain constraints. However, the sense of individuality here cannot be understood in terms of the Identity of Indiscernibles, since on a standard interpretation of quantum theory, Leibniz’s Principle is violated by both fermions and bosons. Criticisms of this argument are reviewed, as is Saunders’ recent attempt to defend a Quinean form of the Principle. The consequences of regarding quantum particles as individuals are considered in detail, and Teller’s account of entanglement in terms of non-supervenient relations is developed in this context. The conclusion is reached that quantum physics supports two alternative metaphysical packages of individuality and non-individuality, yielding a stronger form of underdetermination, which can be used to support a form of structuralism.