The quantum three-box paradox considers a ball prepared in a superposition of being in any one of three boxes. Bob makes measurements by opening either box 1 or box 2. After performing some unitary operations (shuffling), Alice can infer with certainty that the ball was detected by Bob, regardless of which box he opened, if she detects the ball after opening box 3. The paradox is that the ball would have been found with certainty by Bob in either box if that box had been opened. Resolutions of the paradox include that Bob’s measurement cannot be made non-invasively or else that realism cannot be assumed at the quantum level. Here, we strengthen the case for the former argument by constructing macroscopic versions of the paradox. Macroscopic realism implies that the ball is in one of the boxes prior to Bob or Alice opening any boxes. We demonstrate the consistency of the paradox with macroscopic realism, if carefully defined (as weak macroscopic realism, wMR) to apply to the system at the times prior to Alice or Bob opening any boxes but after the unitary operations associated with preparation or shuffling. By solving for the dynamics of the unitary operations and comparing with mixed states, we demonstrate agreement between the predictions of wMR and quantum mechanics: the paradox only manifests if Alice’s shuffling combines both local operations (on box 3) and nonlocal operations, on the other boxes. Following previous work, the macroscopic paradox is shown to correspond to a violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality, which implies failure of non-invasive measurability if wMR holds.
The quantum three-box paradox considers a ball prepared in a superposition of being in any one of three boxes. Bob makes measurements by opening either box 1 or box 2. After performing some unitary operations (shuffling), Alice can infer with certainty that the ball was detected by Bob, regardless of which box he opened, if she detects the ball after opening box 3. The paradox is that the ball would have been found with certainty by Bob in either box if that box had been opened. Resolutions of the paradox include that Bob’s measurement cannot be made non-invasively or else that realism cannot be assumed at the quantum level. Here, we strengthen the case for the former argument by constructing macroscopic versions of the paradox. Macroscopic realism implies that the ball is in one of the boxes prior to Bob or Alice opening any boxes. We demonstrate the consistency of the paradox with macroscopic realism, if carefully defined (as weak macroscopic realism, wMR) to apply to the system at the times prior to Alice or Bob opening any boxes but after the unitary operations associated with preparation or shuffling. By solving for the dynamics of the unitary operations and comparing with mixed states, we demonstrate agreement between the predictions of wMR and quantum mechanics: the paradox only manifests if Alice’s shuffling combines both local operations (on box 3) and nonlocal operations, on the other boxes. Following previous work, the macroscopic paradox is shown to correspond to a violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality, which implies failure of non-invasive measurability if wMR holds.
The violation of a Leggett–Garg inequality confirms the incompatibility between quantum mechanics and the combined premises (called macro-realism) of macroscopic realism (MR) and noninvasive measurability (NIM). Arguments can be given that the incompatibility arises because MR fails for systems in a superposition of macroscopically distinct states—or else, that NIM fails. In this paper, we consider a strong negation of macro-realism, involving superpositions of coherent states, where the NIM premise is replaced by Bell’s locality premise. We follow recent work and propose the validity of a subset of Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) and Leggett–Garg premises, referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). In finding consistency with wMR, we identify that the Leggett–Garg inequalities are violated because of failure of both MR and NIM, but also that both are valid in a weaker (less restrictive) sense. Weak MR is distinguished from deterministic macroscopic realism (dMR) by recognizing that a measurement involves a reversible unitary interaction that establishes the measurement setting. Weak MR posits that a predetermined value for the outcome of a measurement can be attributed to the system after the interaction, when the measurement setting is experimentally specified. An extended definition of wMR considers the “element of reality” defined by EPR for system A, where one can predict with certainty the outcome of a measurement on A by performing a measurement on system B. Weak MR posits that this element of reality exists once the unitary interaction determining the measurement setting at B has occurred. We demonstrate compatibility of systems violating Leggett–Garg inequalities with wMR but point out that dMR has been shown to be falsifiable. Other tests of wMR are proposed, the predictions of wMR agreeing with quantum mechanics. Finally, we compare wMR with macro-realism models discussed elsewhere. An argument in favour of wMR is presented: wMR resolves a potential contradiction pointed out by Leggett and Garg between failure of macro-realism and assumptions intrinsic to quantum measurement theory.
We consider tests of Leggett-Garg's macrorealism and of macroscopic local realism, where for spacelike separated measurements the assumption of macroscopic noninvasive measurability is justified by that of macroscopic Bell locality. We give a mapping between the Bell and Leggett-Garg experiments for microscopic qubits based on spin-1/2 eigenstates and gedanken experiments for macroscopic qubits based on two macroscopically distinct coherent states $|\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ and $|\ensuremath{-}\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rangle}$ (as $\ensuremath{\alpha}\ensuremath{\rightarrow}\ensuremath{\infty}$). In this mapping, the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ of the Stern-Gerlach analyzer or polarizing beam splitter is realized by a local interaction $H=\mathrm{\ensuremath{\Omega}}{\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}}^{4}$ where $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{n}$ is the number of quanta. By adjusting the time of interaction, one alters the measurement setting $\ensuremath{\theta}$. We thus predict violations of Leggett-Garg and Bell inequalities in a macroscopic regime where coarse-grained measurements $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ need only discriminate between two macroscopically distinct coherent states. To interpret the violations, we distinguish between different definitions of macroscopic realism. Deterministic macroscopic local realism (dMR) assumes the system is in a state with a definite outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ for the measurement $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$ prior to the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, and is negated by the violations. Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) assumes a definite outcome for systems prepared in a superposition ${\ensuremath{\psi}}_{\text{pointer}}$ of two macroscopically distinct eigenstates of $\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{M}$, after the unitary rotation ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$. We find that wMR can be viewed consistently with the violations and with the predictions of quantum mechanics for two tests of wMR. A model is presented in which wMR holds and the macroscopic violations emerge over the course of the unitary dynamics occurring at both sites. Implications for the realism of the micro-macro state generated during a quantum measurement are discussed. Finally, we point out an EPR-type paradox, which demonstrates inconsistency between wMR and the completeness of quantum mechanics at a microscopic level.
Wigner's friend paradoxes highlight contradictions between measurements made by friends inside a laboratory and superobservers outside the laboratory, who have access to an entangled state of the measurement apparatus. Where there are two separated laboratories, the contradictions lead to no-go theorems for observer-independent facts, thus challenging concepts of objectivity. Here, we examine the paradoxes from the perspective of establishing consistency with macroscopic realism. We present versions of the Brukner-Wigner's-friend and Frauchiger-Renner paradoxes in which the spin-1/2 systems measured by the friends correspond to two macroscopically distinct states. The local unitary operations ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ that determine the measurement settings ${\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}$ at each laboratory are carried out using nonlinear interactions, which are tailored to ensure that measurements need only distinguish between the macroscopically distinct states. The macroscopic paradoxes are perplexing, seemingly suggesting there is no objectivity in a macroscopic limit. However, we demonstrate consistency with a contextual weak form of macroscopic realism (wMR): The premise wMR asserts that each system j can be considered to have a definite spin outcome ${\ensuremath{\lambda}}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$, at the time after the system has undergone the local unitary rotation ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ to prepare it in a suitable measurement basis. We further show that the paradoxical outcomes imply failure of deterministic macroscopic local realism and arise when there are unitary interactions ${U}_{{\ensuremath{\theta}}_{j}}$ occurring due to a change of measurement setting at both laboratories, with respect to the state prepared by each friend. In models which validate wMR, there is a breakdown of a subset of the assumptions that constitute the Bell-locality premise. A similar interpretation involving a contextual weak form of local realism exists for the original paradoxes.
Wigner's friend paradoxes highlight contradictions between measurements made by Friends inside a laboratory and superobservers outside a laboratory, who have access to an entangled state of the measurement apparatus. The contradictions lead to no-go theorems for observer-independent facts, thus challenging concepts of objectivity. Here, we examine the paradoxes from the perspective of establishing consistency with macroscopic realism. We present versions of the Brukner-Wigner-friend and Frauchiger-Renner paradoxes in which the spin-1/2 system measured by the Friends corresponds to two macroscopically distinct states. The local unitary operations Uθ that determine the measurement setting θ are carried out using nonlinear interactions, thereby ensuring measurements need only distinguish between the macroscopically distinct states. The macroscopic paradoxes are perplexing, seemingly suggesting there is no objectivity in a macroscopic limit. However, we demonstrate consistency with a contextual weak form of macroscopic realism (wMR): The premise wMR asserts that the system can be considered to have a definite spin outcome λθ, at the time after the system has undergone the unitary rotation Uθ to prepare it in a suitable pointer basis. We further show that the paradoxical outcomes imply failure of deterministic macroscopic local realism, and arise when there are unitary interactions Uθ occurring due to a change of measurement setting at both sites, with respect to the state prepared by each Friend. In models which validate wMR, there is a breakdown of a subset of the assumptions that constitute the Bell-Locality premise. A similar interpretation involving a weak contextual form of realism exists for the original paradoxes.
Macroscopic Realism (MR) says that a macroscopic system is always determinately in one or other of the macroscopically distinguishable states available to it. The Leggett-Garg (LG) inequality was derived to allow experimental test of whether or not this doctrine is true; it is also often thought of as a temporal version of a Bell-inequality. Despite recent interest in the inequality, controversy remains regarding what would be shown by its violation. Here we resolve this controversy, which arises due to an insufficiently general and model-independent approach to the question so far. We argue that LG's initial characterisation of MR does not pick out a particularly natural realist position, so we articulate an operationally well-defined and well-motivated position in its place. We show that much weaker conditions than LG's are sufficient to derive the inequality: in the first instance, its violation only demonstrates that certain measurements fail to be non-disturbing at the operational level. We articulate three distinct species of MR-ist position, and argue that it is only the first of these which can be refuted by LG inequality violation. This first position is an attractive one, so ruling it out remains of interest, however. A crucial role is played in LG's argument by the assumption of noninvasive measurability. We show that this notion is ambiguous between the weaker notion of disturbance at the operational level, and the stronger notion of invasiveness at the ontic level of properties of the system. Ontic noninvasiveness would be required to rule out MR per se but this property is not entailed by MR, and its presence cannot be established in a model-independent way. It follows that despite the formal parallels, Bell's and LG's inequalities are not methodologically on a par. We close with some reflections on the implications of our analysis for the pedagogy of quantum superposition.
Macroscopic realism is the thesis that macroscopically observable properties must always have definite values. The idea was introduced by Leggett and Garg (1985), who wished to show a conflict with the predictions of quantum theory, by using it to derive an inequality that quantum theory violates. However, Leggett and Garg's analysis required not just the assumption of macroscopic realism per se, but also that the observable properties could be measured non-invasively. In recent years there has been increasing interest in experimental tests of the violation of the Leggett-Garg inequality, but it has remained a matter of controversy whether this second assumption is a reasonable requirement for a macroscopic realist view of quantum theory. In a recent critical assessment Maroney and Timpson (2014) identified three different categories of macroscopic realism, and argued that only the simplest category could be ruled out by Leggett-Garg inequality violations. Allen, Maroney, and Gogioso (2016) then showed that the second of these approaches was also incompatible with quantum theory in Hilbert spaces of dimension 4 or higher. However, we show that the distinction introduced by Maroney and Timpson between the second and third approaches is not noise tolerant, so unfortunately Allen's result, as given, is not directly empirically testable. In this paper we replace Maroney and Timpson's three categories with a parameterization of macroscopic realist models, which can be related to experimental observations in a noise tolerant way, and recover the original definitions in the noise-free limit. We show how this parameterization can be used to experimentally rule out classes of macroscopic realism in Hilbert spaces of dimension 3 or higher, without any use of the non-invasive measurability assumption. Even for relatively low precision experiments, this will rule out the original category of macroscopic realism, that is tested by the Leggett-Garg inequality, while as the precision of the experiments increases, all cases of the second category and many cases of the third category, will become experimentally ruled out.