Abstract David Bohm has put forward the first deterministic interpretation of quantum physics, and for this he seems to be regarded as a champion of determinism by physicists (both his contemporaries and the supporters of his interpretation, the so-called “Bohmians”) as well as by historians of physics. The standard narrative is that he underwent a “conversion” from being a supporter of Bohr to being a staunch determinist, due to his interaction with Einstein and his commitment to Marxism. Here we show that Bohm actually upheld with continuity throughout his career some philosophical tenets that included a strong rejection of mechanistic determinism. As such, we conclude that Bohm was never a Bohmian and that his philosophical views have been largely misinterpreted.
Abstract David Bohm has put forward the first deterministic interpretation of quantum physics, and for this he seems to be regarded as a champion of determinism by physicists (both his contemporaries and the supporters of his interpretation, the so-called “Bohmians”) as well as by historians of physics. The standard narrative is that he underwent a “conversion” from being a supporter of Bohr to being a staunch determinist, due to his interaction with Einstein and his commitment to Marxism. Here we show that Bohm actually upheld with continuity throughout his career some philosophical tenets that included a strong rejection of mechanistic determinism. As such, we conclude that Bohm was never a Bohmian and that his philosophical views have been largely misinterpreted.
Abstract Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics has generally been received as an attempt to restore the determinism of classical physics. However, although this interpretation, as Bohm initially proposed it in 1952, does indeed have the feature of being deterministic, for Bohm this was never the main point. In fact, in other publications and in correspondence from this period, he argued that the assumption that nature is deterministic is unjustified and should be abandoned. Whereas it has been argued before that Bohm’s commitment to determinism was connected to his interest in Marxism, I argue for the opposite: Bohm found resources in Marxist philosophy for developing a non-deterministic notion of causality, which is based on the idea of infinite complexity and an infinite number of levels of nature. From ca. 1954 onwards, Bohm’s conception of causality further weakened, as he developed the idea of a dialectical relation between causality and chance.
Abstract The paper investigates David Bohm’s philosophy of science as a form of fallibilist realism that underpins his causal interpretation of quantum mechanics Bohm (Bohm 1952a, 1952b, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990; Bohm and Hiley 1975, 1984, 1993). Bohm’s central aim is to establish the superiority of his interpretation over the standard Copenhagen framework, particularly in contrast to that of Niels Bohr. Whereas Bohr asserts that knowledge of quantum phenomena is restricted to the statistical outcomes of measurement, Bohm’s approach is distinctly realist in orientation. Responding to the challenges posed by Einstein and other physicists, Bohm relies on extra-empirical criteria such as determinism, objectivity and intelligibility. The paper develops what will be termed the methodology of intuitive intelligibility (II), consisting of four stages: (1) reformulation of the standard quantum equations, (2) physical interpretation of the mathematical symbols, (3) drawing analogies with classical laws, and (4) drawing analogies with common experience. It is argued that Bohm applies the (II) methodology consistently, with the notable exception of the ontological status of the wave function and quantum potential. In attempting to explain causal relations from a 3N-dimensional configuration space (where N is the number of particles) to familiar three-dimensional space through an appeal to ‘information’, Bohm arguably commits a category mistake. A proposed resolution—drawing on Bohm’s own holistic analogies—is supported by the recent multi-field interpretation (Romano Multi-field and Bohm’s theory. Synthese, 198(30), 10587–10609, 2021). The term fallibilist realism aptly characterizes Bohm’s stance in the philosophy of science: he repeatedly emphasizes that the causal interpretation is not intended as a final theory. Nevertheless, holism constitutes a substantive ontological commitment that he is unwilling to abandon.
Determinism is related to other fundamental concepts such as causality. However, with the growth of quantum physics, determinism became a scientific "dilemma" and has created many challenges in various contemporary sciences. Most of modern physicists chose elimination of determinism. The basic question is: Is determinism completely removable? To answer this question, this paper is to investigate this concept analytically. At first we consider different aspects of the terminology and definition of determinism. Particularly, we pay attention to different kinds of determinism including global/local domain, complete/incomplete form, and the main factor in the formation of events. It is discussed that although determinism took a complete and universal form in classical physics, because of some philosophical ideas, determinism changed into a different concept, even as a problem and an undesirable element, in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics. It is explained that determinism is a complex concept with a number of aspects and characteristics. Prediction, the world accessibility, and connection between the past and the future are the characteristics of the concept of determinism which cannot be set aside from the science. The final result is that, without any pre-assumption or alternative interpretation as what is done in already known realistic and deterministic theories as Bohmian quantum mechanics and/or many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics, determinism cannot be completely denied in the standard (Copenhagen interpretation of) quantum mechanics.
The radical redefinition of the landscape of physics that followed the contributions of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg at the start of the 20th century led to plethora [of] new perspectives on age-old metaphysical questions on determinism and the nature of reality. The main contention of this article is that the work of Gilbert Simondon - whose magnum opus possesses a scope uniting the most basic philosophical concerns with the (then) most recent breakthroughs in natural sciences - is highly relevant for an adequate understanding of the split between determinism and indeterminism, as well as the underlying presuppositions which have driven some influential contributions to this topic. To this end, the article shows that the more deterministic interpretation of quantum mechanics offered by David Bohm and Louis de Broglie proves to be a valuable reference point for a more precise use and understanding of Simondon?s transductive logic - especially when its philosophical lapses are considered closely. Finally, following the considerations of both thinkers, we aim at a more precise reconsideration of the stakes of indeterminism in modern physics, as well as a restructuration of what is often understood as a polarization.
The contribution of quantum mechanics to the debate on whether free will exists is usually limited to considerations of how the indeterminism implied by certain interpretations of quantum mechanics might allow room for free will where the classical determinism of Newtonian mechanics seemingly would not. However, this Paper advances the idea that such arguments are flawed, as they cannot account for how an agent would exercise control over an indeterministic choice, which could just as easily be resolved by chance or randomness. This Paper will put forward an alternative account of how quantum mechanics could account for free will, based on the deterministic and non-materialistic interpretation of David Bohm. In this interpretation, the human mind, seen objectively as “active information” and perceived subjectively as “meaning”, can have an “informational” causal influence on the behaviour of the human body. This is shown to complement a compatibilist account of free will, where free will is taken to mean simply that an agent can act according to his/her will without impediment and is thus compatible with determinism, and to augment it, by giving mind a fundamental place in reality and thus explaining the mental causation necessary for any account of free will. This analysis is then taken to legal philosophy, to show that a Bohmian account of compatibilist free will can similarly augment the ‘Act Requirement’ of criminal jurisprudence and the ‘formal agency’ element of Brudner’s liberal theory of penal justice, such that it can better ground our philosophical justification of holding individuals responsible for criminal acts.