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arXiv:2305.05734 · Quantum

A Theory of Inaccessible Information

Jacopo Surace

Published Sep 9, 2024• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

What would be the consequences if there were fundamental limits to our ability to experimentally explore the world? In this work we seriously consider this question. We assume the existence of statements whose truth value is not experimentally accessible. That is, there is no way, not even in theory, to directly test if these statements are true or false. We further develop a theory in which experimentally accessible statements are a union of a fixed minimum number of inaccessible statements. For example, the value of truth of the statements "a" and "b" is not accessible, but the value of truth of the statement "a or b" is accessible. We do not directly assume probability theory, we exclusively define experimentally accessible and inaccessible statements and build on these notions using the rules of classical logic. We find that an interesting structure emerges. Developing this theory, we relax the logical structure to a probabilistic one, obtaining a theory rich in structure that we call "theory of inaccessible information". Surprisingly, the simplest model of theory of inaccessible information is the qubit in quantum mechanics. Along the path for the construction of this theory, we characterise and study a family of multiplicative information measures that we call "inaccessibility measures".

DOI
10.22331/q-2024-09-09-1464

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We take the view that physical quantities are values generated by processes in measurement, not pre-existent objective quantities, and that a measurement result is strictly a product of the apparatus and the subject of the measurement. We habitually make an inaccurate statements when we speak of the measurement of a quantity by an apparatus. These statements can be formalised as a many valued logic with the structure of a vector space with a hermitian form in such a way as to generate probabilities in the results of measurement. The difference between this and classical probability theory is that we are not finding probabilities generated by unknown variables, but probabilities generated by unknown structure. We thus interpret quantum logic as the application of complex truth values to statements in an inaccurate language, and find that the properties of vector space hold for approximate measurement as well as for measurement of optimal accuracy, suggesting that Planck's constant governs the scale of the fundamental structures of matter.

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The ability to transfer information securely is essential in the modern world we live in. While the field of cryptography has long researched ways to do this, events over the last couple of years have brought the issues of secure information transfer squarely into the public eye. As a consequence, security and cryptography have quickly become issues of social and political importance, sparking debates about the values of privacy and the role of government. An essential ingredient of modern cryptography is the generation of randomness: cryptographic techniques are built on the premise that one has access to random bits. It is well known, however, that computers cannot produce algorithmically random sequences – that is, sequences with maximal algorithmic information content – but are doomed to produce ‘pseudorandomness’. This lack of randomness can be, and has been, exploited to compromise security, see [4]. 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Indeed, we have shown that a) some of the postulated properties of quantum information follow from the formal structure of the theory and b) a purely formal notion of information within a quantum world can generate, via measurement, meaningful and useful information in the macroscopic world (for example, in cryptography). The indeterminism of quantum measurements can be formalised via the notion of value indefiniteness. To explain this concept, let us consider an arbitrary quantum system and ask whether the outcome of a measurement of any observable quantity A (such as the energy of the system, its angular momentum (spin), etc.) is determined prior to the measurement. If this is the case, then we say the observable is value definite with value v(A); otherwise, the observable is value indefinite and v(A) is undefined. Mathematically, one can reduce all observable quantities to so-called projection observables, which can only take the values 0 or 1. Thus, the question of whether the outcome of several measurements can be simultaneously determined in advance can be rephrased in terms of the information ‘carried’ by a particular system in a definite quantum state. Classically, one expects that all quantities are determined in advance, and hence all observables are value definite. Quantum mechanically, however, the belief is that this is not the case, and the information content of quantum systems is limited. Formulating carefully the notion of value indefiniteness allows us to formalise the notion of (quantum) indeterminism; however, this doesn’t help clarify whether quantum systems are indeed value indefinite or not. Staying in this formal framework, the Kochen-Specker theorem [5] provides a first positive result, showing that at least some observables must be value indefinite if one makes the assumption known as non-contextuality, which states that any definite values that exist must be independent of other compatible measurements that may or may not be performed on the system. Under the same assumption, this theorem can be strengthened to show that only one single observable can have the definite value 1 (see [2]). Furthermore, only observables that can be measured simultaneously with this single one can have the definite value 0; the rest must all be value indefinite. Since the preparation of a system involves precisely ensuring that, usually via measurement, the system is in a definite state with respect to some desired observable, this result shows that no other incompatible observable can be value definite. 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Importantly, bi-immunity is a property of observed, macroscopic quantities, quite separate from the quantum framework in which the value indefiniteness is formalised. This form of macroscopic meaning created from the lack of syntactic information is precisely the scenario that quantum random number generators try to create, and which is essential for the development and certification of quantum cryptographic systems. The fact that the macroscopic information created goes beyond anything classically obtainable serves as a valuable practical resource, outside of and removed from the quantum formalism. To conclude, quantum information creates meaning within the quantum and via measure- ment, the lack of information within the quantum, creates meaning and valuable information at the macroscopic level. Acknowledgments The second author thanks Prof. S. Marcus for useful conversations on quantum information theory. This work was supported in part by Marie Curie FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IRSES Grant RANPHYS. References and Notes Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. Strong Kochen-Specker theorem and incomputability of quantum randomness. Physical Review A 2012, 86, 062109. Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. Value-indefinite observables are almost everywhere. Physical Review A 2013, 89, 032109. Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. On the unpredictability of individual quantum measurement outcomes. CDMTCS Research Report 2014, 458. Calude, C.S. Quantum randomness & cryptology. CyberTalk 2013, 3, 42–43. Kochen, S.; Specker, E. The problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 1967, 17, 59–87. Zeilinger, A. A foundational principle for quantum mechanics. Foundations of Physics 1999, 29(4),631–643.

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Michael Betancourt reviews Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods to calculate expectation values over high dimensional probabilities.11 Theo Steininger and coworkers present the NIFTy3 software package for numerical information field theory calculations, which can handle very high dimensional field inference problems.12 Finally, in an article focused on the subtleties of the Monty Hall problem and mostly aiming at information theoretical entertainment, Torsten Enßlin and Margret Westercamp investigate the possibility that human intuition might be more rational than contemporary psychology thinks.13 A number of possible topics for an issue on physics of information are not addressed here. We would have loved to have articles on Landauer's principle, which states that erasing information has to cost energy, on QBism, a Bayesian version of quantum mechanics, on artificial and biological neural networks, as well as any other aspect of the information-soaked biological world. What has a reader of this special issue to be equipped with in order to follow the lines of thoughts? In addition to the usual physicist's education, the minimal additional equipment are the basics of probability theory and the concept of entropy. Most of the other concepts used in the articles rest on those and are introduced there. Let A, B, and C be propositions (or possibilities). The probability P ( A | B ) of A being true assuming that B is true is a number between 0 and 1, with P ( A | B ) = 1 expressing certainty of A under B ( B ⇒ A ) and P ( A | B ) = 0 expressing certainty of not A being the case under B ( B ⇒ ¬ A ).

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AIP conference proceedings•Jan 1, 2017•0 citations
What would be the consequences if there were fundamental limits to our ability to experimentally explore the world? In this work we seriously consider this question. We assume the existence of statements whose truth value is not experimentally accessible. That is, there is no way, not even in theory, to directly test if these statements are true or false. We further develop a theory in which experimentally accessible statements are a union of a fixed minimum number of inaccessible statements. For example, the value of truth of the statements "a" and "b" is not accessible, but the value of truth of the statement "a or b" is accessible. We do not directly assume probability theory, we exclusively define experimentally accessible and inaccessible statements and build on these notions using the rules of classical logic. We find that an interesting structure emerges. Developing this theory, we relax the logical structure to a probabilistic one, obtaining a theory rich in structure that we call "theory of inaccessible information". Surprisingly, the simplest model of theory of inaccessible information is the qubit in quantum mechanics. Along the path for the construction of this theory, we characterise and study a family of multiplicative information measures that we call "inaccessibility measures".
We take the view that physical quantities are values generated by processes in measurement, not pre-existent objective quantities, and that a measurement result is strictly a product of the apparatus and the subject of the measurement. We habitually make an inaccurate statements when we speak of the measurement of a quantity by an apparatus. These statements can be formalised as a many valued logic with the structure of a vector space with a hermitian form in such a way as to generate probabilities in the results of measurement. The difference between this and classical probability theory is that we are not finding probabilities generated by unknown variables, but probabilities generated by unknown structure. We thus interpret quantum logic as the application of complex truth values to statements in an inaccurate language, and find that the properties of vector space hold for approximate measurement as well as for measurement of optimal accuracy, suggesting that Planck's constant governs the scale of the fundamental structures of matter.
The ability to transfer information securely is essential in the modern world we live in. While the field of cryptography has long researched ways to do this, events over the last couple of years have brought the issues of secure information transfer squarely into the public eye. As a consequence, security and cryptography have quickly become issues of social and political importance, sparking debates about the values of privacy and the role of government. An essential ingredient of modern cryptography is the generation of randomness: cryptographic techniques are built on the premise that one has access to random bits. It is well known, however, that computers cannot produce algorithmically random sequences – that is, sequences with maximal algorithmic information content – but are doomed to produce ‘pseudorandomness’. This lack of randomness can be, and has been, exploited to compromise security, see [4]. The active field of quantum information theory has proposed approaches to provide supposedly ‘unbreakable’ security by exploiting various quantum phenomena. This security unfortunately relies on assumptions about the nature of quantum measurements and their ability to generate random bits. Anton Zeilinger summarises this by postulating that the simplest quantum systems, qubit, can hold only one bit of classical information [6]. This foundational principle is in line with a wider paradigm shift to view quantum information as an extension of classical information, but it is nonetheless unsatisfying to simply postulate this principle, given its importance in determining the practical advantages of quantum information theory. In order to understand better how quantum mechanics can help generate meaningful information, we instead look to relate the outcomes of quantum measurements to formal properties of the system based on more fundamental assumptions. Indeed, we have shown that a) some of the postulated properties of quantum information follow from the formal structure of the theory and b) a purely formal notion of information within a quantum world can generate, via measurement, meaningful and useful information in the macroscopic world (for example, in cryptography). The indeterminism of quantum measurements can be formalised via the notion of value indefiniteness. To explain this concept, let us consider an arbitrary quantum system and ask whether the outcome of a measurement of any observable quantity A (such as the energy of the system, its angular momentum (spin), etc.) is determined prior to the measurement. If this is the case, then we say the observable is value definite with value v(A); otherwise, the observable is value indefinite and v(A) is undefined. Mathematically, one can reduce all observable quantities to so-called projection observables, which can only take the values 0 or 1. Thus, the question of whether the outcome of several measurements can be simultaneously determined in advance can be rephrased in terms of the information ‘carried’ by a particular system in a definite quantum state. Classically, one expects that all quantities are determined in advance, and hence all observables are value definite. Quantum mechanically, however, the belief is that this is not the case, and the information content of quantum systems is limited. Formulating carefully the notion of value indefiniteness allows us to formalise the notion of (quantum) indeterminism; however, this doesn’t help clarify whether quantum systems are indeed value indefinite or not. Staying in this formal framework, the Kochen-Specker theorem [5] provides a first positive result, showing that at least some observables must be value indefinite if one makes the assumption known as non-contextuality, which states that any definite values that exist must be independent of other compatible measurements that may or may not be performed on the system. Under the same assumption, this theorem can be strengthened to show that only one single observable can have the definite value 1 (see [2]). Furthermore, only observables that can be measured simultaneously with this single one can have the definite value 0; the rest must all be value indefinite. Since the preparation of a system involves precisely ensuring that, usually via measurement, the system is in a definite state with respect to some desired observable, this result shows that no other incompatible observable can be value definite. That is, preparing a system in a definite state by making the ‘preparation’ observable value definite specifies completely the information content of the quantum system. This is an example of syntactical quantum information acquiring meaning at the level of the quantum itself. Can the syntactical information at the level of the quantum generate meaning outside the quantum, that is, at the macroscopic level? The results cited above hold in the Hilbert-space framework of quantum mechanics and are formulated only in terms of a syntactical notion of information. Their real importance becomes evident when one interprets them in the context of quantum measurements. Specifically, if we prepare a quantum system in a known state, they allow us to ‘locate’ observables which we can measure, but which are value indefinite; that is, observables whose measurement results are not specified by any pre-existing property of the quantum system. Furthermore, with respect to a mathematical model of unpredictability which we developed in [3], the results of these measurements can be shown to be absolutely unpredictable. In this way we get a mathematical explanation and justification of the largely accepted intuition that quantum mechanics is inherently unpredictable, and that this unpredictability arises from the phenomenon of indefiniteness within the quantum world. Furthermore, if one considers a hypothetical infinite sequence generated by the repeated measurement of a quantum value indefinite observable, one can prove that these sequences must be strongly incomputable, technically ‘bi-immune’ [1]. Such sequences cannot be generated by any Turing machine or classical computer, showing that value indefiniteness leads to a clear classical/quantum split in a purely algorithmic context. Importantly, bi-immunity is a property of observed, macroscopic quantities, quite separate from the quantum framework in which the value indefiniteness is formalised. This form of macroscopic meaning created from the lack of syntactic information is precisely the scenario that quantum random number generators try to create, and which is essential for the development and certification of quantum cryptographic systems. The fact that the macroscopic information created goes beyond anything classically obtainable serves as a valuable practical resource, outside of and removed from the quantum formalism. To conclude, quantum information creates meaning within the quantum and via measure- ment, the lack of information within the quantum, creates meaning and valuable information at the macroscopic level. Acknowledgments The second author thanks Prof. S. Marcus for useful conversations on quantum information theory. This work was supported in part by Marie Curie FP7-PEOPLE-2010-IRSES Grant RANPHYS. References and Notes Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. Strong Kochen-Specker theorem and incomputability of quantum randomness. Physical Review A 2012, 86, 062109. Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. Value-indefinite observables are almost everywhere. Physical Review A 2013, 89, 032109. Abbott, A.A.; Calude, C.S.; Svozil, K. On the unpredictability of individual quantum measurement outcomes. CDMTCS Research Report 2014, 458. Calude, C.S. Quantum randomness & cryptology. CyberTalk 2013, 3, 42–43. Kochen, S.; Specker, E. The problem of hidden variables in quantum mechanics. Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 1967, 17, 59–87. Zeilinger, A. A foundational principle for quantum mechanics. Foundations of Physics 1999, 29(4),631–643.
According to quantum mechanics, statements about the future made by sentient beings like us are, in general, neither true nor false; they must satisfy a many-valued logic. I propose that the truth value of such a statement should be identified with the probability that the event it describes will occur. After reviewing the history of related ideas in logic, I argue that it gives an understanding of probability which is particularly satisfactory for use in quantum mechanics. I construct a lattice of future-tense propositions, with truth values in the interval [0, 1], and derive logical properties of these truth values given by the usual quantum-mechanical formula for the probability of a history.
What is information? A short answer could be: Anything that changes our minds and states of thinking! Information is virtual. It can be carried by speech, an image, scratches on a stone, patterns in a photon field, the connections of neurons in our brains or even by the wavefunction of an electron. Information does not depend on the actual means of transmission nor does its identity change when changing the carrier. Information is physical. It needs to be sustained by a physical substrate and rearranging that substrate to contain the wanted information requires to spend energy or work. Without a physical world, information can not be stored, processed, or transmitted. Our world is permeated with different representations of information. Actually Information about the physical laws governing our Universe can be found everywhere and in everything. Could it then be that the real fundamental elements of this world are tiny bits of information? Could we get it from bit?1 A number of researcher investigate this possibility, and several of their attempts to recover physical laws from the principles governing information are reported about in this special issue on physics of information. The articles by Gregg Jaeger,2 by Ariel Caticha,3 and by John Skilling and Kevin Knuth4 address the reconstruction of quantum mechanics from information theory. Furthermore, Kevin Knuth and James Walsh5 show how to recover space-time from particles sending each others signals in an initially geometry-free setting. A central element of most works on information is the concept of a probability. Probabilities can be defined via various routes. Most familiar might be their definitions by the frequentists school as relative frequencies of events (in the limit of infinite amounts of such). A more general definition of probabilities is the Bayesians' one, which regards probabilities as quantifiers of statements, expressing how much those should be expected to be true. Although this definition looks subjective on the first glance, it rests on a solid mathematical theorem by Richard Cox6 that any extension of binary logic to a continuum of single valued truthfulness quantifier that respects a minimum of requirements must be isomorphic to probability theory. And this definition turns out to embrace the frequentists' definition in case that infinite numbers of comparable events are actually available and can be counted. The majority of authors of this special issues seem to favor the Bayesian perspective, which is probably a result of our own, the guest editors', preference and not necessarily a reflection of the prevailing position of contemporary scientists. The different views on probabilities of frequentists and Bayesians are addressed by the article of Allen Caldwell.7 He builds a bridge between these antagonistic camps by explaining frequentists' constructions in a Bayesian language. In particular, his argumentation why the omnipresent p-value in statistical and experimental literature might often capture a relevant signal of model misfit is reassuring, given that a large fraction of our medical system is based on decisions backed up by p-values. A Bayesian might add that it would be even more reassuring, if a system rigorously build on logic and its continuous extension would be used for decisions affecting live-or-death questions. The laws governing probabilities themselves seem to reflect that of more elementary mathematical structures. Kevin Knuth shows how these emerge from lattice theory, which deals with relations in partially ordered sets like that of collections of possibilities.8 The sum rule of probability theory is a direct consequence of the underlying lattice structure. Interestingly, a number of other theories are resting also on such lattices and therefore exhibit their own versions of sum rules: measures of sets, mutual information, the Euler characteristics of topological spaces, as well as quantum mechanical interactions that are quantified by pairs of numbers, the real and imaginary parts of complex probability amplitudes (see also4). The theory of information has very practical application in physics and elsewhere. Manfred Opper discusses how the solutions of stochastic differential equations can be inferred via variational methods, which have their origin in thermodynamics.9 Torsten Enßlin introduces information field theory (IFT), the information theory for fields, as a means to infer the configuration of a physical field from incomplete and noisy data.10 The mathematical apparatus for this is that of quantum field theory (QFT), just with ordinary probabilities instead of complex probability amplitudes as in the latter. Could it be that the difference between IFT and QFT is just be the same as between classical information theory and quantum mechanics, the transition from real valued to complex valued quantifier for statements? Anyhow, any practical inference machinery, be it for dynamical systems or for fields, requires sophisticated numerical methods. Michael Betancourt reviews Markov Chain Monte Carlo Methods to calculate expectation values over high dimensional probabilities.11 Theo Steininger and coworkers present the NIFTy3 software package for numerical information field theory calculations, which can handle very high dimensional field inference problems.12 Finally, in an article focused on the subtleties of the Monty Hall problem and mostly aiming at information theoretical entertainment, Torsten Enßlin and Margret Westercamp investigate the possibility that human intuition might be more rational than contemporary psychology thinks.13 A number of possible topics for an issue on physics of information are not addressed here. We would have loved to have articles on Landauer's principle, which states that erasing information has to cost energy, on QBism, a Bayesian version of quantum mechanics, on artificial and biological neural networks, as well as any other aspect of the information-soaked biological world. What has a reader of this special issue to be equipped with in order to follow the lines of thoughts? In addition to the usual physicist's education, the minimal additional equipment are the basics of probability theory and the concept of entropy. Most of the other concepts used in the articles rest on those and are introduced there. Let A, B, and C be propositions (or possibilities). The probability P ( A | B ) of A being true assuming that B is true is a number between 0 and 1, with P ( A | B ) = 1 expressing certainty of A under B ( B ⇒ A ) and P ( A | B ) = 0 expressing certainty of not A being the case under B ( B ⇒ ¬ A ).