Abstract In this chapter we discuss the Einstein Podolsky Rosen theorem and its strong relation with Bell’s theorem. The central role played by the concept of beable introduced by Bell is emphasized. In particular we stress that beables involved in EPR and Bell theorems are not limited to hidden supplementary variables (e.g., like in the de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) pilot-wave theory) but also include the wave function. In full agreement with Bell this allows us the reformulate the EPR and Bell results as strong theorems concerning nonlocality for quantum mechanics itself and not only for hidden-variables approaches as it is often mistakenly assumed. Furthermore, we clarify some repeated ambiguities concerning ‘local-realism’ and emphasize that neither realism nor determinism nor counterfactual definiteness are prerequisites of EPR and Bell theorems.
Quantum mechanics, despite its extraordinary success in describing microscopic phenomena, continues to raise foundational questions concerning measurement, nonlocality, and the nature of physical reality. These issues are exemplified by the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox and the Bell inequality, which contrast quantum correlations with classical notions of locality and realism. In this work, we critically examine the assumptions underlying Bell’s theorem in light of the incompatible and contextual nature of quantum observables. We show that Bell’s constraint on simultaneous definite values for incompatible observables, together with the assumption of hidden variables, is not applicable to quantum mechanics itself, which is inherently nonclassical and contextual. When measurement is modeled as a local system-environment interaction within the framework of quantum decoherence, the resulting dynamics remain entirely local and unitary in the EPR scenario. Decoherence naturally selects pointer states and suppresses interference, giving rise to the appearance of wavefunction collapse consistent with quantum predictions. Importantly, the Bell correlations obtained in this framework reproduce the standard quantum results and are independent of both system-bath and inter-bath interactions, which affect only the rate of decoherence. Our analysis suggests that, in the EPR scenario, quantum mechanics can be both local and realistic when the wavefunction is treated as an ontic description of reality within the decoherence framework, offering a potential route toward a locally realistic quantum theory aligned with Einstein’s vision. This work contributes to a more rigorous foundation for quantum mechanics, providing insights that can accelerate progress in quantum computing and nanoenergy harvesting.
John Stewart Bell’s famous theorem is widely regarded as one of the most important developments in the foundations of physics. Yet even as we approach the 50th anniversary of Bell’s discovery, its meaning and implications remain controversial. Many workers assert that Bell’s theorem refutes the possibility suggested by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR) of supplementing ordinary quantum theory with “hidden” variables that might restore determinism and/or some notion of an observer-independent reality. But Bell himself interpreted the theorem very differently—as establishing an “essential conflict” between the well-tested empirical predictions of quantum theory and relativistic local causality. Our goal is to make Bell’s own views more widely known and to explain Bell’s little-known formulation of the concept of relativistic local causality on which his theorem rests. We also show precisely how Bell’s formulation of local causality can be used to derive an empirically testable Bell-type inequality and to recapitulate the EPR argument.
Most physicists agree that the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bell paradox exemplifies much of the strange behavior of quantum mechanics, but argument persists about what assumptions underlie the paradox. To clarify what the debate is about, we employ a simple and well-known thought experiment involving two correlated photons to help us focus on the logical assumptions needed to construct the EPR and Bell arguments. The view presented in this paper is that the minimal assumptions behind Bell’s inequality are locality and counterfactual definiteness but not scientific realism, determinism, or hidden variables as are often suggested. We further examine the resulting constraints on physical theory with an illustration from the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics—an interpretation that we argue is deterministic, local, and realist but that nonetheless violates the Bell inequality.
Negating the classical/quantum divide in line with Bell's hidden-variable ideas, we resolve Bell's ‘action-at-a-distance' dilemma in accord with his hopes. We identify the resultant theory as clear local realism (CLR), the union of Bohr's ‘measurement' insight, Einstein locality and Bell beables. Our method follows: (i) consistent with Bohr's insight, we replace EPR's elements of physical reality with Bell's beables; (ii) we let Bell's beable λ denote a pristine particle's total angular momentum; (iii) validating Malus' Law in our quantum-compatible equivalence relations, we deliver the hopes of Bell and Einstein for a simple constructive model of EPRB; (iv) we then derive the correct results for CHSH and Mermin's version of GHZ; (v) we thus justify EPR's belief that additional variables would bring locality and causality to QM. In short, advancing Bell's ideas in line with his expectations: we amend EPR, resolve Bell's dilemma, negate nonlocality, endorse Einstein's locally-causal Lorentz-invariant worldview, demystify the classical/quantum divide, etc. CLR: clear via Bohr's insight, local via Einstein locality, realistic via Bell beables.
The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox gives an argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics based on a plausible criterion for reality, as well as the assumption of locality. A general view is that the argument is compromised, because EPR's premises are falsified by Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) and Bell experiments. In this paper, we present an EPR argument based on premises not falsified by these experiments. First, we consider macroscopic EPR-Bohm, Bell, and GHZ experiments using spins ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ defined by two macroscopically distinct states. The analyzers that realize the unitary operations ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ determining the measurement settings $\ensuremath{\theta}$ are nonlinear devices creating macroscopic superposition states. We note two definitions of macroscopic realism (MR). For a system with two macroscopically distinct states available to it, MR posits a predetermined outcome for the measurement ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ distinguishing between the states. Deterministic macroscopic realism assumes MR for the system defined prior to the interaction ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ being carried out but is falsifiable by the macroscopic Bell and GHZ proposals. Motivated by arguments to uphold MR (without resorting to decoherence), as well as no-signaling and the properties of a meter, we define a set of premises referred to as weak macroscopic realism (wMR). Weak macroscopic realism (wMR) posits MR for the system after ${U}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$, at the time
tf---when the system is prepared with respect to the measurement basis, ready for a ``pointer'' measurement and readout. For this system, wMR posits that the outcome of ${\stackrel{\ifmmode \hat{}\else \^{}\fi{}}{S}}_{\ensuremath{\theta}}$ is determined and not changed by interactions that might subsequently occur at a remote system
B. The premise wMR also posits a weaker version of EPR's criterion for reality. Importantly, we show that the GHZ and Bell predictions are consistent with wMR. Yet, an EPR paradox arises for a macroscopic EPR-Bohm state, based on wMR. As considered by Schr\"odinger, it is possible to measure two complementary spins of system
A simultaneously, ``one by direct, the other by indirect measurement'': If we assume wMR, then once both settings are fixed, the outcomes of the two spins are both determined. We revisit the original EPR paradox and find a similar result: An EPR argument can be based on a set of premises, weak local realism, which we show are not falsifiable by GHZ or Bell experiments.