Satellite based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is currently the only viable technology to span thousands of kilometres. Since the typical overhead pass of a satellite lasts for a few minutes, it is crucial to increase the the signal rate to maximise the secret key length. For the QUARC CubeSat mission due to be launched within two years, we are designing a dual wavelength, weak-coherent-pulse decoy-state Bennett- Brassard ’84 (WCP DS BB84) QKD source. The optical payload is designed in a 12×9×5cm3 bespoke aluminium casing. The Discrete Variable QKD Source consists of two symmetric sources operating at 785 nm and 808 nm. The laser diodes are fixed to produce Horizontal,Vertical, Diagonal, and Anti-diagonal (H,V,D,A) polarisation respectively, which are combined and attenuated to a mean photon number of 0.3 and 0.5 photons/pulse. We ensure that the source is secure against most side channel attacks by spatially mode filtering the output beam and characterising their spectral and temporal characterstics. The extinction ratio of the source contributes to the intrinsic Qubit Error Rate(QBER) with 0.817±0.001%. This source operates at 200MHz, which is enough to provide secure key rates of a few kilo bits per second despite 40 dB of estimated loss in the free space channel.1
Satellite based Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) is currently the only viable technology to span thousands of kilometres. Since the typical overhead pass of a satellite lasts for a few minutes, it is crucial to increase the the signal rate to maximise the secret key length. For the QUARC CubeSat mission due to be launched within two years, we are designing a dual wavelength, weak-coherent-pulse decoy-state Bennett- Brassard ’84 (WCP DS BB84) QKD source. The optical payload is designed in a 12×9×5cm3 bespoke aluminium casing. The Discrete Variable QKD Source consists of two symmetric sources operating at 785 nm and 808 nm. The laser diodes are fixed to produce Horizontal,Vertical, Diagonal, and Anti-diagonal (H,V,D,A) polarisation respectively, which are combined and attenuated to a mean photon number of 0.3 and 0.5 photons/pulse. We ensure that the source is secure against most side channel attacks by spatially mode filtering the output beam and characterising their spectral and temporal characterstics. The extinction ratio of the source contributes to the intrinsic Qubit Error Rate(QBER) with 0.817±0.001%. This source operates at 200MHz, which is enough to provide secure key rates of a few kilo bits per second despite 40 dB of estimated loss in the free space channel.1
To enable practical real-time quantum key distribution (QKD) over free-space links, such as for satellite-to-ground secure communications, the encoding rate of the system should be sufficiently high to distribute long keys (>106bits) in a short period of time (< 300 seconds) [1]. Here, we report an optical assembly and driving electronics designed to form a low-size}, weight and power (SWaP) QKD transmitter, which can operate at gigahertz clock rates. The QKD transmitter employs multiple vertical cavity surface emission lasers (VCSELs), which provide a low power and high polarization extinction ratio (PER) source of weak coherent pulses of light. These light pulses are combined using an intrinsically stable optical combining module utilising polarization-maintaining fiber. In the experiments presented we employ discrete variable QKD via the decoy-state BB84 protocol to achieve high secure key rates over large channel losses [2]. We characterise the source using a free-space polarization decoder over short free-space links within the laboratory and explore the performance of the system with commercially available single photon detectors. Fig. 1 Plot showing the effect of varying the channel loss over the free-space link. We show the measured quantum bit error rate (blue circles), sifting rate (green triangles) and secure key rate (red squares) alongside the rates simulated using the measured system parameters (solid lines). We characterise the system up to ~38 db of channel loss, revealing positive key rates at relatively high channel loss.
Satellite-ground quantum key distribution has embarked on the stage of engineering implementation, and a global quantum-secured network is imminent in the foreseeable future. As one payload of the quantum-science satellite which will be ready before the end of 2015, we report our recent work of the space-bound decoy-state optical source. Specialized 850 nm laser diodes have been manufactured and the integrated optical source has gotten accomplished based on these LDs. The weak coherent pulses produced by our optical source feature a high clock rate of 100 MHz, intensity stability of 99.5%, high polarization fidelity of 99.7% and phase randomization. A series of space environment tests have been conducted to verify the optical source's performance and the results are satisfactory. The emulated final secure keys are about 120 kbits during one usable pass of the low Earth orbit satellite. This work takes a significant step forward towards satellite-ground QKD and the global quantum-secured network.
As more aspects of modern society depend on digital communication, we increasingly rely on infrastructure that ensures the privacy and security of this communication. Classically, this has been provided by cryptographic protocols such as public-key encryption, in which secrets called keys are exchanged between different parties to enable secure communication. The rapid development of quantum algorithms which violate the assumptions of these protocols, however, poses a security challenge to modern cryptography. \n \nQuantum resources can also be used to strengthen cryptographic security, particularly the security of key exchange protocols. This approach, QKD, can be implemented by encoding in quantum systems such as single photons sent through free-space or a fiber. Fiber based QKD devices are already commercially available, but are fundamentally limited to distributing keys over a few hundred kilometers. To address this distance limitation, research QKD systems are being developed to exchange keys through free-space to satellites. This work considers practical challenges to building and testing both types of QKD devices. \n \nFirstly, we consider modeling and mission analysis for airborne demonstrations of QKD to stratospheric balloons and aircraft to simulate a satellite. Based on the mission parameters available for both platforms, we found aircraft platforms were more promising for testing prototype QKD satellite systems. We developed a mission planning tool to help design the flight geometries for testing the device. \n \nNext, we developed three new components for a QKD satellite prototype. The requirements for electro-optical devices in orbit are very different from lab environments, mandating new approaches to designing QKD devices. We developed a quad single photon detector package to meet the requirements for free-space links to low earth orbit. Moreover, we designed and built optical systems for analyzing the polarization of photons and an adaptive optics unit to increase the efficiency of collecting the encoded photons. All three devices were tested in conditions that simulated the time and loss of a satellite pass. \n \nFinally, we demonstrated a laser damage attack on a live commercial QKD system. Our attack injected additional optical power into the sender device to modify security-critical components. Specifically, our attack damaged the PIN diodes which monitor the encoded photon number, reducing their sensitivity or completely blinding them. Our damage could compromise the entire key, and was performed during system operation while raising no alarms. \n \nIn summary, this work shows the trade-offs of testing QKD payloads on different airborne platforms, develops components for a satellite QKD payload, and demonstrates a security vulnerability in a commercial QKD system that can fully compromise the key. These results help address practical challenges to building QKD devices, improving the security of modern cryptography.
In Quantum Key Distribution (QKD), the emitter and receiver need to share an optical quantum channel - which can be optical fibre, terrestrial free-space or space-based links- to exchange the quantum states. However, with the future aim to achieve a quantum global communication network, communications links between small satellites in constellations will be required. In this context, the experience of INTA in the ANSER (Advanced Nanosatellite Systems for Earth Observation Research) small satellite constellation program will be exploited. This program develops a set of missions that will include groupings of a minimum of three CubeSats (a leader and two or more followers) flying in formation and in coordinated operation for a common mission. Therefore, the only difference between ANSER and Q-ANSER program will be the payload of the satellite. In Q-ANSER, in which a prepare-and-measure B92 QKD protocol will be used to generate the secret key, two optical systems will be introduced. In the emitter this system will be capable of sending polarized weak coherent laser pulses, attenuated to single-photon level, to the receiver, which will also be an optical system capable of receiving and detecting these single photons. Prepare-and-measure QKD schemes with polarization encoding require the minimization of polarization degradation both in the transmitter and receiver designs. In particular, the polarization extinction ratio (PER) should be maintained as high as possible to reduce the quantum bit error rate (QBER) . This polarization control will be done with the polarization modulators based on liquid crystals developed by INTA.
Experimental realization of entanglement-based quantum key distribution (QKD) in a daylight-uplink (ground-to-satellite) communication channel is highly challenging due to the very low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of this configuration, and it has yet to be successfully implemented to date. While current research efforts focus on weak coherent pulse (WCP) sources for daylight QKD, we present a proof-of-principle laboratory demonstration emulating daylight-uplink QKD in a free-space-fiber hybrid configuration using polarization-entangled photon pairs generated via a spontaneous parametric down-conversion (SPDC) process. The emulated uplink channel attenuation reaches up to 50 dB, equivalent to low-earth-orbit (LEO) distances. Furthermore, the detected noise level (up to a few MHz) in the receiver telescope is representative of daylight conditions. The enhancement of SNR is achieved by implementing rigorous filtering on spatial, spectral, and temporal modes. Our ultra-bright source of entangled photons, characterized by a narrow spectral bandwidth of 0.54 nm FWHM, ensures minimal signal attenuation. Using a theoretical model, we estimate the conditional feasibility of entanglement-based QKD for daylight-uplink LEO satellite links up to approximately 400 km, subject to the experimentally motivated system assumptions adopted in this work, including efficient single-mode fiber (SMF) coupling performance.
In the age of information and globalisation, secure communication as well as the protection of sensitive data against unauthorised access are of utmost importance. Quantum cryptography currently provides the only way to exchange a cryptographic key between two parties in an unconditionally secure fashion. Owing to losses and noise of today's optical fibre and detector technology, at present quantum cryptography is limited to distances below a few 100 km. In principle, larger distances could be subdivided into shorter segments, but the required quantum repeaters are still beyond current technology. An alternative approach for bridging larger distances is a satellite-based system, that would enable secret key exchange between two arbitrary points on the globe using free-space optical communication. The aim of the presented experiment was to investigate the feasibility of satellite-based global quantum key distribution. In this context, a free-space quantum key distribution experiment over a real distance of 144 km was performed. The transmitter and the receiver were situated in 2500 m altitude on the Canary Islands of La Palma and Tenerife, respectively. The small and compact transmitter unit generated attenuated laser pulses, that were sent to the receiver via a 15-cm optical telescope. The receiver unit for polarisation analysis and detection of the sent pulses was integrated into an existing mirror telescope designed for classical optical satellite communications. To ensure the required stability and efficiency of the optical link in the presence of atmospheric turbulence, the two telescopes were equipped with a bi-directional automatic tracking system. Still, due to stray light and high optical attenuation, secure key exchange would not be possible using attenuated pulses in connection with the standard BB84 protocol. The photon number statistics of attenuated pulses follows a Poissonian distribution. Hence, by removing a photon from all pulses containing two or more photons, an eavesdropper could measure its polarisation without disturbing the polarisation state of the remaining pulse. In this way, he can gain information about the key without introducing detectable errors. To protect against such attacks, the presented experiment employed the recently developed method of using additional "decoy" states, i.e., the the intensity of the pulses created by the transmitter were varied in a random manner. By analysing the detection probabilities of the different pulses individually, a photon-number-splitting attack can be detected. Thanks to the decoy-state analysis, the secrecy of the resulting quantum key could be ensured despite the Poissonian nature of the emitted pulses. For a channel attenuation as high as 35 dB, a secret key rate of up to 250 bit/s was achieved. Our outdoor experiment was carried out under real atmospheric conditions and with a channel attenuation comparable to an optical link from ground to a satellite in low earth orbit. Hence, it definitely shows the feasibility of satellite-based quantum key distribution using a technologically comparatively simple system.