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arXiv:2210.15396 · Leibniz international proceedings in informatics

Quantum Security of Subset Cover Problems

Samuel Bouaziz--Ermann, Alex B. Grilo, Damien Vergnaud

Published Oct 27, 2022• 1 citation
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Abstract

The subset cover problem for $k \geq 1$ hash functions, which can be seen as an extension of the collision problem, was introduced in 2002 by Reyzin and Reyzin to analyse the security of their hash-function based signature scheme HORS. The security of many hash-based signature schemes relies on this problem or a variant of this problem (e.g. HORS, SPHINCS, SPHINCS+, $\dots$). Recently, Yuan, Tibouchi and Abe (2022) introduced a variant to the subset cover problem, called restricted subset cover, and proposed a quantum algorithm for this problem. In this work, we prove that any quantum algorithm needs to make $Ω\left((k+1)^{-\frac{2^{k}}{2^{k+1}-1}}\cdot N^{\frac{2^{k}-1}{2^{k+1}-1}}\right)$ queries to the underlying hash functions with codomain size $N$ to solve the restricted subset cover problem, which essentially matches the query complexity of the algorithm proposed by Yuan, Tibouchi and Abe. We also analyze the security of the general $(r,k)$-subset cover problem, which is the underlying problem that implies the unforgeability of HORS under a $r$-chosen message attack (for $r \geq 1$). We prove that a generic quantum algorithm needs to make $Ω\left(N^{k/5}\right)$ queries to the underlying hash functions to find a $(1,k)$-subset cover. We also propose a quantum algorithm that finds a $(r,k)$-subset cover making $O\left(N^{k/(2+2r)}\right)$ queries to the $k$ hash functions.

DOI
10.4230/lipics.itc.2023.9

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The subset cover problem for k≥1k \geq 1k≥1 hash functions, which can be seen as an extension of the collision problem, was introduced in 2002 by Reyzin and Reyzin to analyse the security of their hash-function based signature scheme HORS. The security of many hash-based signature schemes relies on this problem or a variant of this problem (e.g. HORS, SPHINCS, SPHINCS+, …\dots…). Recently, Yuan, Tibouchi and Abe (2022) introduced a variant to the subset cover problem, called restricted subset cover, and proposed a quantum algorithm for this problem. In this work, we prove that any quantum algorithm needs to make Ω((k+1)−2k2k+1−1⋅N2k−12k+1−1)Ω\left((k+1)^{-\frac{2^{k}}{2^{k+1}-1}}\cdot N^{\frac{2^{k}-1}{2^{k+1}-1}}\right)Ω((k+1)−2k+1−12k​⋅N2k+1−12k−1​) queries to the underlying hash functions with codomain size NNN to solve the restricted subset cover problem, which essentially matches the query complexity of the algorithm proposed by Yuan, Tibouchi and Abe. We also analyze the security of the general (r,k)(r,k)(r,k)-subset cover problem, which is the underlying problem that implies the unforgeability of HORS under a rrr-chosen message attack (for r≥1r \geq 1r≥1). We prove that a generic quantum algorithm needs to make Ω(Nk/5)Ω\left(N^{k/5}\right)Ω(Nk/5) queries to the underlying hash functions to find a (1,k)(1,k)(1,k)-subset cover. We also propose a quantum algorithm that finds a (r,k)(r,k)(r,k)-subset cover making O(Nk/(2+2r))O\left(N^{k/(2+2r)}\right)O(Nk/(2+2r)) queries to the kkk hash functions.
Hash functions are a basic cryptographic primitive. Certain hash functions try to prove security against collision and preimage attacks by reductions to known hard problems. These hash functions usually have some additional properties that allow for that reduction. Hash functions which are additive or multiplicative are vulnerable to a quantum attack using the hidden subgroup problem algorithm for quantum computers. Using a quantum oracle to the hash, we can reconstruct the kernel of the hash function, which is enough to find collisions and second preimages. When the hash functions are additive with respect to the group operation in an Abelian group, there is always an efficient implementation of this attack. We present concrete attack examples to provable hash functions, including a preimage attack to ⊕\oplus⊕-linear hash functions and for certain multiplicative homomorphic hash schemes.
Shor's quantum factoring algorithm and a few other efficient quantum algorithms break many classical crypto-systems. In response, people proposed post-quantum cryptography based on computational problems that are believed hard even for quantum computers. However, security of these schemes against \emph{quantum} attacks is elusive. This is because existing security analysis (almost) only deals with classical attackers and arguing security in the presence of quantum adversaries is challenging due to unique quantum features such as no-cloning. This work proposes a general framework to study which classical security proofs can be restored in the quantum setting. Basically, we split a security proof into (a sequence of) classical security reductions, and investigate what security reductions are "quantum-friendly". We characterize sufficient conditions such that a classical reduction can be "lifted" to the quantum setting. We then apply our lifting theorems to post-quantum signature schemes. We are able to show that the classical generic construction of hash-tree based signatures from one-way functions and and a more efficient variant proposed in~\cite{BDH11} carry over to the quantum setting. Namely, assuming existence of (classical) one-way functions that are resistant to efficient quantum inversion algorithms, there exists a quantum-secure signature scheme. We note that the scheme in~\cite{BDH11} is a promising (post-quantum) candidate to be implemented in practice and our result further justifies it. Finally we demonstrate the generality of our framework by showing that several existing works (Full-Domain hash in the quantum random-oracle model~\cite{Zha12ibe} and the simple hybrid arguments framework in~\cite{HSS11}) can be reformulated under our unified framework.
Modern public-key cryptography relies on the hardness of mathematical problems such as integer factorization and discrete logarithms. However, the development of quantum computing poses an imminent threat to these assumptions. Shor’s algorithm, in particular, can factor large semiprimes exponentially faster than classical algorithms, compromising systems like RSA, DSA, and ECC. This paper explores the mathematical foundations of pre-quantum cryptography, discusses the limitations of classical security models when confronted with quantum capabilities, and then pays attention to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), a field dedicated to developing cryptographic schemes resilient against both classical and quantum attacks. Among the proposed families, this paper focuses specifically on hash function–based cryptography for its simplicity and minimal reliance on algebraic structure. This study focuses in particular on SPHINCS+, a stateless hash-based digital signature scheme currently under consideration by NIST. Through detailed mathematical explanation and a visual example, we analyze its construction using Winternitz One-Time Signatures and Merkle trees. The results highlight SPHINCS+ as a robust candidate for post-quantum security due to its reliance on well-understood hash primitives and its resistance to known quantum algorithms such as Grover’s. Finally, this paper discusses ongoing challenges such as performance trade-offs, standardization, and real-world deployment. This research underscores the urgency of adopting quantum-resistant cryptographic systems before large-scale quantum computers become a reality.
The fact that modern cryptographic systems are susceptible to a significant attack from quantum computing which solves complex mathematical problem exponentially faster than the classical scheme of computers makes the present situation a dangerous one. Legacy encryption methods including RSA, ECC, and AES that are the heart of secure communication are especially susceptible to quantum attacks such as Shor’s and Grover’s algorithms. To mitigate this potential threat, this research puts forth state of the art quantum-resistant technologies inclusive of lattice based cryptography and hash based signature solutions. The Lattice-Hash Hybrid method that is proposed, improves security by exploiting the computational intractability of lattice problems and the collision resistance of the hash functions, making it very hard to crack the system using quantum decryption algorithms. In the study, a comparative analysis of the proposed method with traditional lattice-based, hash-based and code-based cryptographic methods is performed. Experimental results suggest that the proposed algorithm features better encryption speed, decreased decryption latency, and increased security level as compared with the current state of the art. The results emphasize the need for the implementation of cutting edge electronic cryptography strategies to protect integrity and confidentiality of data in the days to come within the context of quantum computing. Further research will concentrate on optimizing the proposed techniques further and bringing them to real-world deployment.
Recently, Ambainis gave an O(N^(2/3))-query quantum walk algorithm for element distinctness, and more generally, an O(N^(L/(L+1)))-query algorithm for finding L equal numbers. We point out that this algorithm actually solves a much more general problem, the problem of finding a subset of size L that satisfies any given property. We review the algorithm and give a considerably simplified analysis of its query complexity. We present several applications, including two algorithms for the problem of finding an L-clique in an N-vertex graph. One of these algorithms uses O(N^(2L/(L+1))) edge queries, and the other uses \\tilde{O}(N^((5L-2)/(2L+4))), which is an improvement for L <= 5. The latter algorithm generalizes a recent result of Magniez, Santha, and Szegedy, who considered the case L=3 (finding a triangle). We also pose two open problems regarding continuous time quantum walk and lower bounds.
The use of public key cryptosystems range from securely encrypting emails and files to creating digital signatures for non-repudiation. The security of public key cryptosystems is based on computationally "unsolvable" complex mathematical problems. This tends to change with the introduction of quantum computers that undoubtedly pose a threat to the current schemes. In response to that extensive research has been conducted that resulted in several cryptosystems that are believed to be quantum resistant. This thesis presents a concise overview of multiple hash-based signature schemes and provides a comparative description and analysis of them. The comparisons are based on different signature scheme properties, such as key sizes, signature sizes and security level provided. The proposed quantum resistant schemes are also compared to the standard schemes used today, such as RSA and ECDSA.