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arXiv:2210.09025

Relative facts do not exist. Relational Quantum Mechanics is Incompatible with Quantum Mechanics. Response to the critique by Aurélien Drezet

Jay Lawrence, Markiewicz, Marcin, Marek Żukowski

Published Oct 14, 2022• 2 citations
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Abstract

In this comment we answer to the recent critique of our article [arXiv:2208.11793] about Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) by Aurélien Drezet [arXiv:2209.01237]. Here we point out that our critical analysis of RQM was precisely based on the most recent formulation of RQM, and that the theses found in the critique are based on neither RQM assumptions nor on our arguments.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2210.09025

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In this comment we answer to the recent critique of our article [arXiv:2208.11793] about Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) by Aurélien Drezet [arXiv:2209.01237]. Here we point out that our critical analysis of RQM was precisely based on the most recent formulation of RQM, and that the theses found in the critique are based on neither RQM assumptions nor on our arguments.
Abstract Lawrence et al. have presented an argument purporting to show that “relative facts do not exist” and, consequently, “Relational Quantum Mechanics is incompatible with quantum mechanics”. The argument is based on a GHZ-like contradiction between constraints satisfied by measurement outcomes in an extended Wigner’s friend scenario. Here we present a strengthened version of the argument, and show why, contrary to the claim by Lawrence et al., these arguments do not contradict the consistency of a theory of relative facts. Rather, considering this argument helps clarify how one should not think about a theory of relative facts, like RQM.
In a recent paper, Rovelli responds to our critical assessment of Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM). His main argument is that our assessment lacks merit, because we fail to understand, or cope with, the premises of his theory; instead, he argues, we judge his proposal, blinded by the preconceptions inherent to ``our camp''. Here, we explicitly show that our assessment judges RQM on its own terms, together with the basic requirements of precision, clarity, logical soundness and empirical suitability. Under those circumstances, we prove false Rovelli's claim that RQM provides a satisfactory, realistic, non-solipsistic description of the world. Moreover, his reply serves us to further exhibit the serious problems of the RQM proposal, as well as the failures of its author to understanding the basic conceptual difficulties of quantum theory.
Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) claims to be an interpretation of quantum theory \cite{Rovelli.21}. However, there are significant departures from quantum theory: (i) in RQM measurement outcomes arise from interactions which entangle a system S and an observer A without decoherence, and (ii) such an outcome is a "fact" relative to the observer A , but it is not a fact relative to another observer B who has not interacted with S or A during the foregoing measurement process. For B the system S⊗A remains entangled. We derive a GHZ-like contradiction showing that relative facts described by these statements are incompatible with quantum theory. Hence Relational Quantum Mechanics should not be considered an interpretation of quantum theory, according to a criterion for interpretations that we have introduced. The criterion states that whenever an interpretation introduces a notion of outcomes, these outcomes, whatever they are, must follow the probability distribution specified by the Born rule.