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arXiv:2209.10798

Making Quantum Local Verifiers Simulable with Potential Applications to Zero-Knowledge

Lijie Chen, Ramis Movassagh

Published Sep 22, 2022• 0 citations
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Abstract

Recently Chen and Movassagh proposed the quantum Merkle tree, which is a quantum analogue of the well-known classical Merkle tree. It gives a succinct verification protocol for quantum state commitment. Although they only proved security against semi-honest provers, they conjectured its general security. Using the proposed quantum Merkle tree, they gave a quantum analogue of Kilian's succinct argument for NP, which is based on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs). A nice feature of Kilian's argument is that it can be extended to a zero-knowledge succinct argument for NP, if the underlying PCP is zero-knowledge. Hence, a natural question is whether one can also make the quantum succinct argument by Chen and Movassagh zero-knowledge as well. This work makes progress on this problem. We generalize the recent result of Broadbent and Grilo to show that any local quantum verifier can be made simulable with a minor reduction in completeness and soundness. Roughly speaking, a local quantum verifier is simulable if in the yes case, the local views of the verifier can be computed without knowing the actual quantum proof; it can be seen as the quantum analogue of the classical zero-knowledge PCPs. Hence we conjecture that applying the proposed succinct quantum argument of Chen and Movassagh to a simulable local verifier is indeed zero-knowledge.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2209.10798

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Recently Chen and Movassagh proposed the quantum Merkle tree, which is a quantum analogue of the well-known classical Merkle tree. It gives a succinct verification protocol for quantum state commitment. Although they only proved security against semi-honest provers, they conjectured its general security. Using the proposed quantum Merkle tree, they gave a quantum analogue of Kilian's succinct argument for NP, which is based on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs). A nice feature of Kilian's argument is that it can be extended to a zero-knowledge succinct argument for NP, if the underlying PCP is zero-knowledge. Hence, a natural question is whether one can also make the quantum succinct argument by Chen and Movassagh zero-knowledge as well. This work makes progress on this problem. We generalize the recent result of Broadbent and Grilo to show that any local quantum verifier can be made simulable with a minor reduction in completeness and soundness. Roughly speaking, a local quantum verifier is simulable if in the yes case, the local views of the verifier can be computed without knowing the actual quantum proof; it can be seen as the quantum analogue of the classical zero-knowledge PCPs. Hence we conjecture that applying the proposed succinct quantum argument of Chen and Movassagh to a simulable local verifier is indeed zero-knowledge.
Committing to information is a central task in cryptography, where a party (typically called a prover) stores a piece of information (e.g., a bit string) with the promise of not changing it. This information can be accessed by another party (typically called the verifier), who can later learn the information and verify that it was not meddled with. Merkle trees \cite{Merkle87} are a well-known construction for doing so in a succinct manner, in which the verifier can learn any part of the information by receiving a short proof from the honest prover. Despite its significance in classical cryptography, there was no quantum analog of the Merkle tree. A direct generalization using the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) \cite{BonehDFLSZ11} does not seem to be secure. In this work, we propose the quantum Merkle tree . It is based on what we call the Quantum Haar Random Oracle Model (QHROM). In QHROM, both the prover and the verifier have access to a Haar random quantum oracle G and its inverse.Using the quantum Merkle tree, we propose a succinct quantum argument for the Gap- k -Local-Hamiltonian problem. Assuming the Quantum PCP conjecture is true, this succinct argument extends to all of QMA. This work raises a number of interesting open research problems.
We show that every language in QMA admits a classical-verifier, quantum-prover zero-knowledge argument system which is sound against quantum polynomial-time provers and zero-knowledge for classical (and quantum) polynomial-time verifiers. The protocol builds upon two recent results: a computational zero-knowledge proof system for languages in QMA, with a quantum verifier, introduced by Broadbent et al. (FOCS 2016), and an argument system for languages in QMA, with a classical verifier, introduced by Mahadev (FOCS 2018).
With the rapid development of quantum computers, proofs of quantumness have recently become an interesting research direction. However, in current schemes for proofs of quantumness, quantum provers face the risk of being maliciously exploited by classical verifiers. Through malicious strategies in interaction with quantum provers, classical verifiers could solve some instances of hard problems that arise from the specific scheme in use. This is due to the lack of formalization that prevents malicious verifiers from extracting useful information in proofs of quantumness. To address this issue, we formalize zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness. Intuitively, the zero-knowledge property necessitates that the information gained by the classical verifier from interactions with the quantum prover should not surpass what can be simulated using a simulated classical prover interacting with the same verifier. As a result, the new zero-knowledge notion can prevent a malicious verifier from exploiting quantum advantage. We find that the classical zero-knowledge proof is sufficient to compile some existing proofs of quantumness schemes into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness schemes. It appears to be more general to require zero-knowledge proof on the verifier side instead of the prover side. This helps to regulate the verifier's behavior from malicious to be honest-but-curious. As a result, both parties will play not only one role in the proofs of quantumness but also the dual role in the classical zero-knowledge proof. Specifically, Shor's factoring-based scheme and the learning with errors-based scheme in [Brakerski et al., FOCS, 2018] can be transformed into zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness by requiring an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge argument on the verifier side. Zero-knowledge proofs of quantumness can thus be viewed as an enhanced security notion for proofs of quantumness.
In a proof of knowledge (PoK), a verifier becomes convinced that a prover possesses privileged information. In combination with zero-knowledge proof systems, PoKs play an important role in security protocols such as in digital signatures and authentication schemes, as they enable a prover to demonstrate possession of certain information (such as a private key or a credential), without revealing it. A PoK is formally defined via the existence of an extractor, which is capable of reconstructing the key information that makes a verifier accept, given oracle access to any accepting prover. We extend this concept to the setting of a single classical verifier and multiple quantum provers and present the first statistical zero-knowledge (ZK) PoK proof system for problems in QMA. To achieve this, we establish the PoK property for the ZK protocol of Broadbent, Mehta, and Zhao (TQC 2024), which applies to the local Hamiltonian problem. More specifically, we construct an extractor which, given oracle access to a provers' strategy that leads to high acceptance probability, is able to reconstruct the ground state of a local Hamiltonian. Our result can be seen as a new form of self-testing, where, in addition to certifying a pre-shared entangled state, the verifier also certifies that provers have access to a quantum system, in particular, a ground state; this indicates a new level of verification for a proof of quantumness.
Succinct arguments are a fundamental cryptographic primitive for verifying computational claims with small communication. In the classical setting, succinct arguments for NP can be constructed from unstructured hardness alone (e.g., hash functions) by compiling probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) or interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) for NP via the commit-and-open paradigm. In contrast, known succinct arguments for QMA rely on ``structured'' cryptographic primitives, or on the quantum PCP conjecture. We construct the first succinct argument for QMA in the quantum random oracle model (QROM) without relying on additional cryptographic assumptions or unproven conjectures. This yields succinct arguments for QMA from unstructured hardness alone, showing that ideal hash functions not only suffice for succinct arguments for NP but also for QMA. Underlying our result is an efficiency-preserving transformation that compiles quantum interactive oracle proofs (QIOPs), a recently introduced interactive generalization of quantum PCPs, into quantum arguments for the same language, via a natural quantum commit-and-open paradigm. Our transformation applies to every QIOP with public-query soundness, a notion that we formalize to capture a natural requirement of the commit-and-open paradigm and is satisfied by a known QIOP for QMA. As a key ingredient in our transformation, we formalize and construct extractable vector commitments for quantum states with local openings in the QROM, which may be of independent interest.
Prior work has established that all problems in NP admit classical zero-knowledge proof systems, and under reasonable hardness assumptions for quantum computations, these proof systems can be made secure against quantum attacks. We prove a result representing a further quantum generalization of this fact, which is that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum zero-knowledge proof system. More specifically, assuming the existence of an unconditionally binding and quantum computationally concealing commitment scheme, we prove that every problem in the complexity class QMA has a quantum interactive proof system that is zero-knowledge with respect to efficient quantum computations. Our QMA proof system is sound against arbitrary quantum provers, but only requires an honest prover to perform polynomial-time quantum computations, provided that it holds a quantum witness for a given instance of the QMA problem under consideration. The proof system relies on a new variant of the QMA-complete local Hamiltonian problem in which the local terms are described by Clifford operations and standard basis measurements. We believe that the QMA-completeness of this problem may have other uses in quantum complexity.