arXiv:2209.02639 · Quantum Reports

Personal Identity and Uncertainty in the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics

Zhonghao Lu

Published Sep 11, 2023• 2 citations

Abstract

The deterministic nature of EQM (the Everett Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics) seems to be inconsistent with the use of probability in EQM, giving rise to what is known as the “incoherence problem”. In this paper, I explore approaches to solve the incoherence problem of EQM via pre-measurement uncertainty. Previous discussions on the validity of pre-measurement uncertainty have leaned heavily on intricate aspects of the theory of semantics and reference, the embrace of either four-dimensionalism or three-dimensionalism of personhood, or the ontology of EQM. In this paper, I argue that, regardless of the adoption of three-dimensionalism or four-dimensionalism of personhood, the overlapping view or the divergence view of the ontology of EQM, the pre-measurement uncertainty approach to the incoherence problem of EQM can only achive success while contradicting fundamental principles of physicalism. I also use the divergence view of EQM as an example to illustrate my analyses.

DOI: 10.3390/quantum5030038

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