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arXiv:2205.13828

Portable ground stations for space-to-ground quantum key distribution

Ji-Gang Ren, Maimaiti Abulizi, Hai-Lin Yong, Juan Yin, Li, Xue-Jiao, Yuan Ying Jiang, Weiyang Wang, Hua-Jian Xue, Yu‐He Chen, Jin, Biao, Ya-Yun Yin, Zhou-Yu Tu, Zhu Xiao-juan, Shuang-Qiang Zhao, Fengzhi Li, Sheng‐Kai Liao, Wenqi Cai, Wei-Yue Liu, Yuan Cao, Fei Zhou, Li Li, Nai-Le Liu, Qiang Zhang, Yu-Ao Chen, Cheng-Zhi Peng, Jian-Wei Pan

Published May 27, 2022• 10 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to share unconditionally secure keys between distant users. Previous works based on the quantum science satellite "Micius" have initially demonstrated the feasibility of a global QKD network. However, the practical applications of space-based QKD still face many technical problems, such as the huge size and weight of ground stations required to receive quantum signals. Here, we report space-to-ground QKD demonstrations based on portable receiving ground stations. The weight of the portable ground station is less than 100 kg, the space required is less than 1 m$^{3}$ and the installation time requires no more than 12 hours, all of the weight, required space and deployment time are about two orders of magnitude lower than those for the previous systems. Moreover, the equipment is easy to handle and can be placed on the roof of buildings in a metropolis. Secure keys have been successfully generated from the "Micius" satellite to these portable ground stations at six different places in China, and an average final secure key length is around 50 kb can be obtained during one passage. Our results pave the way for, and greatly accelerate the practical application of, space-based QKD.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2205.13828

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics to share unconditionally secure keys between distant users. Previous works based on the quantum science satellite "Micius" have initially demonstrated the feasibility of a global QKD network. However, the practical applications of space-based QKD still face many technical problems, such as the huge size and weight of ground stations required to receive quantum signals. Here, we report space-to-ground QKD demonstrations based on portable receiving ground stations. The weight of the portable ground station is less than 100 kg, the space required is less than 1 m3^{3}3 and the installation time requires no more than 12 hours, all of the weight, required space and deployment time are about two orders of magnitude lower than those for the previous systems. Moreover, the equipment is easy to handle and can be placed on the roof of buildings in a metropolis. Secure keys have been successfully generated from the "Micius" satellite to these portable ground stations at six different places in China, and an average final secure key length is around 50 kb can be obtained during one passage. Our results pave the way for, and greatly accelerate the practical application of, space-based QKD.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can in principle offer unconditional security by making use of the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. In practice, this is typically achieved by preparing individual photons in quantum superposition states and sending them to a remote receiver. To date, most commercially available QKD systems rely on the transmission of the photons via optical fibers, which, due to channel loss and detector noise, limits the distance over which QKD is feasible to a few hundred kilometers. Alternatively, satellite-based QKD facilitates low photon loss and negligible signal disturbance and offers a viable solution for establishing a global scale quantum network. Recently, a quantum science mission of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in collaboration with the Austrian Academy of Sciences (AAS) and the University of Vienna aimed at a satellite-based intercontinental quantum-key relay. Using the Chinese Quantum Science Satellite “Micius” as a trusted relay, a quantum network consisting of three optical ground stations located in China (Xinglong, Nanshan) and Austria (Graz-Lustbühel) has been demonstrated successfully. Here we report on the development of a quantum receiving module, installed at the Satellite Laser Ranging Station in Graz (Austria) capable of implementing the so-called decoy-state QKD protocol in a downlink scenario from the LEO satellite “Micius”. Furthermore, we will present the experimental results obtained during several downlinks from the Chinese satellite focusing on the performance of the Austrian receiving station.
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the technology to generate distant secure keys for later usage in secure communication, has become a mature topic since the 1980s. While terrestrial QKD over fiber networks is suitable for short-distance urban networks, QKD via satellites promises to gap the distance requirement on a global scale that limits terrestrial QKD. Satellite QKD requires the exchange of quantum states between a satellite and multiple ground stations. The goal is then to facilitate shared secret keys between the ground stations, which can then be relayed to users near the ground stations. The satellite usually carries the quantum sources as its payload and sends them to the ground station via a downlink. The QKD protocol is heavily influenced by the choice of the quantum source, with typically one of two types: approximate single photon source (such as a weak laser) or an entangled source. Similarly, the ground station must be equipped to receive, measure and process the quantum signals sent by the satellite. Although there are also reverse schemes, where the satellite acts as the receiver and the ground station as the sender, these schemes are less explored due to higher noise in the uplink and less engineering experience. As with any system containing a high heterogeneity, many different implementation schemes lead to a variety of optimized use cases based on different criteria. Satellite QKD carries the further complication that it must be adapted to international standards. In this paper we present different satellite and ground station architectures that lean on the developments in the projects EAGLE-1, QUBE, QuNET, RoGloQuaN, addressing different protocols, sources, satellite sizes and telescope sizes. We also discuss the need for agility and configuration of components in a heterogeneous environment.
We perform decoy-state quantum key distribution between a low-Earth-orbit satellite and multiple ground stations located in Xinglong, Nanshan, and Graz, which establish satellite-to-ground secure keys with ∼kHz rate per passage of the satellite Micius over a ground station. The satellite thus establishes a secure key between itself and, say, Xinglong, and another key between itself and, say, Graz. Then, upon request from the ground command, Micius acts as a trusted relay. It performs bitwise exclusive or operations between the two keys and relays the result to one of the ground stations. That way, a secret key is created between China and Europe at locations separated by 7600 km on Earth. These keys are then used for intercontinental quantum-secured communication. This was, on the one hand, the transmission of images in a one-time pad configuration from China to Austria as well as from Austria to China. Also, a video conference was performed between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which also included a 280 km optical ground connection between Xinglong and Beijing. Our work clearly confirms the Micius satellite as a robust platform for quantum key distribution with different ground stations on Earth, and points towards an efficient solution for an ultralong-distance global quantum network.
Abstract Satellite-based quantum terminals are a feasible way to extend the reach of quantum communication protocols such as quantum key distribution (QKD) to the global scale. To that end, prior demonstrations have shown QKD transmissions from airborne platforms to receivers on ground, but none have shown QKD transmissions from ground to a moving aircraft, the latter scenario having simplicity and flexibility advantages for a hypothetical satellite. Here, we demonstrate QKD from a ground transmitter to a receiver prototype mounted on an airplane in flight. We have specifically designed our receiver prototype to consist of many components that are compatible with the environment and resource constraints of a satellite. Coupled with our relocatable ground station system, optical links with distances of 3–10 km were maintained and quantum signals transmitted while traversing angular rates similar to those observed of low-Earth-orbit satellites. For some passes of the aircraft over the ground station, links were established within 10 s of position data transmission, and with link times of a few minutes and received quantum bit error rates typically ≈3%–5% , we generated secure keys up to 868 kb in length. By successfully generating secure keys over several different pass configurations, we demonstrate the viability of technology that constitutes a quantum receiver satellite payload and provide a blueprint for future satellite missions to build upon.
Abstract Satellite-based platforms are currently the only feasible way of achieving intercontinental range for quantum communication, enabling thus the future global quantum internet. Recent demonstrations by the Chinese spacecraft Micius have spurred an international space race and enormous interest in the development of both scientific and commercial systems. Research efforts so far have concentrated upon in-orbit demonstrations involving a single satellite and one or two ground stations. Ultimately satellite quantum key distribution should enable secure network communication between multiple nodes, which requires efficient scheduling of communication with the set of ground stations. Here we present a study of how satellite quantum key distribution can service many ground stations taking into account realistic constraints such as geography, operational hours, and most importantly, weather conditions. The objective is to maximise the number of keys a set of ground stations located in the United Kingdom could share while simultaneously reflecting the communication needs of each node and its relevance in the network. The problem is formulated as a mixed-integer linear optimisation program and solved to a desired optimality gap using a state of the art solver. The approach is presented using a simulation run throughout six years to investigate the total number of keys that can be sent to ground stations.
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a revolutionary technology which leverages the laws of quantum mechanics to distribute cryptographic keying material between two parties with theoretically unconditional security. Terrestrial QKD systems are limited to distances of <;200 km in both optical fiber and line-of-sight free-space configurations due to severe losses during single photon propagation and the curvature of the Earth. Thus, the feasibility of fielding a low Earth orbit (LEO) QKD satellite to overcome this limitation is being explored. Moreover, in August 2016, the Chinese Academy of Sciences successfully launched the world's first QKD satellite. However, many of the practical engineering performance and security tradeoffs associated with space-based QKD are not well understood for global secure key distribution. This paper presents several system-level considerations for modeling and studying space-based QKD architectures and systems. More specifically, this paper explores the behaviors and requirements that researchers must examine to develop a model for studying the effectiveness of QKD between LEO satellites and ground stations.