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arXiv:2205.11820 · Journal of the Physical Society of Japan

Security against Collective Attacks for a Continuous-Variable Quantum Key Distribution Protocol Using Homodyne Detection and Postselection

Ryo Namiki

Published Dec 2, 2022• 2 citations
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Abstract

We analyze the security against collective attacks for a homodyne-based continuous-variable quantum key distribution protocol using binary coherent states and postselection. We derive a lower bound of the secret key rate in an asymptotic scenario, and numerically optimize it for the case of a symmetric Gaussian channel.
DOI
10.7566/jpsj.92.014001

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