A thought-experiment is described and the probability of a particular type of results is predicted according to the quantum formalism. Then, the assumption is made that there exists a particle that travels from the source to one of the detectors, along a continuous trajectory. A contradiction appears: for agreeing with the quantum prediction, the particle has to land at once on two space-separated detectors. Therefore, the trajectory of the particle—if it exists—cannot be continuous.
A thought-experiment is described and the probability of a particular type of results is predicted according to the quantum formalism. Then, the assumption is made that there exists a particle that travels from the source to one of the detectors, along a continuous trajectory. A contradiction appears: for agreeing with the quantum prediction, the particle has to land at once on two space-separated detectors. Therefore, the trajectory of the particle—if it exists—cannot be continuous.
It is in general accepted that the concept of continuous trajectories for particles is at odds with the relativistic quantum mechanics. Namely, when examining the evolution of entangled quantum objects according to frames of coordinates in relative move-ment, one gets contradictory trajectories. Such a situation is typically derived from the famous “Hardy’s paradox”. However, it is argued here that if the rationale ignores the principle of quantum contextuality, as happens typically when using Hardy’s thought-experiment, the conclusion—rejection of the assumption of trajectories—is questionable. The issue is exemplified by an additional example: the 101 property of spin 1 bosons implies conflicting trajectories when the singlet state of two such bosons is examined according to frames in relative movement. It is concluded here that in the absence of a rationale which doesn’t violate the quantum contextuality, there are no sufficient arguments for refuting the possibility of a substructure of the quantum mechanics, consisting in particles following continuous trajectories.
A type of mechanics will be presented that possesses some distinctive properties. On the one hand, its physical description & rules of operation are readily comprehensible & intuitively clear. On the other, it fully satisfies all observable predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. Within it, particles exist at points in space, follow continuous, piecewise differentiable paths, and their linear momentum is equal to their mass times their velocity along their path. Yet the probabilities for position and momentum, conditioned on the state of the particle's environment, follow the rules of quantum theory. Indeed, all observable consequences of quantum theory are satisfied; particles can be entangled, have intrinsic spin, this spin is not local to the particle, particle identity can effect probabilities, and so forth. All the rules of quantum mechanics are obeyed, and all arise in a straightforward fashion. After this is established, connections will be drawn out between this type of mechanics and other types of quantum worlds; those that obey Bohmian mechanics, stochastic mechanics, the many worlds interpretation, and physical collapse. In the final section, a relativistic version of the mechanics will be presented.
Is the wave-function a physical reality traveling through our apparatus? Is it a real wave, or it is only a mathematical tool for calculating probabilities of results of measurements? Different interpretations of the quantum mechanics (QM) assume different answers to this question. It is shown in this article that the assumption that the wave-function is a real wave entails a contradiction with the predictions of the QM, when the special relativity is invoked. Therefore, this text concentrates on interpretations that conjecture that the reality that moves in our apparatuses is particles, and they move under the constraints of the wave-function. The de Broglie-Bohm interpretation, which matches this picture, assumes that the particle travels along a continuous trajectory. However, the idea of continuous trajectories was proved to lead to a contradiction with the quantum predictions. Therefore this interpretation is not considered here. S. Gao conjectured that the particle is in a permanent random and discontinuous motion (RDM). As it jumps all the time from place to place, the total set of occupied positions at a certain time is given by the absolute square of the wave-function. As motivation for his idea, Gao argued that if a charged particle were simultaneously in two or more locations at the same time, the copies of the particle would repel one another, destroying the wave-function. It is proved here that the quantum formalism renders this motivation wrong. Although refuting this motivation, the RDM interpretation is examined here. A couple of problems of this interpretation are examined and it is proved that they don’t lead to any observable contradictions with the QM predictions, except one problem which seems to have no solution. In all, it appears that none of the wide-spread interpretations of the QM is free of contradictions.
The quantum systems we have discussed so far have been described by finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces. Basic measurements on such systems have a finite number of possible outcomes, and a quantum state predicts a discrete probability distribution over these. Now we wish to extend our theory to handle systems with one or more continuous degrees of freedom, such as the position of a particle that can move in one dimension. This will require an extension of our theory to Hilbert spaces of infinite dimension, and to systems with continuous observables.
The hypothesis of empty/full waves considers that a click in a detector is triggered by a property carried by the wave-packet that impinges on that detector. Different authors call this property particle, but according to the terminology of this hypothesis, the term full wave is used in this text. The present article discusses the validity of the empty/full waves hypothesis. It is shown that the energy conservation principle imposes for a full wave a continuous trajectory from the source to the detector. That gives legitimacy to the question -- in case the wave function consists in a couple of space-separated branches -- which wave-packet was a full wave before the click in the detector, or, in other authors' terminology, where was the particle before the detector clicked. This question is a counterfactual question. In some multi-particle experiments, e.g. Hardy's thought-experiment with an electron and a positron, the combination of the empty/full waves hypothesis and counterfactual reasoning leads to a contradiction with the predictions of the quantum theory. However, it is shown here that this contradiction is solvable if the locality requirement is relaxed. To the difference from the local hidden variables, it is not possible to prove or disprove the idea of empty/ full waves, at least at present. But it is possible to ask whether this hypothesis offers a solution to the quantum puzzles. The answer is negative. For instance it offers no solution to the before-before loop. The question remains open whether the empty/full waves hypothesis is correct, or "God plays dice".
We attempt to answer several questions relating to the presence of a particle, with known initial state, in a given region of space during a given period of time. In the process, we try to extend the quantum theory of observation to the case in which the observation goes on continuously. Although this mode of observation is common in practice, the theory does not seem to describe it adequately. In general, questions like those that we are asking do not have simple, unambiguous answers in quantum theory. In order to approach such a question, we usually have to assume that the particle interacts with something in the space-time region of interest, and then to infer the probability of the particle's presence from the probability of its interacting with the other object. This fact suggests either that we are asking the wrong questions or that perhaps quantum mechanics should be regarded as a theory of interaction events rather than a theory of systems.