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arXiv:2203.02064 · Research

Securing Data in Multimode Fibers by Exploiting Mode-Dependent Light Propagation Effects

Stefan Rothe, Karl-Ludwig Besser, David Krause, Robert Kuschmierz, Nektarios Koukourakis, Eduard Axel Jorswieck, Jürgen W. Czarske

Published Jan 1, 2023• 32 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Multimode fibers hold great promise to advance data rates in optical communications but come with the challenge to compensate for modal crosstalk and mode-dependent losses, resulting in strong distortions. The holographic measurement of the transmission matrix enables not only correcting distortions but also harnessing these effects for creating a confidential data connection between legitimate communication parties, Alice and Bob. The feasibility of this physical-layer-security-based approach is demonstrated experimentally for the first time on a multimode fiber link to which the eavesdropper Eve is physically coupled. Once the proper structured light field is launched at Alice's side, the message can be delivered to Bob, and, simultaneously, the decipherment for an illegitimate wiretapper Eve is destroyed. Within a real communication scenario, we implement wiretap codes and demonstrate confidentiality by quantifying the level of secrecy. Compared to an uncoded data transmission, the amount of securely exchanged data is enhanced by a factor of 538. The complex light transportation phenomena that have long been considered limiting and have restricted the widespread use of multimode fiber are exploited for opening new perspectives on information security in spatial multiplexing communication systems.

DOI
10.34133/research.0065

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Multimode fibers hold great promise to advance data rates in optical communications but come with the challenge to compensate for modal crosstalk and mode-dependent losses, resulting in strong distortions. The holographic measurement of the transmission matrix enables not only correcting distortions but also harnessing these effects for creating a confidential data connection between legitimate communication parties, Alice and Bob. The feasibility of this physical-layer-security-based approach is demonstrated experimentally for the first time on a multimode fiber link to which the eavesdropper Eve is physically coupled. Once the proper structured light field is launched at Alice's side, the message can be delivered to Bob, and, simultaneously, the decipherment for an illegitimate wiretapper Eve is destroyed. Within a real communication scenario, we implement wiretap codes and demonstrate confidentiality by quantifying the level of secrecy. Compared to an uncoded data transmission, the amount of securely exchanged data is enhanced by a factor of 538. The complex light transportation phenomena that have long been considered limiting and have restricted the widespread use of multimode fiber are exploited for opening new perspectives on information security in spatial multiplexing communication systems.
Holographic transmission matrix measurements of optical multimode fibre communication channels enable optical precoding on the transmitter-side exploiting the physical layer. This approach can achieve a crucial SNR advantage for legitimate communication participants over illegitamte ones, such as an eavesdropper. We present measurements on a 55-mode fibre channel including transmitter Alice and receiver Bob, to which an eavesdropper Eve is physically coupled. Alice performs a programmable optical precoding through an SLM based on singular value decomposition enabling space division multiplexing. Demonstration of confidential data transmission is based on measurements from both channels Alice/Bob and Alice/Eve, which are used for determining the achievable amount of securely exchanged data between Alice and Bob, i.e. secrecy rate. Results are shown on step-index fibres of up to 100 m length.
The light propagation through a multimode fiber is used to increase information security during data transmission without the need for cryptographic approaches. The use of an inverse precoding method in a multimode fiber-optic communication network is based on mode-dependent losses on the physical layer. This leads to an asymmetry between legitimate (Bob) and illegitimate (Eve) recipients of messages, resulting in significant SNR advantage for Bob. In combination with dynamic mode channel changes, there are defined hurdles for Eve to reconstruct a sent message even in a worst-case scenario in which she knows the channel completely. This is the first time that physical layer security has been investigated in a fiber optical network based on measured transmission matrices. The results show that messages can be sent securely using traditional communication techniques. The technology introduced is a step towards the development of cyber physical systems with increased security.
Optical networks are vulnerable to physical layer attacks; wiretappers can improperly receive messages intended for legitimate recipients. Multimode fiber (MMF) transmission can be modeled via a broadcast channel in which both the legitimate receiver's and wiretapper's channels are multiple-input-multiple-output complex Gaussian channels. This work considers the theoretical aspects of this security problem in the domain of a broadcast channel. Source-channel coding analyses based on the use of distortion as the metric for secrecy are developed. Alice has a source sequence to be encoded and transmitted over this broadcast channel so that the legitimate user Bob can reliably decode it while forcing the distortion of the wiretapper, or eavesdropper, Eve's estimate to be as high as possible. Tradeoffs between transmission rate and distortion under two extreme scenarios are examined: the best case where Eve has only her channel output and the worst case where she also knows the past realization of the source. It is shown that under the best case, an operationally separate source-channel coding scheme guarantees maximum distortion at the same rate as needed for reliable transmission. Theoretical bounds are given, and particularized for MMF. Numerical results showing the rate distortion tradeoff are presented and compared with corresponding results for the perfect secrecy case.
In fiber-optic communication networks, research on data security at lower layers of the protocol stack and in particular at the physical layer by means of information-theoretic concepts is only in the beginning. Nevertheless, it has recently attracted quite some attention as it holds the promise of providing unconditional, perfect security without the need for secret key exchanges. In this paper, we analyze some important constraints that such concepts put on a potential implementation of physical-layer security. We review the fundamentals of physical-layer security on the basis of the commonly used AWGN wiretap channel model. For such channel model we summarize the security metrics which are typically used in information theory and in particular recall that, for secure communication over the AWGN channel, the legitimate receiver needs an SNR advantage over the eavesdropper. Next, we relate the information theoretic metrics to physically measurable quantities in optical communications engineering, namely optical signal-to-noise ratio (OSNR) and bit-error ratio (BER), and translate the information-theoretic wiretap scenario to a simple real-world point-to-point optical transmission link in which part of the light is wiretapped using a bend coupler. We investigate the achievable OSNR advantage under realistic assumptions for fiber loss, tap ratio, and noise budget and find that secure transmission is limited to a distance of a few tens of kilometers in this case. The maximum secure transmission distance decreases with an increasing tap ratio chosen by the eavesdropper. This can be only counteracted by monitoring the link loss towards the legitimate receiver which would force the eavesdropper to choose small tap ratios in order to remain undetected. In an outlook towards further research directions we identify information-theoretic approaches which could potentially allow to realize physical-layer security in more generalized scenarios or over longer distances.
Space-division multiplexed (SDM) fiber optic transmission systems can not only increase system capacity, but also achieve physical-layer security against fiber tapping attacks. In this paper, we examine the information-theoretic security of optical multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) SDM by evaluating the tradeoff between the achievable information rate and the confidentiality for different channel dynamics. In particular, we provide problem formulations for secure communication over these channels and study three types of secrecy capacities: 1) guaranteed capacity; 2) outage capacity; and 3) average capacity, each serving as a performance metric for a coding strategy tailored to a specific type of MIMO-SDM channel. We also assess the impact of key system parameters, such as the number of modes, the mode-dependent loss (MDL), and the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), on the various secrecy capacities. Our results indicate that, with a proper design of channel codes that balance information rate and security, an SDM system has the potential of offering confidential data transmission at a rate that could be orders of magnitude higher than what can be achieved through other means of encryption. Moreover, we show that MDL, unavoidably induced by fiber tapping, can allow information-theoretic security even if the SNR of the eavesdropper's receiver is better than that of the legitimate receiver.