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arXiv:2106.10500 · IEEE Journal of Quantum Electronics

Experimental Side Channel Analysis of BB84 QKD Source

Ayan Biswas, Anindya Banerji, Pooja Chandravanshi, Rupesh Kumar, Ravindra Pratap Singh

Published Sep 9, 2021• 26 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same characteristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating mutual information between source and eavesdropper. Based on our experimental observations of cross correlation between parameter values for different laser diodes, we suggest methods to reduce information leakage to Eve.

DOI
10.1109/jqe.2021.3111332

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A typical implementation of BB84 protocol for quantum communication uses four laser diodes for transmitting weak coherent pulses, which may not have the same characteristics. We have characterized these lasers for mismatch in various parameters such as spectral width, pulse width, spatial mode, peak wavelength, polarization and their arrival times at the receiver. This information is utilized to calculate possible information leakage through side channel attacks by evaluating mutual information between source and eavesdropper. Based on our experimental observations of cross correlation between parameter values for different laser diodes, we suggest methods to reduce information leakage to Eve.
In principle BB84 protocol supports secure quantum communication by assuming transmitter and receiver devices to be ideal. However, practically it is very challenging to build an ideal single photon source and detector. These imperfections in practical devices (i.e., wavelength mismatch, full width at half maximum (FWHM) pulse width mismatch and different arrival times of photon) leads to side channel attacks. In this work, we have analyzed the wavelength mismatch issue associated with four laser diode based practical BB84 transmitter. An asymptotically achievable rate of extraction of secure key (also known as key generation rate) is estimated from side-channel leakage calculation between transmitter (Alice) and adversary (Eve).
For a compact quantum key distribution (QKD) sender for the polarization encoding BB84 protocol, an eavesdropper could take a side-channel attack by measuring the spatial information of photons to infer their polarizations. The possibility of this attack can be reduced by introducing an aperture in the QKD sender, however, the effect of the aperture on the QKD security lacks of quantitative analysis. In this paper, we analyze the mutual information between the actual keys encoded at this QKD sender and the inferred keys at the eavesdropper (Eve), demonstrating the effect of the aperture to eliminate the spatial side-channel information quantitatively. It shows that Eve’s potential on eavesdropping spatial side-channel information is totally dependent on the optical design of the QKD sender, including the source arrangement and the aperture. The height of compact QKD senders with integrated light-emitting diode (LED) arrays could be controlled under several millimeters, showing great potential on applications in portable equipment.
High-speed is one development tendency of the practical and commercial quantum key distribution (QKD) systems, and the gain-switched semiconductor laser (GSSL) and Sagnac interferometer have been popular components for high-speed commercial polarization-based BB84 QKD systems thanks to their stability, compactness and low cost. However, due to the finite extinction ratio (ER) of the GSSL, the time-dependent source side-channel, which is theoretically presented in [Phys. Rev. A106(6): 062618 (2022)10.1103/PhysRevA.106.062618], also exists in these QKD systems. In this article, we experimentally investigate this side-channel in the polarization-based BB84 QKD system. The results show an obvious correlation in the output polarization states between the weak leakage light and its adjacent pulses, which will cause information to leak. More importantly, we have proposed several countermeasures, retested the side channel, and developed a mathematical framework to quantitatively assess the impact of the time-dependent side channel and these countermeasures on the secure key rate. Finally, we offer a trade-off analysis that considers defense effectiveness, pulse impact, and cost for various countermeasures in QKD. This provides a practical recommendation for improving the security of QKD systems.
Practical implementations of QKD protocols involve devices which are not perfect, and an eavesdropper may exploit this to gain information leading to attacks. Here we have considered the effects of coupling mismatch between the detectors. We find possible information leakage to Eve due to coupling mismatch at the receiver’s detectors in terms of mutual information between the eavesdropper and receiver. The experiment has been performed for the Gaussian and Laguerre-Gaussian modes of the signal. This aspect becomes essential while implementing free space QKD using a satellite. The results suggest that accounting for detection coupling mismatch is crucial to avoid side-channel attacks.
One of the key assumptions in the security proof of BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with a weak coherent light source is that the phase of each pulse emitted from the source is random. If the phases correlated, an efficient eavesdropping method exists, and more sacrifice bits are necessary to guarantee the security of the protocol. The phase correlation between the adjacent pulses was examined experimentally, for the first time, by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode driven by 10 GHz clock signal. Clear interference was observed when the DC bias current exceeds the laser threshold. This high visibility implies phase correlation between pulses. In contrast, only a low visibility, i.e. very weak phase correlation, was observed when the DC bias current was set far below the threshold. The phase correlation became stronger as the DC bias current increased. The experimental results imply that a QKD equipment implementing BB84 protocol with a coherent light source is secure as long as the laser is operated in gain-switch even for 10 GHz clock frequency.
One of the key assumptions in the security proof of BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol with a weak coherent light source is that the phase of each pulse emitted from the source is random. If the phases correlated, an efficient eavesdropping method exists, and more sacrifice bits are necessary to guarantee the security of the protocol. The phase correlation between the adjacent pulses was examined experimentally, for the first time, by measuring the visibility of interference. An asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer was used to observe the interference between adjacent pulses from a distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode driven by 10 GHz clock signal. Clear interference was observed when the DC bias current exceeds the laser threshold. This high visibility implies phase correlation between pulses. In contrast, only a low visibility, i.e. very weak phase correlation, was observed when the DC bias current was set far below the threshold. The phase correlation became stronger as the DC bias current increased. The experimental results imply that a QKD equipment implementing BB84 protocol with a coherent light source is secure as long as the laser is operated in gain-switch even for 10 GHz clock frequency.