We are interested here in the program of reconstruction of quantum mechanics of the German physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, which still has some supporters today. In the major part of this article, we limit ourselves to examining purely epistemological and philosophical questions. The theory of the German physicist is often interpreted with reference to Kant, but the most of the time in a rather vague way (categories of understanding, theory of experience). We can afford to be more precise. First we situate the theory of fundamental alternatives (or Ur-alternatives) of von Weizsäcker in the lineage of the Kantian theory of the transcendental Ideal. We then show that the physicist only substitutes for the classical logic, on which Kant relied, a quantum logic allowing to generate, from the alternatives, via the local isomorphism between certain spinor groups and groups linked to space-time, the whole of physical reality to which we have access. After examining some problems, we finally show how this perspective leads to a quantum theory of information.
We are interested here in the program of reconstruction of quantum mechanics of the German physicist and philosopher Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, which still has some supporters today. In the major part of this article, we limit ourselves to examining purely epistemological and philosophical questions. The theory of the German physicist is often interpreted with reference to Kant, but the most of the time in a rather vague way (categories of understanding, theory of experience). We can afford to be more precise. First we situate the theory of fundamental alternatives (or Ur-alternatives) of von Weizsäcker in the lineage of the Kantian theory of the transcendental Ideal. We then show that the physicist only substitutes for the classical logic, on which Kant relied, a quantum logic allowing to generate, from the alternatives, via the local isomorphism between certain spinor groups and groups linked to space-time, the whole of physical reality to which we have access. After examining some problems, we finally show how this perspective leads to a quantum theory of information.
Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker's thinking has always crossed the borders between physics and philosophy. Being a physicist by training he still feels at home in the physics community, as a philosopher by passion, however, his mind cannot stop thinking at the limits of physics. His physical ideas are based on the general conceptual and methodological preconditions of physical theories. Such a line of reasoning about the foundations of physics has brought Weizsaecker into an abstract program of a possible reconstruction of physics in terms of yes-no-alternatives, which he called "ur-theory." I shall start this paper with a review of the basic ideas of ur-theory: the definition of an ur and the connection between ur-spinors and spacetime. I then go over to some of ur-theory's present borders: the construction of quantized spacetime tetrads and the difficulties to incorporate gravity and gauge theories. Finally, I shall discuss the possible prospects of ur-theory -- partly with a view to modern quantum gravity approaches, but mainly in connection with its philosophical implications. Here, one of the crucial questions is, whether form, or, modern, information is an entity per se and what particular consequences this may have.
In this paper, I argue that Heisenberg's mature philosophy of quantum mechanics must be understood in the context of his epistemological project to reinterpret and redefine Kant's notion of the a priori. After discussions with Weizsäcker and Hermann in Leipzig in the 1930s, Heisenberg attempted to ground his interpretation of quantum mechanics on what might be termed a ‘practical’ transformation of Kantian philosophy. Taking as his starting point, Bohr's doctrine of the indispensability of classical concepts, Heisenberg argued that concepts such as space, time and causality can be regarded as ‘practically a priori’, in so far as they remain the conditions for the possibility of experience and even of ‘objective reality’, though they are not universal and necessary in a strictly Kantian sense. We cannot avoid using classical concepts in the description of experiments in quantum theory, despite the fact that there are limits to their applicability. Such concepts are, for Heisenberg, historically contingent, yet indispensable in our time, because we have no other language through which we can describe and conceive of the interaction between ‘object’ and ‘measuring device’.
The article is devoted to the problem of time in modern science, where in recent years there have been major changes related to the latest discoveries in the field of the foundations of quantum theory. The author refers to works of K.-F. von Weizsacker (which works are not well-known in Russian-speaking field). Weizsacker deploys a large-scale program of building modern physics, while starting (not only as a physicist, but also a professional philosopher) with questions of philosophical interpretation of postulates of modern physics, especially quantum mechanics. His key thesis is that time in physics is fundamentally distinct, which represents the whole physics as an integral scientific discipline. Weizsacker comes from physical and philosophical reflections, that give a special value to his work. Analyzing the conclusions of theoretical physics, namely the issues of substantiation of statistical mechanics, thermodynamics, and, above all, quantum mechanics, Weizsacker comes to the key idea of the structure of time in the substantiation of physical theory. The author in this conclusion disagrees with the opinion of most modern physicists that time has a subjective character, and the modus of the past, present and future reflects its essential character. The allocation of the time structure requires special logic. Such a logic is temporal and quantum. Starting from temporal logic, introducing the concept of possibility and probability, he comes to the substantiation of quantum mechanics. Being modal logic, it is based on the concept of possibility and probability. Key concept for Weizsacker is a binary alternative (Uralternative), closely related to the principle of superposition in quantum mechanics. By introducing the concept of certain alternatives, essentially actualized alternatives, Weizsacker shows how one can get the theory of relativity with its space-time structure. Further, he shows that based on its structure, you can get the theory of relativity. The space-time structure in this case is secondary, relational, as understood by Leibniz, Mach, and Einstein.
The quantum theory of Ur-alternatives of Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker tries to constitute general quantum theory based on the concept of logical alternatives in time. Based on this interpretation of quantum theory the existence of free objects in space, their symmetry properties and their interactions shall be inferred. The alternatives are represented by binary alternatives, which are called Ur-alternatives because of their logically fundamental character. Through Ur-alternatives as elementary quantum theoretical units of information the Copernican revolution with respect to the question of space is realized in a consequent way. This means that not the objects of nature are in a given space, but the existence of space arises as a kind of indirect representation of relations between abstract quantum theoretical objects. The Ur-alternatives do not exist in a given physical reality, but the existence of space is constituted by Ur-alternatives at all. Such a concept of reality is implicitly contained within the uncertainty relation and can be seen especially in the EPR-paradoxon. It is shown in this thesis in a mathematical consistent way that a state in the tensor space of many Ur-alternatives can directly be mapped into a real three dimensional space which means that together with the dynamics a representation in a (3+1)-dimensional space-time becomes possible. By considering the G2 an approach for the incorporation of the internal symmetries can be suggested. Furthermore the Ur-alternatives enable the constitution of a concept of interaction, which is based on quantum theoretical entanglement. By using this concept it is tried to obtain a purely quantum theoretical description of electromagnetism and gravity. This corresponds to a much more principle and in a radical sense background independent way of quantization.
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant argues that the empirical knowledge of the world depends on a priori conditions of human sensibility and understanding, i. e., our capacities of sense experience and concept formation. The objective knowledge presupposes, on one hand, space and time as a priori conditions of sensibility and, on another hand, a priori judgments, like the principle of causality, as constitutive conditions of understanding. The problem is that in the XX century the physical science completely changed how we conceive our knowledge of the world. Face to this new situation, what was changed in our classical reason? However, if the transcendental point of view is adopted, in the specific case of quantum mechanics, we have to wonder about the general conditions of this theory that make possible such knowledge, which predictive value is much more accurate than the classical physics. The aim of this work is firstly to show the Kantian implications on Bohr’s interpretation of quantum phenomena and secondly to provide an overview of the key elements for understanding the transcendental locus of ordinary language in the quantum mechanics context, in order to give support to a transcendental pragmatic position in the analysis of science.
The ideas in Heisenberg's paper on quantum mechanics in 1925 mark the beginning not only of a new phase in modern physics, but also of Heisenberg's own philosophical journey. This thesis examines that journey between 1925 and the late 1950s by situating Heisenberg's philosophy of quantum mechanics in the context of his encounters with his contemporaries as well as the context of various strands of thought in the German-speaking world at the time. Heisenberg's early philosophical critique of the 'classical' viewpoint between 1925 and 1927 bears the decisive influence of Einstein's theory of relativity, more specifically, the positivism he saw as underpinning Einstein's emancipation from Newtonian physics. The positivist influence on Heisenberg's early attitude to quantum mechanics is evident in three ways: (a) his invocation of an observability principle in 1925 to justify the renunciation of the concept of the electron orbit, (b) an instrumentalist conception of understanding, which characterised Heisenberg's response to Schrodinger's demand for classical visualisation in space and time in 1926-7, and (c) the introduction of an operational definition of concepts such as position and velocity in 1927, in an attempt to replace the concepts of classical physics. But after discussions with Bohr and Einstein in 1926-7, Heisenberg soon recognised what we might term his `empiricist' viewpoint was problematic. In 1927 Heisenberg's thought undergoes a shift away from the `empiricist' viewpoint that had underpinned his early philosophy of quantum mechanics. The nature and scope of this transformation, which forms the central theme in this thesis, has, up until now, been poorly understood and often completely neglected. Through his discussions with Bohr, Heisenberg came to the realisation that despite their limitations, classical concepts were conditions for the possibility of the description of all experience. This marked the abandonment of his earlier attempt to replace classical concepts with quantum concepts. The recognition of the primacy of classical language forms the point of departure for much of Heisenberg's later thought, which brought him into contact with the attempts in the German-speaking world in the 1920s to reconstruct Kantian epistemology. By the mid-1930s, Heisenberg advocated a 'pragmatic transformation' of Kantian philosophy, in which classical concepts were held to be a priori in the sense that they remained the conditions for the possibility of experience, but were no longer held to be necessary or universal in a strict Kantian sense. After 1940 Heisenberg saw the paradoxes of quantum mechanics under the aegis of what can be termed a 'transcendental conception of language', according to which language is not a mere tool, but actively shapes, gives form, and objectifies, our 'reality'. The limits of a classical 'description' in quantum mechanics therefore came to signify for Heisenberg, the limits of 'objective reality'. While Bohr exerted perhaps the most important philosophical influence on Heisenberg, their intellectual relationship was characterised by disagreement and misunderstanding. This is most strikingly displayed in their respective views on wave-particle duality and complementarily. While after 1927 Heisenberg accepted Bohr's basic insight that our knowledge of the quantum world is mediated through classical language, he did not share Rohr's interpretation of complementarity. While Heisenberg certainly used terms such as 'complementarity' and wave-particle duality' in his writings, a close reading reveals that these terms had very different meanings for the two physicists. This is particularly evident in the contrast between Heisenberg's notion of wave-particle equivalence and Bohr's idea of complementarity. In bringing to light these divergences between Bohr and Heisenberg, this thesis lends further weight to the view - already advocated by scholars such as John Hendry and Mara Beller - that the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics should not be thought of as a unified philosophical position, but actually comprises a number of different strands.