Dirac notation is the most common way to describe quantum states and operations on states. It is very convenient and allows for quick visual distinction between vectors, scalars and operators. For quantum processes that involve interactions of multiple systems an even better visualisation has been proposed by Coecke and Kissinger, in the form of a diagrammatic formalism [CK2017]. Their notation expresses formulas in the form of diagrams, somewhat similar to Feynman diagrams, and is more general than the circuit notation for quantum computing. This document consists of two parts. (1) We give a brief summary of the diagrammatic notation of quantum processes, tailored to readers who already know quantum physics and are not interested in general process theory. For this audience our summary is less daunting than the encyclopaedic book by Coecke and Kissinger [CK2017], and on the other hand more accessible than the ultra-compact introduction of [KTW2017]. We deviate a somewhat from [CK2017,KTW2017] in that we do not assume basis states to equal their own complex conjugate; this means that we do not use symmetric notation for basis states, and it leads us to explicitly show arrows on wires where they are usually omitted. (2) We extend the work of Kissinger, Tull and Westerbaan [KTW2017] which gives a diagrammatic security proof for BB84 and 6-state Quantum Key Distribution. Their proof is based on a sequence of diagrammatic manipulations that works when the bases used in the protocol are mutually unbiased. We extend this result to 8-state encoding, which has been proposed as a tool in quantum key recycling protocols [SdV2017,LS2018], and which does not have mutually unbiased bases.
Dirac notation is the most common way to describe quantum states and operations on states. It is very convenient and allows for quick visual distinction between vectors, scalars and operators. For quantum processes that involve interactions of multiple systems an even better visualisation has been proposed by Coecke and Kissinger, in the form of a diagrammatic formalism [CK2017]. Their notation expresses formulas in the form of diagrams, somewhat similar to Feynman diagrams, and is more general than the circuit notation for quantum computing. This document consists of two parts. (1) We give a brief summary of the diagrammatic notation of quantum processes, tailored to readers who already know quantum physics and are not interested in general process theory. For this audience our summary is less daunting than the encyclopaedic book by Coecke and Kissinger [CK2017], and on the other hand more accessible than the ultra-compact introduction of [KTW2017]. We deviate a somewhat from [CK2017,KTW2017] in that we do not assume basis states to equal their own complex conjugate; this means that we do not use symmetric notation for basis states, and it leads us to explicitly show arrows on wires where they are usually omitted. (2) We extend the work of Kissinger, Tull and Westerbaan [KTW2017] which gives a diagrammatic security proof for BB84 and 6-state Quantum Key Distribution. Their proof is based on a sequence of diagrammatic manipulations that works when the bases used in the protocol are mutually unbiased. We extend this result to 8-state encoding, which has been proposed as a tool in quantum key recycling protocols [SdV2017,LS2018], and which does not have mutually unbiased bases.
We haven't really paid much attention to thought as a process. We have engaged in thoughts, but we have only paid attention to the content, not to the process. – David Bohm and David Peat, 1987 In this chapter we provide a practical introduction to basic diagrammatic reasoning, namely how to perform computations and solve problems using diagrams. We also demonstrate why diagrams are far better in many ways than traditional mathematical notation. The development and study of diagrammatic languages is a very active area of research, and intuitively obvious aspects of diagrammatic reasoning have actually taken many years to get right. Luckily, the hard work needed to formalise the diagrams in this book has already been done! So, all that remains to do is reap the benefits of a nice, graphical language. Along the way, we will encounter Dirac notaton . Readers who have previously studied quantum mechanics or quantum information theory may have already seen Dirac notation used in the context of linear maps. Here, we'll explain how it arises as a one-dimensional fragment of the two-dimensional graphical language. Thus, readers not familiar with Dirac notation will learn it as a special case of the graphical notation we use throughout the book. We also introduce the notion of a process theory , which provides a means of interpreting diagrams by fixing a particular collection of (physical, computational, mathematical, edible, etc.) systems and the processes that these systems might undergo (being heated up, sorted, multiplied by two, cooked, etc.). As we pointed out in Chapter 1, taking process theories as our starting point represents a substantial departure from standard practice in many disciplines. Rather than forcing ourselves to totally understand single systems before even thinking about how those systems compose and interact, we will seek to understand systems primarily in terms of their interactions with others. Rather than trying to understand Dave the dodo by dissecting him (at which point, he'll look pretty much like any other fat bird), we will turn him loose in the world and see what he does. This turns out to be very close in spirit to the aims of category theory , which we will meet briefly in the advanced material at the end of this chapter.
Quantum entanglement is a key resource in many quantum protocols, such as quantum teleportation and quantum cryptography. Yet entanglement makes protocols presented in Dirac notation difficult to verify. This is why Coecke and Duncan have introduced a diagrammatic language for quantum protocols, called the ZX-calculus. This diagrammatic notation is both intuitive and formally rigorous. It is a simple, graphical, high level language that emphasises the composition of systems and naturally captures the essentials of quantum mechanics. In the author's MSc thesis it has been shown for over 25 quantum protocols that the ZX-calculus provides a relatively easy and more intuitive presentation. Moreover, the author embarked on the task to apply categorical quantum mechanics on quantum security; earlier works did not touch anything but Bennett and Brassard's quantum key distribution protocol, BB84. Superdense coding with the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger state and quantum key distribution with the W-state are presented in the ZX-calculus in this paper.
In this thesis we develop practical tools for quantum key distribution (QKD) security proofs. We apply the tools to provide security proofs for several protocols, ranging from discrete variable protocols in high dimensions, protocols with realistic implementations, measurement device independent QKD and continuous-variable QKD. The security proofs are based on the Devetak-Winter security framework [I. Devetak and A. Winter, Proc. of the Roy. Soc. of London Series A, 461, 207 (2005); B. Kraus, N. Gisin, and R. Renner, Phys. Rev. Lett., 95 080501 (2005)]. \n \nIn the key rate calculation, it is often convenient to assume that the optimal attack is symmetric. \nUnder the assumption that the parameter estimation is based on coarse-grained observations, we show that the optimal attack is symmetric, if the protocol and the postselection have sufficient symmetries. \nAs an example we calculate the key rates of protocols using 2, d and d+1 mutually unbiased bases in d-dimensional Hilbert spaces. \n \nWe investigate the connection between the optimal collective eavesdropping attack and the optimal cloning attack, in which the eavesdropper employs an optimal cloner to attack the protocol. \nWe find that, in general, it does not hold that the optimal attack is an optimal cloner. However, there are classes of protocols, for which we can identify the optimal attack by an optimal cloner. \nWe analyze protocols with mutually unbiased bases in d dimensions, and show that for the protocols with 2 and d+1 mutually unbiased bases the optimal attack is an optimal cloner, but for the protocols with d mutually unbiased bases, it is not. \n \nIn optical implementations of the phase-encoded BB84 protocol, the bit information is usually encoded in the phase of two consecutive photon pulses generated in a Mach-Zehnder interferometer. In the actual experimental realization, the loss in the arms of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer is not balanced, for example because only one arm contains a lossy phase modulator. \nSince the imbalance changes the structure of the signals states and measurements, the BB84 security analysis no longer applies in this scenario. \nWe provide a security proof for the unbalanced phase-encoded BB84. The loss does lower the key rate compared to a protocol without loss. However, for a realistic parameter regime, the same key rate is found by applying the original BB84 security analysis. \n \nRecently, the security of a measurement device-independent QKD setup with BB84 signal states was proven in Refs. [H.-K. Lo, M. Curty, and B. Qi, Phys. Rev. Lett., 108 (2012); S. L. Braunstein and S. Pirandola, Phys. Rev. Lett., 108 (2012)]. In this setup Alice and Bob send quantum states to an intermediate node, which performs the measurement, and is assumed to be controlled by Eve. \nWe analyze the security of a measurement device-independent QKD protocol with B92 signal states, and calculate the key rates numerically for a realistic implementation. \nBased on our security proof we were able to prove the security of the strong reference pulse B92 protocol. \n \nWe analyze the security of continuous-variable protocols using the entropic uncertainty relations established in Ref. [M. Berta, M. Christandl, R. Colbeck, J. M. Renes, and R. Renner, Nature Physics 6, 659 (2010)] to provide an estimate of the key rate based on the observed first and second moments. We analyze a protocol with squeezed coherent states and the 2-state protocol with two coherent states with opposite phases.
Quantum entanglement, described by Einstein as “spooky action at a distance”, is a key resource in many quantum protocols, like quantum teleportation and quantum cryptography. Yet entanglement makes protocols presented in Dirac notation difficult to follow and check. This is why Coecke nad Duncan have introduced a diagrammatic language for multi-qubit systems, called the red/green calculus or the zx-calculus [23]. This diagrammatic notation is both intuitive and formally rigorous. It is a simple, graphical, high level language that emphasises the composition of systems and naturally captures the essentials of quantum mechanics. One crucial feature that will be exploited here is the encoding of complementary observables and corresponding phase shifts. Reasoning is done by rewriting diagrams, i.e. locally replacing some part of a diagram. Diagrams are defined by their topology only; the number of inputs and outputs and the way they are connected. This exemplifies the ‘flow’ of information. For protocols involving multipartite entangled states, such as the GreenbergerHorne-Zeilinger and W -state, it will be shown that the zx-calculus provides a relatively easy and more intuitive presentation. Moreover, in this representation it is easier to check that protocols are correct. Protocols that will be discussed in detail are quantum teleportation, quantum cryptography, leader election, superdense coding and quantum direct communication with multipartite entangled states.
We assume the reader has a strong background in elementary linear algebra. In this section we familiarize the reader with the algebraic notation used in quantum mechanics, remind the reader of some basic facts about complex vector spaces, and introduce some notions that might not have been covered in an elementary linear algebra course. The linear algebra notation used in quantum computing will likely be familiar to the student of physics, but may be alien to a student of mathematics or computer science. It is the Dirac notation, which was invented by Paul Dirac and which is used often in quantum mechanics. In mathematics and physics textbooks, vectors are often distinguished from scalars by writing an arrow over the identifying symbol: e.g a⃗. Sometimes boldface is used for this purpose: e.g. a. In the Dirac notation, the symbol identifying a vector is written inside a ‘ket’, and looks like |a⟩. We denote the dual vector for a (defined later) with a ‘bra’, written as ⟨a|. Then inner products will be written as ‘bra-kets’ (e.g. ⟨a|b⟩). We now carefully review the definitions of the main algebraic objects of interest, using the Dirac notation. The vector spaces we consider will be over the complex numbers, and are finite-dimensional, which significantly simplifies the mathematics we need. Such vector spaces are members of a class of vector spaces called Hilbert spaces. Nothing substantial is gained at this point by defining rigorously what a Hilbert space is, but virtually all the quantum computing literature refers to a finite-dimensional complex vector space by the name ‘Hilbert space’, and so we will follow this convention. We will use H to denote such a space. Since H is finite-dimensional, we can choose a basis and alternatively represent vectors (kets) in this basis as finite column vectors, and represent operators with finite matrices. As you see in Section 3, the Hilbert spaces of interest for quantum computing will typically have dimension 2n, for some positive integer n. This is because, as with classical information, we will construct larger state spaces by concatenating a string of smaller systems, usually of size two.
The problem of security of quantum key protocols is examined. In addition to the distribution of classical keys, the problem of encrypting quantum data and the structure of the operators which perform quantum encryption is studied. It is found that unitary bases are central to both encryption of quantum information, as well as the generation of states used in generalized quantum key distribution (which are called mutually unbiased bases). A one-to-one correspondence between certain unitary bases and mutually unbiased bases is found. Finally, a new protocol for making anonymous classical broadcasts is given along with a security proof. An experimental procedure to implement this protocol is also given. In order to prove these new results, some new bounds for accessible information of quantum sources are obtained.