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arXiv:2102.08746 · EPJ Quantum Technology

Faking photon number on a transition-edge sensor

Poompong Chaiwongkhot, Jiaqiang Zhong, Anqi Huang, Hao Qin, Sheng‐Cai Shi, Vadim Makarov

Published Sep 5, 2022• 12 citations
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Abstract

We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In one experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength, which is an expected and known behaviour. In another experiment, we unexpectedly find that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, able to steal the key.

DOI
10.1140/epjqt/s40507-022-00141-2

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Controlling passively quenched single photon detectors by bright light

Vadim Makarov

Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched\navalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of\nintensity less than 1nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum\nkey distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In\nthis regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous\nillumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain\ndetector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other\nparameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such\nthat the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue\nto be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when\nEve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has\nfull control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To\ncheck the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched\ndetectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity\ndiagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control\nparameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be\npractically possible.

•Jan 1, 2009•113 citations
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In one experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending a larger number of photons at a longer wavelength, which is an expected and known behaviour. In another experiment, we unexpectedly find that the detector can be blinded by bright continuous-wave light and then, a controlled response simulating single-photon detection can be produced by applying a bright light pulse. We model an intercept-and-resend attack on a quantum key distribution system that exploits the latter vulnerability and, under certain assumptions, able to steal the key.
We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.
We present a method to control the detection events in quantum key distribution systems that use gated single-photon detectors. We employ bright pulses as faked states, timed to arrive at the avalanche photodiodes outside the activation time. The attack can remain unnoticed, since the faked states do not increase the error rate per se . This allows for an intercept–resend attack, where an eavesdropper transfers her detection events to the legitimate receiver without causing any errors. As a side effect, afterpulses, originating from accumulated charge carriers in the detectors, increase the error rate. We have experimentally tested detectors of the system id3110 (Clavis2) from ID Quantique. We identify the parameter regime in which the attack is feasible despite the side effect. Furthermore, we outline how simple modifications in the implementation can make the device immune to this attack.
Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than 1 nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In this regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other parameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.
Single photon detectors (SPDs) based on passively quenched\navalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of\nintensity less than 1nW. A bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum\nkey distribution system containing such detectors is described in this paper. In\nthis regime, all SPDs in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous\nillumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain\ndetector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies the polarization (or other\nparameters used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such\nthat the target detector stops receiving light, while the other detector(s) continue\nto be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when\nEve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has\nfull control of Bob and can perform a successful intercept–resend attack. To\ncheck the feasibility of the attack, three different models of passively quenched\ndetectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity\ndiagrams the detectors would receive in a real QKD system under attack. Control\nparameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be\npractically possible.