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arXiv:2102.08709 · Entropy

Wigner’s Friend Scenarios and the Internal Consistency of Standard Quantum Mechanics

D. Sokolovski, A. Matzkin

Published Sep 9, 2021• 4 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Wigner’s friend scenarios involve an Observer, or Observers, measuring a Friend, or Friends, who themselves make quantum measurements. In recent discussions, it has been suggested that quantum mechanics may not always be able to provide a consistent account of a situation involving two Observers and two Friends. We investigate this problem by invoking the basic rules of quantum mechanics as outlined by Feynman in the well-known “Feynman Lectures on Physics”. We show here that these “Feynman rules” constrain the a priori assumptions which can be made in generalised Wigner’s friend scenarios, because the existence of the probabilities of interest ultimately depends on the availability of physical evidence (material records) of the system’s past. With these constraints obeyed, a non-ambiguous and consistent account of all measurement outcomes is obtained for all agents, taking part in various Wigner’s Friend scenarios.

DOI
10.3390/e23091186

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Wigner’s friend scenarios involve an Observer, or Observers, measuring a Friend, or Friends, who themselves make quantum measurements. In recent discussions, it has been suggested that quantum mechanics may not always be able to provide a consistent account of a situation involving two Observers and two Friends. We investigate this problem by invoking the basic rules of quantum mechanics as outlined by Feynman in the well-known “Feynman Lectures on Physics”. We show here that these “Feynman rules” constrain the a priori assumptions which can be made in generalised Wigner’s friend scenarios, because the existence of the probabilities of interest ultimately depends on the availability of physical evidence (material records) of the system’s past. With these constraints obeyed, a non-ambiguous and consistent account of all measurement outcomes is obtained for all agents, taking part in various Wigner’s Friend scenarios.
Abstract The place and role of an Observer in quantum mechanics has been a subject of an ongoing debate since the theory's inception. Wigner brought this question to the fore in a celebrated scenario in which a super-Observer observes a Friend making a measurement. Here we briefly review why this “Wigner Friend scenario” has been taken to require the introduction of the Observer's consciousness, or alternatively to show the inconsistency of quantum measurement theory. We will argue that quantum theory can consistently leave observers outside its narrative, by making only minimal assumptions about how the information about the observed results is stored in material records.
Wigner-friend scenarios -- in which external agents describe a closed laboratory containing a friend making a measurement -- highlight the difficulties inherent to quantum theory when accounting for measurements. In non-relativistic scenarios, the difficulty is to accommodate unitary evolution for a closed system with a definite outcome obtained by the friend. In relativistic scenarios the tensions between quantum theory and relativity induce additional constraints. A generic property of relativistic scenarios is the frame-dependence of state update upon a measurement. Based on a definite example, we will show that this property leads to inconsistent accounts for outcomes obtained in different reference frames. We will further argue that these results point to some fundamental inadequacy when attempting to model actions taken by a complex agent as unitary operations made on simple wavefunctions.
How can we address the idea of observers in quantum mechanics? The long-standing Wigner’s friend thought experiment provides a conceptual framework for thinking about this question. It considers the the difficulty of reconciling unitary, evolution of systems and non-unitary state update after a making observations. Following from a recent suggested protocol with two friends that share and entangled state, we prove and investigate, in a photonic experiment, a strong no-go theorem for this Wigner’s friend scenario. Specifically, if quantum mechanics applies at the scale of observers, then there are constraints on the set of assumptions: locality; no-superdeterminism; and absoluteness of observed events. We note that this new theorem places strictly stronger constraints on physical reality than Bell’s theorem.
Abstract The description of Wigner friend scenarios —in which external agents describe a closed laboratory containing a friend making a measurement— remains problematic due to the ambiguous nature of quantum measurements. One option is to endorse assumptions leading to observer-dependent facts, given that the friend's measurement outcome is not defined from the point of view of the external observers. We introduce in this work a model in a relativistic context showing that these assumptions can also lead to measurement records that depend on the inertial reference frame in which the agents make their observations. Our model is based on an entangled pair shared by the friend and a distant agent performing space-like separated measurements. An external observer at rest relative to the closed laboratory and observers in a moving frame do not agree on the observed records, which are not Lorentz transforms of one another.
The Wigner's friend paradox concerns one of the most puzzling problems of quantum mechanics: the consistent description of multiple nested observers. Recently, a variation of Wigner's gedankenexperiment, introduced by Frauchiger and Renner, has lead to new debates about the self-consistency of quantum mechanics. At the core of the paradox lies the description of an observer and the object it measures as a closed system obeying the Schrödinger equation. We revisit this assumption to derive a necessary condition on a quantum system to behave as an observer. We then propose a simple single-photon interferometric setup implementing Frauchiger and Renner's scenario, and use the derived condition to shed a new light on the assumptions leading to their paradox. From our description, we argue that the three apparently incompatible properties used to question the consistency of quantum mechanics correspond to two logically distinct contexts: either one assumes that Wigner has full control over his friends' lab, or conversely that some parts of the labs remain unaffected by Wigner's subsequent measurements. The first context may be seen as the quantum erasure of the memory of Wigner's friend. We further show these properties are associated with observables which do not commute, and therefore cannot take well-defined values simultaneously. Consequently, the three contradictory properties never hold simultaneously.
Abstract We take a fresh look at Wigner’s Friend thought-experiment and some of its more recent variants and extensions, such as the Frauchiger-Renner (FR) Paradox. We discuss various solutions proposed in the literature, focusing on a few questions: What is the correct epistemic interpretation of the multiplicity of state assignments in these scenarios? Under which conditions can one include classical observers into the quantum state descriptions, in a way that is still compatible with traditional Quantum Mechanics? Under which conditions can one system be admitted as an additional ‘observer’ from the perspective of another background observer? When can the standard axioms of multi-agent Epistemic Logic (that allow “knowledge transfer” between agents) be applied to quantum-physical observers? In the last part of the paper, we propose a new answer to these questions, sketch a particular formal implementation of this answer, and apply it to obtain a principled solution to Wigner Friend-type paradoxes.