We construct a classical oracle relative to which $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}$ but quantum-computable quantum-secure trapdoor one-way functions exist. This is a substantial strengthening of the result of Kretschmer, Qian, Sinha, and Tal (STOC 2023), which only achieved single-copy pseudorandom quantum states relative to an oracle that collapses $\mathsf{NP}$ to $\mathsf{P}$ . For example, our result implies multi-copy pseudorandom states and pseudorandom unitaries, but also classical-communication public-key encryption, signatures, and oblivious transfer schemes relative to an oracle on which $\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}$ . Hence, in our new relativized world, classical computers live in "Algorithmica" whereas quantum computers live in "Cryptomania," using the language of Impagliazzo's worlds. Our proof relies on a new distributional block-insensitivity lemma for $\mathsf{AC^0}$ circuits, wherein a single block is resampled from an arbitrary distribution.We construct a classical oracle relative to which $\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}$ but quantum-computable quantum-secure trapdoor one-way functions exist. This is a substantial strengthening of the result of Kretschmer, Qian, Sinha, and Tal (STOC 2023), which only achieved single-copy pseudorandom quantum states relative to an oracle that collapses $\mathsf{NP}$ to $\mathsf{P}$. For example, our result implies multi-copy pseudorandom states and pseudorandom unitaries, but also classical-communication public-key encryption, signatures, and oblivious transfer schemes relative to an oracle on which $\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}$. Hence, in our new relativized world, classical computers live in "Algorithmica" whereas quantum computers live in "Cryptomania," using the language of Impagliazzo's worlds. Our proof relies on a new distributional block-insensitivity lemma for $\mathsf{AC^0}$ circuits, wherein a single block is resampled from an arbitrary distribution.

arXiv:2411.02554ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)Jun 15, 20256 citations

A Note on the Minimality of One-Way Functions in Post-Quantum Cryptography

Sam Buxbaum, Mohammad Mahmoody

In classical cryptography, one-way functions (OWFs) play a central role as the minimal primitive that (almost) all primitives imply. The situation is more complicated in quantum cryptography, in which honest parties and adversaries can use quantum computation and communication, and it is known that analogues of OWFs in the quantum setting might not be minimal. In this work we ask whether OWFs are minimal for the intermediate setting of post-quantum cryptography, in which the protocols are classical while they shall resist quantum adversaries. We show that for a wide range of natural settings, if a primitive Q implies OWFs, then so does its (uniformly or non-uniformly secure) post-quantum analogue. In particular, we show that if a primitive Q implies any other primitive P that has a 2-message security game (e.g., OWFs) through a black-box classical security reduction R, then one can always (efficiently) turn any polynomial-size quantum adversary breaking P into a polynomial-size quantum adversary breaking Q. Note that this result holds even if the implementation of P using that of Q is arbitrarily non-black-box. We also prove extensions of this result for when the reduction R anticipates its oracle adversary to be deterministic, whenever either of the following conditions hold: (1) the adversary needs to win the security game of Q only with non-negligible probability (e.g., Q is collision-resistant hashing) or (2) that either of P and Q have “falsifiable” security games (this is the case when P is OWFs). Our work leaves open answering our main question when Q implies OWFs through a non-black-box security reduction, or when P uses a more complicated security game than a two-message one.In classical cryptography, one-way functions (OWFs) play a central role as the minimal primitive that (almost) all primitives imply. The situation is more complicated in quantum cryptography, in which honest parties and adversaries can use quantum computation and communication, and it is known that analogues of OWFs in the quantum setting might not be minimal. In this work we ask whether OWFs are minimal for the intermediate setting of post-quantum cryptography, in which the protocols are classical while they shall resist quantum adversaries. We show that for a wide range of natural settings, if a primitive Q implies OWFs, then so does its (uniformly or non-uniformly secure) post-quantum analogue. In particular, we show that if a primitive Q implies any other primitive P that has a 2-message security game (e.g., OWFs) through a black-box classical security reduction R, then one can always (efficiently) turn any polynomial-size quantum adversary breaking P into a polynomial-size quantum adversary breaking Q. Note that this result holds even if the implementation of P using that of Q is arbitrarily non-black-box. We also prove extensions of this result for when the reduction R anticipates its oracle adversary to be deterministic, whenever either of the following conditions hold: (1) the adversary needs to win the security game of Q only with non-negligible probability (e.g., Q is collision-resistant hashing) or (2) that either of P and Q have “falsifiable” security games (this is the case when P is OWFs). Our work leaves open answering our main question when Q implies OWFs through a non-black-box security reduction, or when P uses a more complicated security game than a two-message one.

IACR Communications in CryptologyJan 13, 20250 citations

Quantum Pessiland

Boyang Chen, Tomoyuki Morimae, Takashi Yamakawa

Pessiland is a world where NP is hard on average but one-way functions (OWFs) do not exist [Impagliazzo 1995]. Because almost all classical cryptographic primitives imply OWFs [Impagliazzo and Luby 1989], there is almost no classical cryptography in Pessiland. On the other hand, quantum cryptography can exist even when OWFs do not [Kretschmer 2021; Morimae and Yamakawa 2022; Ananth, Qian and Yuen 2022]. Is there a quantum analogue of Pessiland where NP is hard on average but even quantum cryptography does not exist? In this paper, we show that such a miserable world, Quantum Pessiland, exists: there is a quantum oracle relative to which $UP\cap coUP$ is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet auxiliary-input EFI pairs do not exist. We also show that there is a classical oracle relative to which $UP\cap coUP$ is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet classically-secure auxiliary-input one-way puzzles (OWPuzzs) do not exist. Almost all quantum cryptographic primitives imply EFI pairs or OWPuzzs, and therefore these results mean that there is almost no quantum cryptography relative to these oracles. We further show that relative to the classical oracle, SampBQP = SampBPP, and therefore there is no sampling-based quantum advantage in Quantum Pessiland. Finally, because our average-case hardness of $UP\cap coUP$ implies $P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly$ , our result also implies that a non-relativizing proof technique is necessary to construct OWPuzzs solely from $P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly$ , which gives a partial negative answer to the open problem of [Khurana and Tomer 2025].Pessiland is a world where NP is hard on average but one-way functions (OWFs) do not exist [Impagliazzo 1995]. Because almost all classical cryptographic primitives imply OWFs [Impagliazzo and Luby 1989], there is almost no classical cryptography in Pessiland. On the other hand, quantum cryptography can exist even when OWFs do not [Kretschmer 2021; Morimae and Yamakawa 2022; Ananth, Qian and Yuen 2022]. Is there a quantum analogue of Pessiland where NP is hard on average but even quantum cryptography does not exist? In this paper, we show that such a miserable world, Quantum Pessiland, exists: there is a quantum oracle relative to which $UP\cap coUP$ is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet auxiliary-input EFI pairs do not exist. We also show that there is a classical oracle relative to which $UP\cap coUP$ is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet classically-secure auxiliary-input one-way puzzles (OWPuzzs) do not exist. Almost all quantum cryptographic primitives imply EFI pairs or OWPuzzs, and therefore these results mean that there is almost no quantum cryptography relative to these oracles. We further show that relative to the classical oracle, SampBQP = SampBPP, and therefore there is no sampling-based quantum advantage in Quantum Pessiland. Finally, because our average-case hardness of $UP\cap coUP$ implies $P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly$, our result also implies that a non-relativizing proof technique is necessary to construct OWPuzzs solely from $P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly$, which gives a partial negative answer to the open problem of [Khurana and Tomer 2025].

quant-pharXiv:2608.29493Sep 1, 20260 citations

Secure Two-Party Computation in a Quantum World

Niklas Büscher, Daniel Demmler, Nikolaos P. Karvelas +5 more

Lecture notes in computer scienceJan 1, 202015 citations

We construct a classical oracle relative to which

\mathsf{P} = \mathsf{NP}

but quantum-computable quantum-secure trapdoor one-way functions exist. This is a substantial strengthening of the result of Kretschmer, Qian, Sinha, and Tal (STOC 2023), which only achieved single-copy pseudorandom quantum states relative to an oracle that collapses

\mathsf{NP}

\mathsf{P}

. For example, our result implies multi-copy pseudorandom states and pseudorandom unitaries, but also classical-communication public-key encryption, signatures, and oblivious transfer schemes relative to an oracle on which

\mathsf{P}=\mathsf{NP}

. Hence, in our new relativized world, classical computers live in "Algorithmica" whereas quantum computers live in "Cryptomania," using the language of Impagliazzo's worlds. Our proof relies on a new distributional block-insensitivity lemma for

\mathsf{AC^0}

circuits, wherein a single block is resampled from an arbitrary distribution.

UP\cap coUP

is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet auxiliary-input EFI pairs do not exist. We also show that there is a classical oracle relative to which

UP\cap coUP

is hard on average against quantum polynomial-time algorithms with quantum advice, yet classically-secure auxiliary-input one-way puzzles (OWPuzzs) do not exist. Almost all quantum cryptographic primitives imply EFI pairs or OWPuzzs, and therefore these results mean that there is almost no quantum cryptography relative to these oracles. We further show that relative to the classical oracle, SampBQP = SampBPP, and therefore there is no sampling-based quantum advantage in Quantum Pessiland. Finally, because our average-case hardness of

UP\cap coUP

implies

P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly

, our result also implies that a non-relativizing proof technique is necessary to construct OWPuzzs solely from

P^{\#P}\not\subseteq i.o.BQP/qpoly

, which gives a partial negative answer to the open problem of [Khurana and Tomer 2025].