Direct phase modulation via optical injection is a newly developed method for coding the phase of a gain-switched laser, which meets high requirements placed on transmitters for quantum key distribution: compactness, low losses, compatibility with CMOS technologies, and the absence of undesirable effects leading to the side-channel information leakage. Despite the successful implementation and good prospects for the further development of this system, there is still a lack of theoretical investigations of this scheme in the literature. Here, for the first time, we perform its theoretical analysis. We study the influence of the spontaneous emission noise, examine the role of the gain non-linearity, and consider the temperature drift effect. The results obtained reveal that these phenomena significantly affect system performance. We have tried to formulate here practical instructions, which will help to take these features into account when elaborating and employing the optical-injection-based phase modulator.
Direct phase modulation via optical injection is a newly developed method for coding the phase of a gain-switched laser, which meets high requirements placed on transmitters for quantum key distribution: compactness, low losses, compatibility with CMOS technologies, and the absence of undesirable effects leading to the side-channel information leakage. Despite the successful implementation and good prospects for the further development of this system, there is still a lack of theoretical investigations of this scheme in the literature. Here, for the first time, we perform its theoretical analysis. We study the influence of the spontaneous emission noise, examine the role of the gain non-linearity, and consider the temperature drift effect. The results obtained reveal that these phenomena significantly affect system performance. We have tried to formulate here practical instructions, which will help to take these features into account when elaborating and employing the optical-injection-based phase modulator.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows secret key exchange between two users with unconditional security. For QKD to be widely deployed, low cost and compactness are crucial requirements alongside high performance. Currently, the majority of QKD systems demonstrated rely on bulk intensity and phase modulators to generate optical pulses with precisely defined amplitude and relative phase difference—i.e., to encode information as signal states and decoy states. However, these modulators are expensive and bulky, thereby limiting the compactness of QKD systems. Here, we present and experimentally demonstrate a novel optical transmitter design to overcome this disadvantage by generating intensity- and phase-tunable pulses at GHz clock speeds. Our design removes the need for bulk modulators by employing directly modulated lasers in combination with optical injection locking and coherent interference. This scheme is, therefore, well suited to miniaturization and photonic integration, and we implement a proof-of-principle QKD demonstration to highlight potential applications.
The decoy-state method serves as a cornerstone for practical quantum key distribution (QKD) with inherent immunity to photon-number-splitting attacks. Leveraging optical injection locking, we propose a directly modulated light source with a scheme that simultaneously generates intensity- and phase-modulated signals without external modulators. Removing external modulators eliminates modulator-related side-channel vulnerabilities, fundamentally enhancing QKD security. Integrated into a high-speed phase-encoding BB84 system with optimized one-decoy protocol and finite-size analysis, our system achieves positive key rates up to 20 dB channel loss (100 km fiber) with commercial InGaAs single-photon detectors, reducing transmitter complexity while ensuring security for practical QKD applications.
Advanced laser modulation techniques have enabled the development of versatile and efficient light sources for quantum communications [1]. In fact, semiconductor lasers are normally used as single-photon sources in most commercial and research quantum key distribution (QKD) systems [2]. In particular, modulated single-mode semiconductor lasers, utilizing gain-switching, optical injection locking and direct phase modulations have been used to implement a great variety of QKD protocols [1]. In recently introduced protocols, like the measurement-device-independent one (MDI) based on the interference of pulses generated by two remote semiconductor laser sources, timing-jitter in gain-switched lasers affects the temporal overlap of the pulses producing a dramatic reduction in the interference visibility [1]. Very recently MDI-QKD systems using optical injection from a semiconductor laser into a gain-switched semiconductor laser have been demonstrated [1]. A reduction of timing-jitter induced by optical injection is then desirable to improve the interference visibility in this type of MDI-QKD systems.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows two users to communicate with theoretically provable secrecy [1]. This is vitally important to secure the confidential data of governments, businesses and individuals. As the technology is adopted by a wider audience, a quantum network will become necessary for multi-party communication, as in the classical communication networks in use today. Unfortunately, a number of phase-encoded QKD protocols based on weak coherent pulses have been developed. Whilst the first protocol, proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 (BB84), is still commonly used, other protocols such as differential phase shift [2] or coherent one way QKD [3] are also adopted. Each protocol has its benefits; however all would require a different transmitter and receiver, increasing the complexity and cost of quantum networks. In this work we demonstrate a multi-protocol transmitter [4-6] that also has the benefits of small footprint, low power consumption and low complexity. We use this transmitter to give the first experimental demonstration of an improved version of the BB84 protocol, known as the differential quadrature phase shift protocol. We have achieved megabit per second secure key rates at short distances, and have shown secure key rates that are, on average, 2.71 times higher than the standard BB84 protocol. This enhanced performance over such a commonly adopted protocol, at no expense to experimental complexity, could lead to a widespread migration to the new protocol. The security of the BB84 protocol relies on each signal and reference pulse pair being globally phase randomised with respect to all other pulse pairs. In the DQPS protocol, blocks with a length L ≥ 2 are used and each block has a globally random phase with respect to all other blocks. Implementing this protocol would ordinarily require a high-speed random number generator and a phase modulator. As well as increasing device complexity, it would also require an unrealistic continuous source of electrical modulation signals for complete security. The transmitter we use injects light from a master laser diode into a 2 GHz gain-switched slave laser diode. The principal of optical injection locking means that the slave laser inherits the phase of the master laser. We apply modulations to the master laser current within a block to control the phase of the slave laser output pulses, and then drive the master laser below threshold for a short period of time when phase randomisation is required. This ensures the lasing comes from below threshold, thus the phase adopted by the slave laser pulse is completely random. We perform an autocorrelation measurement on the blocks to show their randomness. [1] N. Gisin et al. Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002). [2] K. Inoue et al. Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 037902 (2002). [3] D. Stucki et al. Appl. Phys. Lett. 87 194108 (2005). [4] Z. Yuan et al. Phys. Rev. X. 6, 031044 (2016). [5] G. L. Roberts et al. Laser Phot. Rev. 11, 1700067 (2017). [6] G. L. Roberts et al. arXiv:1709.04214 [quant-ph] (2017).
Abstract Quantum key distribution (QKD) networks represent a foundational step toward the future quantum internet and have become a focus of intensive research. By analogy with the architecture of classical optical networks, we can observe that the high-capacity backbone typically relies on complex external modulation, while the cost-sensitive access layer prefers simpler, more compact, and more economical direct modulation. As the cornerstone of quantum networks, today’s QKD networks share this backbone-access hierarchy, yet their implementations remain heavily reliant on external modulators, leaving a clear ecological niche unfilled for directly modulated QKD in the access layer. Here, we propose and experimentally demonstrate the first fully modulator-free, full-degree-of-freedom direct-modulation QKD architecture that fills this niche. The transmitter combines optical injection locking with coherent optical interference to achieve simultaneous phase and intensity control without external modulators, enabling arbitrary quantum-state preparation while preserving inherent compatibility with standard time-bin-encoding receivers. Built with relatively inexpensive laser diodes and passive optical components, our experimental implementation achieves a secure key rate of 4.78 kbps at 30 dB channel loss, matching the performance of conventional modulator-based systems. By filling the long-standing direct-modulation niche in the QKD ecosystem, this work delivers a practical solution to the access-layer deployment challenge and opens a viable new direction for compact, scalable QKD implementation.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables private communications with information-theoretic security. To guarantee the practical security of QKD, it is essential that QKD systems are implemented in accordance with theoretical requirements and are robust with regard to side-channel attacks. Here we study a prominent attack on QKD transmitters known as the laser-seeding attack (LSA). It consists in injecting photons into the laser of the transmitter in an attempt to modify the outgoing light in some way that is beneficial to the eavesdropper. In this work we measure the response of a QKD transmitter to the LSA as a function of the optical power injected, allowing us to quantify the level of optical attenuation required to mitigate the attack. Further, we use a laser-rate-equation model to numerically simulate the effects of the LSA on a gain-switched laser. With this model we are able to reproduce previous experimental results, as well as generate new insight into the LSA by examining the effects of the LSA when the QKD transmitter is operated with different laser current driving parameters.