Continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) offers information-theoretic secure key sharing between two parties. The sharing of a phase reference frame is an essential requirement for coherent detection in CV-QKD. Due to the potential attacks related to transmitting the local oscillator (LO) alongside quantum signals, there has been a focus on using local LOs (LLOs) to establish a shared phase reference. In this work, we develop a new noise model of a current state-of-the-art LLO scheme in the context of the satellite-to-Earth channel. In doing this, we encapsulate detailed phase-screen calculations that determine the coherent efficiency - a critical parameter in free-space CV-QKD that characterizes the wavefront aberrations caused by atmospheric turbulence. Using our new noise model we then determine the CV-QKD key rates for the satellite-to-Earth channel, secure under general attacks in the finite-size regime of the LLO scheme. Our results are of practical importance for next-generation quantum-enabled satellites that utilize multi-photon technology as opposed to single-photon technology.
Continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) offers information-theoretic secure key sharing between two parties. The sharing of a phase reference frame is an essential requirement for coherent detection in CV-QKD. Due to the potential attacks related to transmitting the local oscillator (LO) alongside quantum signals, there has been a focus on using local LOs (LLOs) to establish a shared phase reference. In this work, we develop a new noise model of a current state-of-the-art LLO scheme in the context of the satellite-to-Earth channel. In doing this, we encapsulate detailed phase-screen calculations that determine the coherent efficiency - a critical parameter in free-space CV-QKD that characterizes the wavefront aberrations caused by atmospheric turbulence. Using our new noise model we then determine the CV-QKD key rates for the satellite-to-Earth channel, secure under general attacks in the finite-size regime of the LLO scheme. Our results are of practical importance for next-generation quantum-enabled satellites that utilize multi-photon technology as opposed to single-photon technology.
In practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using local local oscillator (LLO CV-QKD), the phase noise related to coherent detection and phase-reference pulse intensity can be locally calibrated at the receiver side. Therefore, it can be regarded as trusted noise in order to obtain a higher secret key rate and transmission distance. However, security loopholes will be opened for the eavesdropper to launch attacks without appropriate countermeasures. To this end, we propose two practical phase-reference pulse intensity attack strategies, where Eve can reduce the trusted phase noise by manipulating the intensity of the phase-reference pulse, thereby hiding her attack on the signal pulse. The performance of the LLO CV-QKD system under these attacks has been analyzed. We show that precisely monitoring the intensity of the phase-reference pulse in real time is an essential countermeasure to prevent the proposed attacks. Moreover, an intensity-monitoring scheme for the phase-reference pulse is proposed to strengthen the security of the practical LLO CV-QKD system and make the trusted phase noise model more robust.
The value of residual phase noise, after phase compensation, is one of the key limitations of performance improvement for continuous-variable quantum key distribution using a local local oscillator (LLO CV-QKD) system, since it is the major excess noise. However, due to the nonideality of the realistic devices implemented in practice, for example, imperfect lasers, detectors, and unbalanced interferometers, the value of residual phase noise in the current system is still relatively large. Here, we develop a phase noise model to improve the phase noise tolerance of the LLO CV-QKD schemes. In our model, part of the phase-reference measurement noise associated with detection efficiency and electronic noise of Bob's detector as well as a real-time monitored phase-reference intensity at Bob's side is considered trusted because it can be locally calibrated by Bob. We show that using our phase noise model can significantly improve the secure key rate and transmission distance of the LLO CV-QKD system. We further conduct an experiment to substantiate the superiority of the phase noise model. Based on experimental data of a LLO CV-QKD system in the 25-km optical fiber channel, we demonstrate that the secure key rate under our phase noise model is approximately 40% higher than that under the conventional phase noise model.
In practical continuous-variable quantum key distribution system using local local oscillator (LLO CV-QKD), the phase noise related to coherent detection and phase-reference pulse intensity that can be locally calibrated at the receiver side is considered to be trusted noise to improve the performance. However, if the intensity of the phase-reference pulse is not monitored precisely in real-time, a security loophole will be opened for the eavesdropper to launch attacks. To this end, we propose two practical phase-reference pulse intensity attack strategies, where Eve can reduce the trusted phase noise by manipulating the intensity of the phase-reference pulse, thereby hiding her attack on the signal pulse if the total excess noise remains unchanged. The performance of the LLO CV-QKD system under these attacks has been analyzed. We show that precisely monitoring the intensity of the phase-reference pulse in real-time is an essential countermeasure to prevent the proposed attacks. Moreover, an intensity-monitoring scheme for the phase-reference pulse is proposed to strengthen the security of the practical LLO CV-QKD system and make the trusted phase noise model more robust.
We develop a comprehensive framework to model and optimize the performance of continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with a local local oscillator (LLO), when phase reference sharing and QKD are jointly implemented. We first analyze the limitations of the only existing approach, called LLO-sequential, and show that it requires high modulation dynamics and can only tolerate small phase noise. Our main contribution is to introduce two designs to perform LLO CV-QKD, respectively called LLO-delayline and LLO-displacement, and to study their performance. Both designs rely on a self-coherent approach, in which phase reference information and quantum information are coherently obtained from a single optical wavefront. We show that these designs can lift some limitations of the existing LLO-sequential approach. The LLO-delayline design can in particular tolerate much stronger phase noise and thus appears to be an appealing alternative to LLO-sequential in terms of network integrability. We also investigate, with the LLO-displacement design, how phase reference information and quantum information can be multiplexed within a single optical pulse. By studying the trade-off between phase reference recovery and phase noise induced by displacement, we, however, demonstrate that this design can only tolerate low phase noise. On the other hand, the LLO-displacement design has the advantage of minimal hardware requirements and provides a simple approach to multiplex classical and quantum communications, opening a practical path towards the development of ubiquitous coherent classical-quantum communications systems compatible with next-generation network requirements.
In continuous-variable quantum key distribution system with a true local oscillator (LLO CV-QKD), part of the phase noise associated with the coherent detector and the phase-reference intensity can be considered as trusted because which can be locally calibrated at the receiver’s side. The trusted phase noise model can significantly improve the noise tolerance of the system since the phase noise is the major excess noise. However, the transmission of the phase-reference pulse through the insecure quantum channel in the LLO CV-QKD system may leave rooms for the eavesdropper to mount attacks. Here, we propose a practical and flexible phase-reference intensity attack scheme using a phaseinsensitive amplifier to amplify the intensity of the phase-reference pulse. In this case, the eavesdropper can compromise the security of the LLO CV-QKD system severely by lowering the trusted part of the phase noise to compensate her increased attack on the signal pulse while the total excess noise is unchanged. We simulate the secure key rate with respect to the transmission distance to show that precisely monitoring the instantaneous intensity of the phase-reference pulse in real time is of great importance to guarantee the security of the LLO CV-QKD system.
Currently, quantum key distribution (QKD) using continuous variable (CV) technology has only been demonstrated over short-range terrestrial links. Here, we attempt to answer whether CV-QKD over the much longer satellite-to-Earth channel is feasible. To this end, we first review the concepts and technologies that will enable CV-QKD over the satellite-to-Earth channels. We then consider, in the infinite key limit, the simplest-to-deploy QKD protocols, the coherent state (CS) QKD protocol with homodyne detection and the CS-QKD protocol with heterodyne detection. We then focus on the CS-QKD protocol with heterodyne detection in the pragmatic setting of finite keys, where complete security against general attacks is known. We pay particular attention to the relevant noise terms in the satellite-to-Earth channel and their impact on the secret key rates. In system set-ups where diffraction dominates losses, we find that the main components of the total excess noise are the intensity fluctuations due to scintillation, and the time-of-arrival fluctuations between signal and local oscillator. We conclude that for a wide range of pragmatic system models, CS-QKD with information-theoretic security in the satellite-to-Earth channel is feasible.