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arXiv:2010.08474 · Physical Review Applied

Countermeasure Against Quantum Hacking Using Detection Statistics

Gaëtan Gras, Davide Rusca, Hugo Zbinden, Félix Bussières

Published Mar 17, 2021• 8 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of quantum key distribution systems. Even though such attacks are technically challenging to implement, it is important to consider countermeasures to avoid information leakage. In this paper, we present a countermeasure against these kinds of attacks based on the use of multipixel detectors. We show that with this method, we are able to estimate an upper bound on the information an eavesdropper could have on the key exchanged. Finally, we test a multipixel detector based on superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors to show it can fulfill all the requirements for our countermeasure to be effective.

DOI
10.1103/physrevapplied.15.034052

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Detector blinding attacks have been proposed in the last few years, and they could potentially threaten the security of quantum key distribution systems. Even though such attacks are technically challenging to implement, it is important to consider countermeasures to avoid information leakage. In this paper, we present a countermeasure against these kinds of attacks based on the use of multipixel detectors. We show that with this method, we are able to estimate an upper bound on the information an eavesdropper could have on the key exchanged. Finally, we test a multipixel detector based on superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors to show it can fulfill all the requirements for our countermeasure to be effective.
In real-life implementations of quantum key distribution (QKD), the physical systems with unwanted imperfections would be exploited by an eavesdropper. Based on imperfections in the detectors, detector control attacks have been successfully launched on several QKD systems, and attracted widespread concerns. Here, we propose a robust countermeasure against these attacks just by introducing a variable attenuator in front of the detector. This countermeasure is not only effective against the attacks with blinding light, but also robust against the attacks without blinding light which are more concealed and threatening. Different from previous technical improvements, the single photon detector in our countermeasure model is treated as a blackbox, and the eavesdropper can be detected by statistics of the detection and error rates of the QKD system. Besides theoretical proof, the countermeasure is also supported by an experimental demonstration. Our countermeasure is general in sense that it is independent of the technical details of the detector, and can be easily applied to the existing QKD systems.
We explore bright-light control of superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) in the shunted configuration (a practical measure to avoid latching). In an experiment, we simulate an illumination pattern the SNSPD would receive in a typical quantum key distribution system under hacking attack. We show that it effectively blinds and controls the SNSPD. The transient blinding illumination lasts for a fraction of a microsecond and produces several deterministic fake clicks during this time. This attack does not lead to elevated timing jitter in the spoofed output pulse, and hence does not introduce significant errors. Five different SNSPD chip designs were tested. We consider possible countermeasures to this attack.
In a practical quantum key distribution(QKD) system, imperfect equipment, especially the single-photon detector,can be eavesdropped on by a blinding attack. However, the original blinding attack may be discovered by directly detecting the current. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic blinding attack model, where Eve probabilistically applies a blinding attack without being caught by using only an existing intuitive countermeasure. More precisely, our countermeasure solves the problem of how to define the bound in the limitation of precision of current detection, and then we prove security of the practical system by considering the current parameter. Meanwhile, we discuss the bound of the quantum bit error rate(QBER) introduced by Eve, by which Eve can acquire information without the countermeasure.
Superconducting nanowire single-photon detector (SNSPD) is a promising candidate for achieving high-rate quantum key distribution (QKD) over long distances, and it has been widely employed in recent QKD experiments. However, SNSPD is naturally polarization sensitive, which, if unchecked, could leave a back door for an eavesdropper to perform quantum hacking. Here, we experimentally study the polarization dependency on the detection efficiency of SNSPD and propose a quantum hacking attack to exploit this vulnerability. We experimentally characterize the polarization-dependent efficiencies of different SNSPDs and perform risk analysis on the security of a standard phase-encoding QKD implementation. Our experimental data and security analysis show that, if the effect of polarization-dependent efficiency is unnoticed, an eavesdropper can successfully hack the QKD implementation using the polarization-rotation attack. Countermeasures are also discussed. The result is important for the future design of secure implementations of QKD.
Nowadays, the superconducting single-photon detectors (SSPDs) are used in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) instead of single-photon avalanche photodiodes. Recently bright-light control of the SSPD has been demonstrated. This attack employed a “backdoor” in the detector biasing technique. We developed the autoreset system which returns the SSPD to superconducting state when it is latched. We investigate latched state of the SSPD and define limit conditions for effective blinding attack. Peculiarity of the blinding attack is a long nonsingle photon response of the SSPD. It is much longer than usual single photon response. Besides, we need follow up response duration of the SSPD. These countermeasures allow us to prevent blind attack on SSPDs for Quantum Key Distribution.