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arXiv:2010.03389

Are mental states nonlocal?

Ovidiu Cristinel Stoica

Published Oct 6, 2020• 0 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

I show that if mental states are function of physical states, then they are nonlocal, in a sense that will be explained. I argue that, if mental states are reducible to brain physics, and if they are integrated experiences, this nonlocality implies that Classical Physics is not enough, in particular the computationalist thesis does not hold. I illustrate the argument with a thought experiment. The proof of nonlocality is straightforward and general, but the result is counterintuitive, so I spend a large part of the article discussing possible objections, alternatives, and implications. I discuss the possibility that Quantum Physics allows this kind of nonlocality.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.2010.03389

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I show that if mental states are function of physical states, then they are nonlocal, in a sense that will be explained. I argue that, if mental states are reducible to brain physics, and if they are integrated experiences, this nonlocality implies that Classical Physics is not enough, in particular the computationalist thesis does not hold. I illustrate the argument with a thought experiment. The proof of nonlocality is straightforward and general, but the result is counterintuitive, so I spend a large part of the article discussing possible objections, alternatives, and implications. I discuss the possibility that Quantum Physics allows this kind of nonlocality.
The article aims to discuss the problem of applicability of quantum-mechanical concepts to the analysis of the mechanisms of brain and the nature of consciousness. Are these tools sufficient and adequate to solve this problem? We claim that despite numerous attempts made in this direction it is difficult to speak about any significant progress. Although the intersection and active interaction between quantum theory and neuroscience forms a kind of “zone of exchange”, allowing us to claim the formation of “quantum neurophysics”, physicalism and reductionism, actually imposed by quantum mechanics, allow us to discuss the nonlocality of neural networks only by analogy with quantum nonlocality. This discussion actually do not touch the underlying machinery of the functionality of these networks, including the processes of their synchronization. Although J. Fodor’s concept of modularity in the context of holism philosophy and ideas of biocultural co-constructivism lead to the idea that it is possible to apply N. Bohr’s complementarity to comprehension of brain functions, but in reality the presence of quantum effects at the level of brain as an integral system is not so obvious. The expression of thought in a word, which means the transformation of a continuous spectrum into a discrete one, only superficially resembles the process of wave function reduction. We can conclude that the boundaries of applicability of quantum-mechanical representations pass through the conceptual space, which does not capture to advance extent the essential features of neither brain, nor consciousness.
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We argue that quantum nonlocality of entangled states is not an actual phenomenon. It appears in quantum mechanics as a consequence of the inconsistency of its superposition principle with the corpuscular properties of a quantum particle. In the existing form, this principle does not distinguish between macroscopically distinct states of a particle and their superpositions: it implies introducing observables for a particle, even if it is in an entangled state. However, a particle cannot take part simultaneously in two or more alternative macroscopically distinct sub-processes. Thus, calculating the expectation values of the one-particle's observables, for entangled states, is physically meaningless: Born's formula is not applicable to such states. The same concerns the entangled states of compound quantum systems. In the {\it existing} quantum mechanics, introducing Bell's inequalities is fully legal. However, these inequalities imply averaging over an entangled state, and, hence, they have no basis for their clear physical interpretation. Experiments to confirm the violation of Bell's inequalities do not prove the existence of nonlocality in microcosm. They confirm only that correlations introduced in the existing theory of entangled states have no physical sense, for they contradict special relativity.
I have been arguing that quantum nonlocality, deeply entrenched in the present formalism of quantum mechanics and widely believed as a reality by physicists, is in fact absent. Spooky nonlocal state reduction is the most, and perhaps the only irrational feature of present day physics. There are experimental results that reject nonlocal state reduction at a distance. Also, there are arguments that show that signal locality itself can be violated if there is true nonlocal collapse of the wavefunction. The Bell's inequalities, the violation of which polarized physicists in favour of nonlocality, arise not due to nonlocality, but due to ignoring prior information on correlations encoded in the phase of local probability amplitudes. Here I discuss an experiment involving particles entangled in energy and time variables that shows that there is no nonlocal state reduction during measurements on entangled particles. Quantum mechanics is inconsistent if it includes the concept of wavefunction collapse as a physical process for entangled multi-particle systems.
Abstract: The standard formulation of Quantum Mechanics has raised from its beginning animated discussions about the interpretation of the counterintuitive properties of mental objects (wave functions or Schrödinger waves) introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects.Two questions have since then been formulated to which a universally accepted answer is still lacking. The first one (Bohr, von Neumann) concerns the ontological nature of physical reality (the existence of classical objects) and the role of the observer (wave packet collapse) in assessing it. The second one is the non local character of quantum physical quantities (Einstein Podolski Rosen [EPR] long distance correlation of particles). An alternative formulation of Quantum Mechanics, originally proposed in 1932 by Eugene Wigner, taken up by Richard Feynman in 1987, and reelaborated by myself in the years from 1998 to 2003, is possible. The mental objects of standard Quantum Mechanics (Schrödinger waves) no longer appear in this new formulation and are replaced by new ones (Wigner functions) which do not show any more the puzzling properties which worried Einstein. My conclusion from the preceding discussion is that different explanations of a given set of experimental data may be derived according to the different nature of the mental objects introduced to represent the properties of the physical objects involved. The confusion between these two kind of objects may be, however, very misleading. I will finally discuss two examples of this conclusion from Biology
We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms.