Recently, major progress has been made towards the realisation of quantum internet to enable a broad range of classically intractable applications. These applications such as delegated quantum computation require running a secure identification protocol between a low-resource and a high-resource party to provide secure communication. In this work, we propose two identification protocols based on the emerging hardware-secure solutions, the quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs). The first protocol allows a low-resource party to prove its identity to a high-resource party and in the second protocol, it is vice versa. Unlike existing identification protocols based on Quantum Read-out PUFs that rely on the security against a specific family of attacks, our protocols provide provable exponential security against any Quantum Polynomial-Time adversary with resource-efficient parties. We provide a comprehensive comparison between the two proposed protocols in terms of resources such as quantum memory and computing ability required in both parties as well as the communication overhead between them.
Recently, major progress has been made towards the realisation of quantum internet to enable a broad range of classically intractable applications. These applications such as delegated quantum computation require running a secure identification protocol between a low-resource and a high-resource party to provide secure communication. In this work, we propose two identification protocols based on the emerging hardware-secure solutions, the quantum Physical Unclonable Functions (qPUFs). The first protocol allows a low-resource party to prove its identity to a high-resource party and in the second protocol, it is vice versa. Unlike existing identification protocols based on Quantum Read-out PUFs that rely on the security against a specific family of attacks, our protocols provide provable exponential security against any Quantum Polynomial-Time adversary with resource-efficient parties. We provide a comprehensive comparison between the two proposed protocols in terms of resources such as quantum memory and computing ability required in both parties as well as the communication overhead between them.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a powerful cryptographic tool for various applications due to their inherent physical uniqueness and unclonability. However, the advent of quantum computers has posed significant threats to classical PUFs. In response, Quantum PUFs (QPUFs), which exploit the principles of quantum mechanics, have been introduced as a robust alternative. This paper analyzes two key applications of QPUFs utilizing their distinctive output: secure storage and identification, from an information theoretic perspective. We establish achievability under different constraints and derive the secure storage capacity and a doubly exponential identification rate, even in the presence of an active adversary attempting to deceive the system by exploiting publicly stored data. We further demonstrate that within the quantum domain, we achieve higher rates compared to classical counterparts.
Abstract This paper, for the first time, addresses the questions related to the connections between quantum pseudorandomness and quantum hardware assumptions, specifically quantum physical unclonable functions (qPUFs). Our results show that efficient pseudorandom quantum states (PRS) are sufficient to construct the challenge set for universally unforgeable qPUFs, improving the previous existing constructions based on the Haar-random states. We also show that both the qPUFs and the quantum pseudorandom unitaries (PRUs) can be constructed from each other, providing new ways to obtain PRS from the hardware assumptions. Moreover, we provide a sufficient condition (in terms of the diamond norm) that a set of unitaries should have to be a PRU in order to construct a universally unforgeable qPUF, giving yet another novel insight into the properties of the PRUs. Later, as an application of our results, we show that the efficiency of an existing qPUF-based client–server identification protocol can be improved without losing the security requirements of the protocol.
Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) leverage inherent, nonclonable physical randomness to generate unique input-output pairs, serving as secure fingerprints for cryptographic protocols like authentication. Quantum PUFs (QPUFs) extend this concept by using quantum states as input-output pairs, offering advantages over classical PUFs, such as challenge reusability via public channels and eliminating the need for trusted parties due to the no-cloning theorem. Recent work introduced a generalized mathematical framework for QPUFs. It was shown that random unitary QPUFs cannot achieve existential unforgeability against quantum polynomial time (QPT) adversaries. Security was possible only with additional uniform randomness. To avoid the cost of external randomness, we propose a novel measurement-based scheme. Here, the randomness naturally arises from quantum measurements. Additionally, we introduce a second model where the QPUF functions as a nonunitary quantum channel, which guarantees existential unforgeability. These are the first models in the literature to demonstrate a high level of provable security. Finally, we show that the quantum phase estimation (QPE) protocol, applied to a Haar random unitary, serves as an approximate implementation of the second type of QPUF by approximating a von Neumann measurement on the unitary's eigenbasis. Published by the American Physical Society 2024
Abstract Authentication is a fundamental building block of secure quantum networks, essential for quantum cryptographic protocols and often debated as a key limitation of quantum key distribution in security standards. Most quantum-safe authentication schemes rely on small pre-shared keys or post-quantum computational assumptions. In this work, we introduce a new authentication approach that combines hardware assumptions, particularly physical unclonable functions (PUFs), along with fundamental quantum properties of non-local states, such as local indistinguishability, to achieve provable security in entanglement-based protocols. We propose two protocols for different scenarios in entanglement-enabled quantum networks. The first protocol, referred to as the offline protocol, requires pre-distributed entangled states but no quantum communication during the authentication phase. It enables a server to authenticate clients at any time with only minimal classical communication. The second, an online protocol, requires quantum communication but only necessitates entangled state generation on the Prover ’s side. For this, we introduce a novel hardware module, the hybrid entangled PUF. Both protocols use weakly secure, off-the-shelf classical PUFs as their hardware module, yet we prove that quantum properties such as local indistinguishability enable exponential security for authentication, even in a single round. We provide full security analysis for both protocols and establish them as the first entanglement-based extension of hardware-based quantum authentication. These protocols are suitable for implementation across various platforms, particularly photonics-based ones, and offer a practical and flexible solution to the long-standing challenge of authentication in quantum communication networks.
We present an information-theoretic framework for secure storage and message identification utilizing fully quantum physically unclonable functions (QPUFs). Extending prior models rooted in classical and hybrid classical-quantum PUFs, we propose a fully quantum setting that enables robust identification protocols in the presence of a powerful quantum wiretapper holding correlated side information. We derive achievable second-order identification rates under stringent privacy leakage constraints and show that secure identification is feasible whenever a positive secret key rate can be extracted from the QPUF output—establishing a quantum analogue of the classical dichotomy theorem. Furthermore, we demonstrate that augmenting the system with an auxiliary public quantum source enhances identification capacity without increasing privacy leakage. Our results provide a rigorous theoretical foundation for quantum-secure identification and storage, with implications for next-generation communication systems and adversarial environments requiring low-latency, energy-efficient quantum-secure storage protocols.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware devices with the assumption of possessing inherent, non-clonable physical randomness which leads to unique pairs of inputs and outputs that provide a secure fingerprint for cryptographic protocols like Authentication. In the case of quantum PUFs (QPUFs), the input-output pairs consists of quantum states instead of classical bitstrings, offering advantages over classical PUFs (CPUFs) such as challenge reusability via public channels and non-reliance over any trusted party due to the no-cloning theorem. In recent literature, a generalized mathematical frame-work for studying QPUFs was developed, which paved the way for having QPUF models with provable security. It was proved that existential unforgeability against Quantum Polynomial Time (QPT) adversaries cannot be achieved by any random unitary QPUF. Since measurements are non-unitary quantum processes, we define a QPUF based on random von Neumann measurements. We prove that such a QPUF is existentially unforgeable. Thus, we introduce the first model in existing literature that depicts such a high level of provable security. We also prove that the Quantum Phase Estimation (QPE) protocol applied on a Haar random unitary serves as an approximate implementation for this kind of QPUF as it approximates a von Neumann measurement on the eigenbasis of the unitary.