Bell's theorem is based on three assumptions: realism, locality, and measurement independence. The third assumption is identified by Bell as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. He holds that ultimately the human free will can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this third assumption are known in the literature as "freedom-of-choice loophole" (FOCL). In a recent publication, Abellán et al [2018] address this problem and follow this same strategy embraced by Bell [2004]. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, Bell's solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that BigBell Test (Abellán et al. [2018]) can in fact close the loophole.
Bell's theorem is based on three assumptions: realism, locality, and measurement independence. The third assumption is identified by Bell as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. He holds that ultimately the human free will can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this third assumption are known in the literature as "freedom-of-choice loophole" (FOCL). In a recent publication, Abellán et al [2018] address this problem and follow this same strategy embraced by Bell [2004]. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, Bell's solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that BigBell Test (Abellán et al. [2018]) can in fact close the loophole.
Bell’s theorem is based on the assumptions of local causality and measurement independence. The last assumption is identified by many authors as linked to the freedom of choice hypothesis. In this sense the human free will ultimately can ensure the measurement independence assumption. The incomplete experimental conditions for supporting this assumption are known in the literature as “freedom-of-choice loophole” (FOCL). Although there is no consensus among the scientists that the measurement independence is linked to human choices, in a recent paper, published in a prestigious journal, signed by more than a hundred authors, this assumption was seriously taken for the first time in an experiment known as Big Bell Test (Abellán et al. 2018). Using photons, single atoms, atomic ensembles and superconducting devices, this experiment was performed in five continents, and involved twelve laboratories, adopting human choices to close the FOCL. Nevertheless, the possibility of human freedom of choice has been a matter of philosophical debate for more than 2000 years, and there is no consensus among philosophers on this topic. If human choice is not free, this solution would not be sufficient to close FOCL. Therefore, in order to support the basic assumption of this experiment, it is necessary to argue that human choice is indeed free. In this paper, we present a Kantian position on this topic and defend the view that this philosophical position is the best way to ensure that Big Bell Test can in fact close the loophole.
Bell's theorem shows that local realistic theories place strong restrictions on observable correlations between different systems, giving rise to Bell's inequality which can be violated in experiments using entangled quantum states. Bell's theorem is based on the assumptions of realism, locality, and the freedom to choose between measurement settings. In experimental tests, "loopholes" arise which allow observed violations to still be explained by local realistic theories. Violating Bell's inequality while simultaneously closing all such loopholes is one of the most significant still open challenges in fundamental physics today. In this paper, we present an experiment that violates Bell's inequality while simultaneously closing the locality loophole and addressing the freedom-of-choice loophole, also closing the latter within a reasonable set of assumptions. We also explain that the locality and freedom-of-choice loopholes can be closed only within nondeterminism, i.e., in the context of stochastic local realism.
We argue that for the proof of Bell's theorem no assumptions about realism or free will are necessary. The key formula E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,b,λ)B(a,b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ follows from the logic of plausible reasoning (the objective Bayesian interpretation of probability theory) taken alone, without any further assumptions about realism. The space Λ, usually interpreted as some space of `hidden variables', can be constructed for an arbitrary `field of discourse' using Stone's theorem. The rejection of superdeterminism follows from logical independence -- the non-existence of information which suggest a dependence -- of the free decisions of the experimenters from everything else. To prove the Bell inequality it is, then, sufficient to reduce this to E(AB∣a,b)=∫A(a,λ)B(b,λ)ρ(λ)dλ. This follows for space-like separated measurements from Einstein causality alone. So, the consequence of the violation of Bell's inequality is that Einstein causality has been empirically falsified, without any loopholes left. We consider and reject the idea of weakening the logic of plausible reasoning could be used to create a loophole. Finally, we discuss what can be used to replace Einstein causality. While weak (signal) Einstein causality holds, it follows either from a notion of strong causality or from human inability to prepare states which violate quantum uncertainty, which makes it uninteresting for fundamental considerations. A notion of strong causality has either unacceptable causal loops or requires a hidden preferred frame. Given that a hidden preferred frame is completely compatible with modern physics, it is argued that this choice is preferable.
Bell's theorem states that no description of a Bell experiment can be simultaneously local, realistic in the sense of counterfactual definiteness, and free of conspiracy between settings and hidden state. The recent generation of experiments has confirmed the predicted violation of the CHSH inequality, so one of the assumptions must be abandoned. Which one, and how one reconstructs a coherent worldview after doing so, is a question on which many authors disagree. This paper is written by three such authors. All three reject both counterfactual definiteness and conspiratorial violation of statistical independence of setting choices and state. After a joint exposition of the classical half of Bell's theorem in the language of Pearl-style causal graphs, a joint summary of the loophole-free experiments, and a joint survey of the recent literature, each author states where they have presently arrived. Gill accepts irreducible and non-local quantum randomness and finds the choice between locality and realism a false dichotomy. In his later works, Bell derives counterfactual definiteness from classical local causality, and that is what has to go. The metaphysical concepts "realism", "locality", "causality" need to be reconsidered. Helland reconstructs the Hilbert-space formalism from a theory of accessible variables, and from this theory he concludes that every observer must be limited in a specific sense. Jongejan proposes a geometric hidden-variable construction in which the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality depends on the number of dimensions of space, Tsirelson's bound corresponding to three dimensions. The authors conclude with a discussion.
A Bell test can rule out local realistic models and has potential applications in communication and information tasks. For example, a Bell's inequality violation can certify the presence of intrinsic randomness in measurement outcomes, which can be used to generate unpredictable random numbers. Nevertheless, a Bell test requires measurements that are chosen independently of environment in the test, as would be the case if the measurement setting choices were themselves intrinsically random. Such situation seems to create a ``bootstrapping problem'' recently addressed in the BIG Bell Test, a collection of various Bell tests using human choices. Here, we report in detail our experimental methods and results within the BIG Bell Test, specifically for a special type of Bell inequality, known as the measurement-dependent local inequality. With this inequality, even a small amount of measurement independence makes it possible to disprove local realistic models. The experiment utilizes human-generated random numbers in selecting the measurement settings and is implemented with space-like separation between two distant measurement sites. The experimental result violates a Bell's inequality, which cannot be explained by local hidden variable models with independence parameter (as defined in [G. P\"utz et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 113, 190402 (2014)]) $l>0.10\ifmmode\pm\else\textpm\fi{}0.05$. This result further quantifies the degree to which a local hidden variable model would need to constrain human choices, if it is to reproduce the experimental results.
Bell's theorem is a conditional statement about theoretical models specified by a complete physical state λ. It shows that models satisfying measurement independence and a stochastic Bell-locality (factorizability) condition obey Bell inequalities. Bell experiments, however, do not directly observe λ or the λ-conditioned probabilities appearing in that condition. They record analyzer settings, detector outcomes, and experimental metadata, from which they estimate operational joint distributions, marginals, correlations, and Bell statistics. We clarify the logical relationship between these two levels. The λ-conditioned factorization identity cannot be directly evaluated at fixed λ from the operational record alone. Nevertheless, by marginalizing over λ under measurement independence, the model class implies observable inequalities that can be empirically violated. A Bell-inequality violation therefore excludes the corresponding Bell-local model class under the assumptions required for the inequality, but it does not by itself identify which latent assumption---measurement independence, parameter independence, or outcome independence---failed, nor does it uniquely determine an ontological interpretation. To illustrate this distinction concretely, we employ the Unified Quantum Mechanics formulation, in which the physical state is real, and the complex wavefunction is representational. We show that all four formulations of the dynamics---Schr\"odinger, Hilbert-transform, complex second-order, and real second-order---require the same two real initial functions u0=u(0) and u1=∂tu(0); the complex initial state is merely a repackaging of them, not additional physical information. We formulate the distinction as a three-level hierarchy: operational data, model-class exclusion, and ontological interpretation. The hierarchy separates experimental loopholes, which concern assumptions linking an actual experiment to an ideal Bell model, from the conceptual underdetermination of latent-variable conditional probabilities, which remains even in a loophole-free experiment. The result clarifies what Bell experiments establish without claiming that Bell-local models are empirically untestable. A Monte Carlo simulation illustrates the distinction between operational Bell-test results and latent-state factorization.