Contextuality is a key feature of quantum mechanics, as was first brought to light by Bohr [Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Library of Living Philosophers Vol. VII, edited by P. A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1998), pp. 199–241] and later realized more technically by Kochen and Specker [J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967)]. Isham and Butterfield put contextuality at the heart of their topos-based formalism and gave a reformulation of the Kochen–Specker theorem in the language of presheaves in Isham and Butterfield [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 37, 2669 (1998)]. Here, we broaden this perspective considerably (partly drawing on existing, but scattered results) and show that apart from the Kochen–Specker theorem, Wigner’s theorem, Gleason’s theorem, and Bell’s theorem also relate fundamentally to contextuality. We provide reformulations of the theorems using the language of presheaves over contexts and give general versions valid for von Neumann algebras. This shows that a very substantial part of the structure of quantum theory is encoded by contextuality.
Contextuality is a key feature of quantum mechanics, as was first brought to light by Bohr [Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, Library of Living Philosophers Vol. VII, edited by P. A. Schilpp (Open Court, 1998), pp. 199–241] and later realized more technically by Kochen and Specker [J. Math. Mech. 17, 59 (1967)]. Isham and Butterfield put contextuality at the heart of their topos-based formalism and gave a reformulation of the Kochen–Specker theorem in the language of presheaves in Isham and Butterfield [Int. J. Theor. Phys. 37, 2669 (1998)]. Here, we broaden this perspective considerably (partly drawing on existing, but scattered results) and show that apart from the Kochen–Specker theorem, Wigner’s theorem, Gleason’s theorem, and Bell’s theorem also relate fundamentally to contextuality. We provide reformulations of the theorems using the language of presheaves over contexts and give general versions valid for von Neumann algebras. This shows that a very substantial part of the structure of quantum theory is encoded by contextuality.
Contextuality is a key distinguishing feature between classical and quantum physics. It expresses a fundamental obstruction to describing quantum theory using classical concepts. In turn, understood as a resource for quantum computation, it is expected to hold the key to quantum advantage. Yet, despite its long recognised importance in quantum foundations and, more recently, in quantum computation, the structural essence of contextuality has remained somewhat elusive - different frameworks address different aspects of the phenomenon, yet their precise relationship often remains unclear. This issue already looms large at the level of the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem: while traditional proofs proceed by showing the nonexistence of valuations, the notion of state-independent contextuality in the marginal approach allows to prove contextuality from seemingly weaker assumptions. In the light of this, and at the absence of a unified mathematical framework for Kochen-Specker contextuality, the original algebraic approach has been widely abandoned, in favour of the study of contextual correlations. Here, we reinstate the algebraic perspective on contextuality. Concretely, by building on the novel concept of context connections, we reformulate the algebraic relations between observables originally postulated by Kochen and Specker, and we explicitly demonstrate their consistency with the notion of state-independent contextuality. In the present paper, we focus on the new conceptual ideas and discuss them in the concrete setting of spin-1 observables, specifically those in the example of [S. Yu and C.H. Oh, Phys. Rev. Lett., 108, 030402 (2012)]; in a companion paper, we generalise these ideas, obtain a complete characterisation of Kochen-Specker contextuality and provide a detailed comparison with the related notions of contextuality in the marginal and graph-theoretic approach.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. In the first part we will argue that a general confusion within the literature comes from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. The first one is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality, introduced by Bohr, which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of quantum measurements. The second, is related to an ontic notion of contextuality, exposed through the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem, which focuses on the constraints to discuss about actual (definite valued) properties within the orthodox formalism of QM. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The outcome of the observable A when mea- sured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A,B] = [A,C] = 0, and [B,C] ̸= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and ontic perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. In the second part of the paper, we will analyse the relation between ‘classical contexts’ and QM. We will show that three accepted presuppositions found within the orthodox literature are, in general, false. Namely: (i) that quantum contextuality does not preclude an objective description of physical reality, (ii) that the choice of a context (or basis) restores a classical description of reality, and (iii) that the choice of a (classical) context is a necessary condition for accounting for empirical statements in QM.
Abstract In chapter 12 we give an overview of the historical development of hidden-variable theories aiming to attribute ‘hidden’ definite outcomes to any potential measurement on a quantum system. We start with a discussion of von Neumann’s assumption on hidden-variable models, which was later realized not to hold by Hermann, Kochen, Specker, and Bell, going into detail on Bell’s refutation of von Neumann’s arguments. We then turn to the notion of contextuality, which severely restricts hidden-variable models: we discuss Gleason’s theorem before stating and proving the famous Kochen-Specker theorem, as well as the simpler versions of Peres’ nonet and Mermin’s pentagram. These results show that quantum mechanics is not compatible with the assignment of definite measurement outcomes to all possible measurements, and such assignments can hence only be made once a restricted set of observables, a context, is selected
The origin and basis of the notion of quantum contextuality is identified in the Copenhagen approach to quantum mechanics, where context is automatically invoked by its requirement that the experimental arrangement involved in any measurements or set of measurements be taken into account while, in general, the outcome of a measurement may depend on other measurements immediately preceding or jointly performed on the same system. For Bohr, the specification of the experimental situation of any measurement is essential to its significance in light of complementarity and the omnipresence of the quantum of action in physics; for Heisenberg, the incompatibility of pairs of sharp measurements belonging to different situations coheres with both the completeness of the quantum state as an objective physical description and the principle of indeterminacy. Here, context in the Copenhagen approach is taken to be the equivalence class of experimental arrangements corresponding to a set of compatible measurements of quantum observables in standard quantum mechanics; the associated form of contextuality in quantum mechanics arises via the non-commutativity in general of sharp observables, proven by von Neumann, that can appear, providing different contexts. This notion is related to theoretical situations explored later by Bell, by Kochen and Specker, and by others in relation to the classification of hidden-variables theories and elsewhere in physics. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Contextuality and probability in quantum mechanics and beyond’.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an interpretation of which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of is related to a purely formal understanding of as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an omelette of contextuality which has been fully widespread through a popularized epistemic explanation of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.
In this paper we attempt to analyze the physical and philosophical meaning of quantum contextuality. We will argue that there exists a general confusion within the foundational literature arising from the improper "scrambling" of two different meanings of quantum contextuality. While the first one, introduced by Bohr, is related to an epistemic interpretation of contextuality which stresses the incompatibility (or complementarity) of certain measurement situations described in classical terms; the second meaning of contextuality is related to a purely formal understanding of contextuality as exposed by the Kochen-Specker (KS) theorem which focuses instead on the constraints of the orthodox quantum formalism in order to interpret projection operators as preexistent or actual (definite valued) properties. We will show how these two notions have been scrambled together creating an "omelette of contextuality" which has been fully widespread through a popularized "epistemic explanation" of the KS theorem according to which: The measurement outcome of the observable A when measured together with B or together with C will necessarily differ in case [A, B] = [A, C] = 0, and [B, C] /= 0. We will show why this statement is not only improperly scrambling epistemic and formal perspectives, but is also physically and philosophically meaningless. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such widespread epistemic reading of KS theorem as related to statistical statements of measurement outcomes.