Advances in highly sensitive detection techniques for classical coherent communication systems have reduced the received signal power requirements to a few photons per bit. At this level one can take advantage of the quantum noise to create secure communication, using continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). In this work therefore we embed CV-QKD signals within classical signals and transmit classical data and secure keys simultaneously over 25 km of optical fibre. This is achieved by using a novel coherent displacement state generator, which has the potential for being used in a wide range of quantum optical experiments. This approach removes the need for separate channels for quantum communication systems and allows reduced system bandwidth for a given communications specification. This demonstration therefore demonstrates a way of implementing direct quantum physical layer security within a conventional classical communications system, offering a major advance in term of practical and low cost implementation.
Advances in highly sensitive detection techniques for classical coherent communication systems have reduced the received signal power requirements to a few photons per bit. At this level one can take advantage of the quantum noise to create secure communication, using continuous variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD). In this work therefore we embed CV-QKD signals within classical signals and transmit classical data and secure keys simultaneously over 25 km of optical fibre. This is achieved by using a novel coherent displacement state generator, which has the potential for being used in a wide range of quantum optical experiments. This approach removes the need for separate channels for quantum communication systems and allows reduced system bandwidth for a given communications specification. This demonstration therefore demonstrates a way of implementing direct quantum physical layer security within a conventional classical communications system, offering a major advance in term of practical and low cost implementation.
Security issues and attack management of optical communication have come increasingly important. Quantum techniques are explored to secure or protect classical communication. In this paper, we present a method for in-service optical physical layer security monitoring that has vacuum-noise level sensitivity without classical security loopholes. This quantum-based method of eavesdropping detection, similar to that used in conventional pilot tone systems, is achieved by sending quantum signals, here comprised of continuous variable quantum states, i.e. weak coherent states modulated at the quantum level. An experimental demonstration of attack detection using the technique was presented for an ideal fibre tapping attack that taps 1% of the ongoing light in a 10 dB channel, and also an ideal correlated jamming attack in the same channel that maintains the light power with excess noise increased by 0.5 shot noise unit. The quantum monitoring system monitors suspicious changes in the quantum signal with the help of advanced data processing algorithms. In addition, unlike the CV-QKD system which is very sensitive to channel excess noise and receiver system noise, the quantum monitoring is potentially more compatible with current optical infrastructure, as it lowers the system requirements and potentially allows much higher classical data rate communication with links length up to 100 s km.
Quantum information processing uses the laws of quantum physics to perform tasks that are infeasible or impossible classically. Within this broader programme, quantum communication has emerged as one of the most practically mature sub-fields of quantum information science, with several proposed protocols having already been demonstrated over deployed optical fibre and free-space links. Of the various platforms available for encoding quantum information for communication, the continuous-variable (CV) framework encodes information in the quadratures of the electromagnetic field and is therefore directly compatible with the existing machinery of classical coherent optical communications. The most prominent CV protocol is continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD), which establishes an information-theoretically secure cryptographic key between two spatially separated parties. Because CV-QKD reuses much of the hardware of classical coherent telecommunications, including off-the-shelf lasers, modulators, and balanced detectors, it is a leading candidate for the deployment of quantum-secured communication over standard optical fibre networks. The development of CV-QKD has typically proceeded with the underlying physics dictating the engineering. Security proofs, often relying on the Gaussian optimality of collective attacks, set the structure of the protocol, and the practical system is then built to satisfy the assumptions on which those proofs depend. Contributions of this thesis adopt the opposite view, taking the practical engineering of high-rate CV-QKD systems as the starting point and developing the theoretical machinery required to support it. The first contribution is the formalisation of one-round sliced reconciliation with guard-band post-selection as a key distillation scheme designed for real-time, high-throughput operation. Originally introduced experimentally as a means to stabilise bit error rates and enable the use of fixed-rate error correction codes at high symbol rates, guard-band post-selection is shown here to identify the guard-band span as a free parameter that can be tuned to hold the quantum bit error rate approximately constant across a range of channel conditions. However, conditioning on accepted data produces non-Gaussian post-selected statistics that lie outside the reach of standard Gaussian-optimality security arguments, which motivates the remaining two contributions. The second contribution is an asymptotic security analysis of guard-band post-selected CV-QKD against arbitrary collective attacks, no longer restricted to Gaussian adversaries. By using a quantum channel estimate as side information and by lifting reduced-state distances to purification distances via entropic continuity bounds, security is certified against the class of channels lying close to a Gaussian thermal-loss reference, with a key-rate penalty that scales with the energy-constrained diamond distance to that reference. The third contribution is the experimental basis required to apply this framework in practice. A lightweight three-stage protocol for quantum channel estimation is proposed and demonstrated, which repurposes the Gaussian probe constellation already present in the CV-QKD signal and requires no additional hardware or modifications to the underlying protocol. Over single-mode optical fibre at distances from 10 km to 50 km, the protocol produces physically valid process tensor estimates whose energy-constrained diamond distances to a Gaussian reference channel remain on the order of 10^(-3) throughout. Together, these three contributions provide a treatment of post-selected Gaussian-modulated CV-QKD in which the engineering, the security theory, and the channel characterisation are designed to operate together within a deployable system.
We have developed a continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) system that employs discrete quadrature-amplitude modulation and homodyne detection of coherent states of light. We experimentally demonstrated automated secure key generation with a rate of 50 kbps when a quantum channel is a 10 km optical fibre. The CV-QKD system utilises a four-state and post-selection protocol and generates a secure key against the entangling cloner attack. We used a pulsed light source of 1550 nm wavelength with a repetition rate of 10 MHz. A commercially available balanced receiver is used to realise shot-noise-limited pulsed homodyne detection. We used a non-binary LDPC code for error correction (reverse reconciliation) and the Toeplitz matrix multiplication for privacy amplification. A graphical processing unit card is used to accelerate the software-based post-processing.
The paper presents a pioneering approach in which classical signals and quantum signals based on discrete-variable QKD are simultaneously generated, transmitted, and received on a single wavelength. The performance of the hybrid transmission scheme is thoroughly investigated across various data rates and levels of channel attenuation. A secure key rate of 591 bps alongside a classical data rate of 125 kbps is experimentally realized by using commercial devices. Compared to existing methods, the proposed scheme optimizes the utilization of optical wave resources, reduces system costs, and effectively mitigates interference from optical communication signals on quantum signals.
We report a 100-MHz continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) experiment over a 25-km fiber channel without sending a local oscillator (LO). We use a "locally" generated LO and implement with a 1-GHz shot-noise-limited homodyne detector to achieve high-speed quantum measurement, and we propose a secure phase compensation scheme to maintain a low level of excess noise. These make high-bit-rate CV-QKD significantly simpler for larger transmission distances compared with previous schemes in which both LO and quantum signals are transmitted through the insecure quantum channel.
Quantum key distribution with continuous variables (CV-QKD) enables two parties to share a secret key by using coherent states of light and homodyne detection. This can be carried out by employing low-cost and mature technology developed for telecommunications. It has been shown that at short distances, CV-QKD allows for higher bit rates than conventional discrete variable QKD protocols. Furthermore, CV-QKD could potentially be employed to build a link for secure communication between two parties inside a building or campus and potentially in satellite communications. In this work, we will direct efforts into developing a fiber-based, low-cost, robust, and high-bitrate CV-QKD link. The theoretical concepts, specifics of the QKD system subsequently put into practice in the implementation, have been detailed. Finally, interference experiments have been performed parallel to the proof-of-principle QKD system.