Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1906.06675

Covert Communication Over a Compound Channel

Sadaf Salehkalaibar, Mohammad Hossein Yassaee, Vincent Y. F. Tan

Published Jun 16, 2019• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

In this paper, we consider fundamental communication limits over a compound channel. Covert communication in the information-theoretic context has been primarily concerned with fundamental limits when the transmitter wishes to communicate to legitimate receiver(s) while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary. This paper, however, considers an alternative, and no less important, setting in which the object to be masked is the state of the compound channel. Such a communication model has applications in the prevention of malicious parties seeking to jam the communication signal when, for example, the signal-to-noise ratio of a wireless channel is found to be low. Our main contribution is the establishment of bounds on the throughput-key region when the covertness constraint is defined in terms of the total variation distance. In addition, for the scenario in which the key length is infinite, we provide a sufficient condition for when the bounds coincide for the scaling of the throughput, which follows the square-root law. Numerical examples, including that of a Gaussian channel, are provided to illustrate our results.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1906.06675

Related papers

State Masking Over a Two-State Compound Channel

Sadaf Salehkalaibar, Mohammad Hossein Yassaee, Vincent Y. F. Tan +1 more

We consider the fundamental limits of reliable communication over a two-state compound channel when the state of the channel needs to be masked. Our model is closely related to an area of study known as covert communication, a setting in which the transmitter wishes to communicate to legitimate receiver(s) while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary. Our main contribution is the establishment of upper and lower bounds on the throughput-key length region when the constraint that quantifies how much the states are masked is defined to be the total variation distance between the channel output distributions of the two states. When length of the key is sufficiently large, we provide sufficient conditions for the bounds to coincide. Our results follow the so-called square-root law and hence are reminiscent of results in covert communications. Numerical examples, including that of a Gaussian channel, are provided to illustrate our results.

arXiv:2012.01706•IEEE Transactions on Information Theory•Jul 12, 2021•2 citations

Information-theoretic limits of covert communication over additive-noise channels

Cécile Bouette

Physical-layer security aims to exploit the randomness inherent in communication channels in order to guarantee confidentiality even against computationally unlimited attackers. In this thesis, we focus on covert communication, also known as “communication with low probability of detection”. This is a scenario where a transmitter and receiver try to prevent an eavesdropper from making a good guess on whether a communication is ongoing or not. We assume that the receiver and the eavesdropper share the same channel and therefore see the same outputs. In this scenario, the transmitter shares a key with the legitimate receiver to provide the necessary advantage to detect the communication and reliably decode the message. Asymptotically, the amount of information that can be sent reliably and covertly scales like the square root of the number of channel uses; this is known as the square root law of covert communication.We study the corresponding scaling constant of the square root law for general memoryless channels including non-Gaussian additive noise, as well as Gaussian channels with memory. In the latter case, we show that the scaling constant is the same as over the memoryless Gaussian channel. For continuous memoryless channels, under mild integrability conditions, we show that the scaling constant is upper bounded by a simple expression which only involves the variance of the logarithm of the probability density function of the noise. Moreover, we show that under some additional assumptions, this upper bound is tight. Furthermore, we provide upper bounds on the length of the secret key required to achieve covertness.The second objective of this work is to investigate the limits of covert communication over continuous memoryless channels in the finite blocklength regime. We provide bounds for the first and second-order asymptotics for covert communication over an AWGN channel under a maximal error probability criterion and for the first-order asymptotics under an average error probability criterion.

•Jan 23, 2025•0 citations

Covert Communication Over a Compound Discrete Memoryless Channel

Mehrasa Ahmadipour, Sadaf Salehkalaibar, Mohammad Hossein Yassaee +1 more

In this paper, we study covert communication over a compound discrete memoryless channel (DMC). There are two channel states in which one of them is arbitrarily chosen and remains fixed during the transmission. The objective is to reliably send a message from the transmitter to the receiver. An adversary who is observing the channel output should not be able to infer the channel state. Two covertness metrics are considered. In the first metric, covertness is measured using the KL-divergence of the channel output marginal of each state with a fixed distribution. Different cases where such a distribution can be specified, are studied. The optimal transmission rate of each case is established. In the second metric, the covertness is measured by using the total variation distance of the channel output marginals of the two states. Upper and lower bounds on the optimal transmission covert rate are derived. The bounds match for a special case and characterize the optimal throughput.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jul 1, 2019•10 citations

Fundamental Limits of Quantum-Secure Covert Communication Over Bosonic Channels

Michael S. Bullock, Christos N. Gagatsos, Saikat Guha +1 more

We investigate the fundamental limit of quantumsecure covert communication over the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel, the quantum-mechanical mode underlying many practical channels. We assume that the adversary has unlimited quantum information processing capabilities as well as access to all transmitted photons that do not reach the legitimate receiver. Given existence of noise that is uncontrolled by the adversary, the square root law (SRL) governs covert communication: up to c√(n) covert bits can be transmitted reliably in n channel uses. Attempting to surpass this limit results in detection with unity probability as n → ∞. Here we present the expression for c, characterizing the SRL for the bosonic channel. We also prove that discrete-valued coherent state quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) constellation achieves the optimal c, which is the same as that achieved by a circularly-symmetric complex-valued Gaussian prior on coherent state amplitude. Finally, while binary phase shift keying (BPSK) achieves the Holevo capacity for non-covert bosonic channels in the low received signal-to-noise ratio regime, we show that it is strictly sub-optimal for covert communication.

arXiv:1907.04228•Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing•Sep 1, 2019•62 citations

Covert Communication over Adversarially Jammed Channels

Qiaosheng Eric Zhang, Mayank Bakshi, Sidharth Jaggi

Suppose that a transmitter Alice potentially wishes to communicate with a receiver Bob over an adversarially jammed binary channel. An active adversary James eavesdrops on their communication over a binary symmetric channel (BSC(q)), and may maliciously flip (up to) a certain fraction p of their transmitted bits based on his observation. We consider a setting where the communication must be simultaneously covert as well as reliable, i.e., James should be unable to accurately distinguish whether or not Alice is communicating, while Bob should be able to correctly recover Alice's message with high probability regardless of the adversarial jamming strategy. We show that, unlike the setting with passive adversaries, reliable covert communication against active adversaries requires Alice and Bob to have a shared key (of length at least Ω(log n)) even when Bob has a better channel than James. We present inner and outer bounds on the information-theoretically optimal throughputs as a function of the channel parameters, the desired level of covertness, and the amount of shared key available. Further, these bounds match for a wide range of parameters of interest.

IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW)•Nov 1, 2018•17 citations

Covert MIMO Communications under Variational Distance Constraint

Shiyuan Wang, Matthieu R. Bloch

We consider the problem of covert communication over Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels, in which a transmitter attempts to reliably communicate with a legitimate receiver while ensuring a low probability of detection by an adversary. We exactly characterize the covert capacity under a variational distance covertness constraint when MIMO channel matrices are static and known to all parties. We also characterize the covert capacity for a class of channels in which the legitimate channel matrix is known but the adversary's channel matrix is only known to satisfy a rank and a spectral norm constraint.

IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)•Jun 1, 2020•3 citations
In this paper, we consider fundamental communication limits over a compound channel. Covert communication in the information-theoretic context has been primarily concerned with fundamental limits when the transmitter wishes to communicate to legitimate receiver(s) while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary. This paper, however, considers an alternative, and no less important, setting in which the object to be masked is the state of the compound channel. Such a communication model has applications in the prevention of malicious parties seeking to jam the communication signal when, for example, the signal-to-noise ratio of a wireless channel is found to be low. Our main contribution is the establishment of bounds on the throughput-key region when the covertness constraint is defined in terms of the total variation distance. In addition, for the scenario in which the key length is infinite, we provide a sufficient condition for when the bounds coincide for the scaling of the throughput, which follows the square-root law. Numerical examples, including that of a Gaussian channel, are provided to illustrate our results.
We consider the fundamental limits of reliable communication over a two-state compound channel when the state of the channel needs to be masked. Our model is closely related to an area of study known as covert communication, a setting in which the transmitter wishes to communicate to legitimate receiver(s) while ensuring that the communication is not detected by an adversary. Our main contribution is the establishment of upper and lower bounds on the throughput-key length region when the constraint that quantifies how much the states are masked is defined to be the total variation distance between the channel output distributions of the two states. When length of the key is sufficiently large, we provide sufficient conditions for the bounds to coincide. Our results follow the so-called square-root law and hence are reminiscent of results in covert communications. Numerical examples, including that of a Gaussian channel, are provided to illustrate our results.
Physical-layer security aims to exploit the randomness inherent in communication channels in order to guarantee confidentiality even against computationally unlimited attackers. In this thesis, we focus on covert communication, also known as “communication with low probability of detection”. This is a scenario where a transmitter and receiver try to prevent an eavesdropper from making a good guess on whether a communication is ongoing or not. We assume that the receiver and the eavesdropper share the same channel and therefore see the same outputs. In this scenario, the transmitter shares a key with the legitimate receiver to provide the necessary advantage to detect the communication and reliably decode the message. Asymptotically, the amount of information that can be sent reliably and covertly scales like the square root of the number of channel uses; this is known as the square root law of covert communication.We study the corresponding scaling constant of the square root law for general memoryless channels including non-Gaussian additive noise, as well as Gaussian channels with memory. In the latter case, we show that the scaling constant is the same as over the memoryless Gaussian channel. For continuous memoryless channels, under mild integrability conditions, we show that the scaling constant is upper bounded by a simple expression which only involves the variance of the logarithm of the probability density function of the noise. Moreover, we show that under some additional assumptions, this upper bound is tight. Furthermore, we provide upper bounds on the length of the secret key required to achieve covertness.The second objective of this work is to investigate the limits of covert communication over continuous memoryless channels in the finite blocklength regime. We provide bounds for the first and second-order asymptotics for covert communication over an AWGN channel under a maximal error probability criterion and for the first-order asymptotics under an average error probability criterion.
In this paper, we study covert communication over a compound discrete memoryless channel (DMC). There are two channel states in which one of them is arbitrarily chosen and remains fixed during the transmission. The objective is to reliably send a message from the transmitter to the receiver. An adversary who is observing the channel output should not be able to infer the channel state. Two covertness metrics are considered. In the first metric, covertness is measured using the KL-divergence of the channel output marginal of each state with a fixed distribution. Different cases where such a distribution can be specified, are studied. The optimal transmission rate of each case is established. In the second metric, the covertness is measured by using the total variation distance of the channel output marginals of the two states. Upper and lower bounds on the optimal transmission covert rate are derived. The bounds match for a special case and characterize the optimal throughput.
We investigate the fundamental limit of quantumsecure covert communication over the lossy thermal noise bosonic channel, the quantum-mechanical mode underlying many practical channels. We assume that the adversary has unlimited quantum information processing capabilities as well as access to all transmitted photons that do not reach the legitimate receiver. Given existence of noise that is uncontrolled by the adversary, the square root law (SRL) governs covert communication: up to c√(n) covert bits can be transmitted reliably in n channel uses. Attempting to surpass this limit results in detection with unity probability as n → ∞. Here we present the expression for c, characterizing the SRL for the bosonic channel. We also prove that discrete-valued coherent state quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) constellation achieves the optimal c, which is the same as that achieved by a circularly-symmetric complex-valued Gaussian prior on coherent state amplitude. Finally, while binary phase shift keying (BPSK) achieves the Holevo capacity for non-covert bosonic channels in the low received signal-to-noise ratio regime, we show that it is strictly sub-optimal for covert communication.
Suppose that a transmitter Alice potentially wishes to communicate with a receiver Bob over an adversarially jammed binary channel. An active adversary James eavesdrops on their communication over a binary symmetric channel (BSC(q)), and may maliciously flip (up to) a certain fraction p of their transmitted bits based on his observation. We consider a setting where the communication must be simultaneously covert as well as reliable, i.e., James should be unable to accurately distinguish whether or not Alice is communicating, while Bob should be able to correctly recover Alice's message with high probability regardless of the adversarial jamming strategy. We show that, unlike the setting with passive adversaries, reliable covert communication against active adversaries requires Alice and Bob to have a shared key (of length at least Ω(log n)) even when Bob has a better channel than James. We present inner and outer bounds on the information-theoretically optimal throughputs as a function of the channel parameters, the desired level of covertness, and the amount of shared key available. Further, these bounds match for a wide range of parameters of interest.
We consider the problem of covert communication over Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channels, in which a transmitter attempts to reliably communicate with a legitimate receiver while ensuring a low probability of detection by an adversary. We exactly characterize the covert capacity under a variational distance covertness constraint when MIMO channel matrices are static and known to all parties. We also characterize the covert capacity for a class of channels in which the legitimate channel matrix is known but the adversary's channel matrix is only known to satisfy a rank and a spectral norm constraint.