The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum-key-distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.
The ability of an eavesdropper (Eve) to perform an intercept-resend attack on a free-space quantum-key-distribution (QKD) receiver by precisely controlling the incidence angle of an attack laser has been previously demonstrated. However, such an attack could be ineffective in the presence of atmospheric turbulence due to beam wander and spatial mode aberrations induced by the air's varying index of refraction. We experimentally investigate the impact turbulence has on Eve's attack on a free-space polarization-encoding QKD receiver by emulating atmospheric turbulence with a spatial light modulator. Our results identify how well Eve would need to compensate for turbulence to perform a successful attack by either reducing her distance to the receiver or using beam wavefront correction via adaptive optics. Furthermore, we use an entanglement-breaking scheme to find a theoretical limit on the turbulence strength that hinders Eve's attack.
ABSTRACT In free‐space quantum key distribution (QKD), atmospheric turbulence affects quantum signals by causing intensity fluctuations, phase distortions, and beam wander, which may be exploited by an eavesdropper. Accurate characterization of the quantum channel and receiver is, therefore, essential. Detector efficiency mismatch has previously been identified as a possible side‐channel vulnerability. This study examines the impact of atmospheric turbulence on the security of a BB84 QKD receiver under a spatial‐mode mismatch attack. Turbulence is emulated in the laboratory using phase screens implemented on a spatial light modulator. Results show that turbulence exacerbates inherent detection probability mismatches, increasing the receiver's vulnerability. Information leakage to an eavesdropper is characterized and quantified based on both detection mismatches and turbulence strengths. A comparative analysis between Gaussian and Laguerre‐Gaussian (LG) modes shows that LG modes, particularly those of higher order, exhibit enhanced resilience against turbulence‐induced information leakage. These findings highlight the importance of receiver characterization and spatial mode selection for the secure implementation of QKD in long‐distance and satellite‐based systems under realistic atmospheric conditions.
The orbital angular momentum (OAM) of photons is a promising degree of freedom for high-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD). However, effectively mitigating the adverse effects of atmospheric turbulence is a persistent challenge in OAM QKD systems operating over free-space communication channels. In contrast to previous works focusing on correcting static simulated turbulence, we investigate the performance of OAM QKD in real atmospheric turbulence with real-time adaptive optics (AO) correction. We show that even though our AO system provides a limited correction, it is possible to mitigate the errors induced by weak turbulence and establish a secure channel. The crosstalk induced by turbulence and the performance of AO systems is investigated in two configurations: a lab-scale link with controllable turbulence, and a 340 m long cross-campus link with dynamic atmospheric turbulence. Our experimental results suggest that an advanced AO system with fine beam tracking, reliable beam stabilization, precise wavefront sensing, and accurate wavefront correction is necessary to adequately correct turbulence-induced error. We also propose and demonstrate different solutions to improve the performance of OAM QKD with turbulence, which could enable the possibility of OAM encoding in strong turbulence.
Transmitting a beam through the atmosphere over long distances can be a challenging problem. Factors from the channel, such as atmospheric turbulence causing beam wander and distortions to the wavefront, or the optical design can change the loss induced in the channel. This work simulates a quantum key distribution system implementing the BB84 protocol with entangled photons operating over a 30 km maritime channel using one, four, and nine spatial modes. For the cases of multiple spatial modes, atmospheric turbulence increases the channel cross talk, resulting in an increase in the noise for each channel. To compensate for distortions in the wavefront, adaptive optics at the transmitter or receiver are used to pre- or post-correct the wavefront.
Orbital angular momentum (OAM) multiplexing provides an infinite-dimensional discrete Hilbert space ideally suited for high-capacity free-space quantum key distribution (QKD). Nevertheless, pure scalar spatial modes carrying topological charge (∣ℓ∣≥1) undergo severe decoherence when transmitted through terrestrial atmospheric turbulence. Turbulent refractive-index eddies split high-order vortex singularities, induce catastrophic intermodal crosstalk across adjacent topological channels, and rapidly drive the quantum bit error rate (QBER) well above the unconditional 11% security threshold associated with individual cloning attacks. Here, we demonstrate that hybrid polarization-OAM entangled states, known as vector vortex beams (VVBs), provide intrinsic, hardware-free immunity against turbulent perturbations. Because the optical anisotropy of terrestrial air is exceedingly small (Δn<10−9), refractive-index fluctuations couple symmetrically to orthogonal circular polarization modes as an identical common-mode scalar phase screen that cancels in the relative polarization-phase degree of freedom. By numerically propagating modal fields through modified power-spectral phase screens over turbulence strengths ranging from D/r0=0 to 3.0, we show that the VVB encoding protocol suppresses the asymptotic QBER from 42.0% to 4.8%, yielding an error-suppression factor of approximately 11.6 without requiring active adaptive optics or deformable mirrors.
When using quantum key distribution (QKD), one of the trade-offs for security is that the generation rate of a secret key is typically very low. Recent works have shown that using a weak coherent source allows for higher secret key generation rates compared to an entangled photon source, when a channel with low loss is considered. In most cases, the system that is being studied is over a fiber-optic communication channel. Here a theoretical QKD system using the BB92 protocol and entangled photons over a free-space maritime channel with multiple spatial modes is presented. The entangled photons are generated from a spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) source of type II. To employ multiple spatial modes, the transmit apparatus will contain multiple SPDC sources, all driven by the pump lasers assumed to have the same intensity. The receive apparatuses will contain avalanche photo diodes (APD), modeled based on the NuCrypt CPDS-1000 detector, and located at the focal point of the receive aperture lens. The transmitter is assumed to be located at Alice and Bob will be located 30 km away, implying no channel crosstalk will be introduced in the measurements at Alice’s side due to turbulence. To help mitigate the effects of atmospheric turbulence, adaptive optics will be considered at the transmitter and the receiver. An eavesdropper, Eve, is located 15 km from Alice and has no control over the devices at Alice or Bob. Eve is performing the intercept resend attack and listening to the communication over the public channel. Additionally, it is assumed that Eve can correct any aberrations caused by the atmospheric turbulence to determine which source the photon was transmitted from. One, four and nine spatial modes are considered with and without applying adaptive optics and compared to one another.
In free-space quantum key distribution (QKD), the sensitivity of the receiver's detector channels may depend differently on the spatial mode of incoming photons. Consequently, an attacker can control the spatial mode to break security. We experimentally investigate a standard polarization QKD receiver and identify sources of efficiency mismatch in its optical scheme. We model a practical intercept-and-resend attack and show that it would break security in most situations. We show experimentally that adding an appropriately chosen spatial filter at the receiver's entrance may be an effective countermeasure.