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arXiv:1810.01790

A note on the quantum query complexity of permutation symmetric functions

André Chailloux

Published Oct 3, 2018• 2 citations
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Abstract

It is known since the work of [AA14] that for any permutation symmetric function $f$, the quantum query complexity is at most polynomially smaller than the classical randomized query complexity, more precisely that $R(f) = \widetilde{O}\left(Q^7(f)\right)$. In this paper, we improve this result and show that $R(f) = {O}\left(Q^3(f)\right)$ for a more general class of symmetric functions. Our proof is constructive and relies largely on the quantum hardness of distinguishing a random permutation from a random function with small range from Zhandry [Zha15].

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1810.01790

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It is known since the work of [AA14] that for any permutation symmetric function fff, the quantum query complexity is at most polynomially smaller than the classical randomized query complexity, more precisely that R(f)=O~(Q7(f))R(f) = \widetilde{O}\left(Q^7(f)\right)R(f)=O(Q7(f)). In this paper, we improve this result and show that R(f)=O(Q3(f))R(f) = {O}\left(Q^3(f)\right)R(f)=O(Q3(f)) for a more general class of symmetric functions. Our proof is constructive and relies largely on the quantum hardness of distinguishing a random permutation from a random function with small range from Zhandry [Zha15].
It is known since the work of [Aaronson and Ambainis, 2014] that for any permutation symmetric function f, the quantum query complexity is at most polynomially smaller than the classical randomized query complexity, more precisely that R(f) = O~(Q^7(f)). In this paper, we improve this result and show that R(f) = O(Q^3(f)) for a more general class of symmetric functions. Our proof is constructive and relies largely on the quantum hardness of distinguishing a random permutation from a random function with small range from Zhandry [Zhandry, 2015].
A collision for a function fff is two distinct inputs x1≠x2x_1\neq x_2x1​=x2​ such that fff outputs the same value on both inputs: f(x1)=f(x2)f(x_1)=f(x_2)f(x1​)=f(x2​). The quantum query complexity of finding collisions has been shown~\cite{BHT1997,AS2004, Ambainis05, Kutin05} in some settings to be Θ(N1/3)\Theta(N^{1/3})Θ(N1/3); however, these results do not apply to random functions. The issues are two-fold. First, the Ω(N1/3)\Omega(N^{1/3})Ω(N1/3) lower bound only applies when the domain is no larger than the co-domain, which precludes many of the cryptographically interesting applications. Second, most of the results in the literature only apply to rrr-to-1 functions, which are quite different from random functions. Understanding the collision problem for random functions is of great importance to cryptography, and we seek to fill the gaps of knowledge for this problem. To that end, we prove that, as expected, a quantum query complexity of Θ(N1/3)\Theta(N^{1/3})Θ(N1/3) holds for all interesting domain and co-domain sizes. Our proofs are simple, and combine existing techniques with several novel tricks to obtain the desired results. Using our techniques, we also give an optimal Ω(M1/3)\Omega(M^{1/3})Ω(M1/3) lower bound for the set equality problem. This lower bound can be used to improve the relationship between classical randomized query complexity and quantum query complexity for so-called permutation-symmetric functions.
The problem of distinguishing between a random function and a random permutation on a domain of size NNN is important in theoretical cryptography, where the security of many primitives depend on the problem's hardness. We study the quantum query complexity of this problem, and show that any quantum algorithm that solves this problem with bounded error must make $\Omega(N^{1/5}/\polylog N)$ queries to the input function. Our lower bound proof uses a combination of the Collision Problem lower bound and Ambainis's adversary theorem.
The analysis of quantum algorithms which query random, invertible permutations has been a long-standing challenge in cryptography. Many techniques which apply to random oracles fail, or are not known to generalize to this setting. As a result, foundational cryptographic constructions involving permutations often lack quantum security proofs. With the aim of closing this gap, we develop and prove soundness of a compressed permutation oracle. Our construction shares many of the attractive features of Zhandry's original compressed function oracle: the purification is a small list of input-output pairs which meaningfully reflect an algorithm's knowledge of the oracle.
One of the main reasons for query model's prominence in quantum complexity is the presence of concrete lower bounding techniques: polynomial method and adversary method. There have been considerable efforts to not just give lower bounds using these methods but even to compare and relate them. We explore the value of these bounds on quantum query complexity for the class of symmetric functions, arguably one of the most natural and basic set of Boolean functions. We show (using the recently introduced spectral sensitivity) that both these bounds (positive adversary and approximate degree) give the same value for every total symmetric Boolean function. We also look at the quantum query complexity of Gap Majority, a partial symmetric function. It has gained importance recently in regard to understanding the composition of randomized query complexity. We characterize the quantum query complexity of Gap Majority and show a lower bound on noisy randomized query complexity (Ben-David and Blais, FOCS 2020) in terms of quantum query complexity. In addition, we study how large certificate complexity and block sensitivity can be as compared to sensitivity (even up to constant factors) for symmetric functions. We show tight separations, i.e., give upper bound on possible separations and construct functions achieving the same.