In the nineteenth century (in the process of transition from mechanics to the field theory), the German school of theoretical physics confronted problems similar to the basic problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). Hertz tried to resolve such problem through analysis of the notion of a scientific theory and interrelation of theory and experiment. This analysis led him to the Bild (image) conception of theory (which was later essentially developed, but also modified by Boltzmann). In this paper, we claim that to resolve the basic foundational problems of QM, one has to use the Bild conception and reject the observational viewpoint on physical theory. As an example of a Bild theory underlying QM (treated as an observational theory), we consider prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT): theory of random subquantum fields.
In the nineteenth century (in the process of transition from mechanics to the field theory), the German school of theoretical physics confronted problems similar to the basic problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics (QM). Hertz tried to resolve such problem through analysis of the notion of a scientific theory and interrelation of theory and experiment. This analysis led him to the Bild (image) conception of theory (which was later essentially developed, but also modified by Boltzmann). In this paper, we claim that to resolve the basic foundational problems of QM, one has to use the Bild conception and reject the observational viewpoint on physical theory. As an example of a Bild theory underlying QM (treated as an observational theory), we consider prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT): theory of random subquantum fields.
We start with a methodological analysis of the notion of scientific theory and its interrelation with reality. This analysis is based on the works of Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Schrödinger (and reviews of D'Agostino). Following Helmholtz, Hertz established the "Bild conception" for scientific theories. Here, "Bild" ("picture") carries the meaning "model" (mathematical). The main aim of natural sciences is construction of the causal theoretical models (CTMs) of natural phenomena. Hertz claimed that a CTM cannot be designed solely on the basis of observational data; it typically contains hidden quantities. Experimental data can be described by an observational model (OM), often based on the price of acausality. CTM-OM interrelation can be tricky. Schrödinger used the Bild concept to create a CTM for quantum mechanics (QM), and QM was treated as OM. We follow him and suggest a special CTM for QM, so-called prequantum classical statistical field theory (PCSFT). QM can be considered as a PCSFT image, but not as straightforward as in Bell's model with hidden variables. The common interpretation of the violation of the Bell inequality is criticized from the perspective of the two-level structuring of scientific theories. Such critical analysis of von Neumann and Bell no-go theorems for hidden variables was performed already by De Broglie (and Lochak) in the 1970s. The Bild approach is applied to the two-level CTM-OM modeling of Brownian motion: the overdamped regime corresponds to OM. In classical mechanics, CTM=OM; on the one hand, this is very convenient; on the other hand, this exceptional coincidence blurred the general CTM-OM structuring of scientific theories. We briefly discuss ontic-epistemic structuring of scientific theories (Primas-Atmanspacher) and its relation to the Bild concept. Interestingly, Atmanspacher as well as Hertz claim that even classical physical theories should be presented on the basic of two-level structuring.
In this chapter we start with methodological analysis of the notion of scientifictheory and its interrelation with reality. This analysis is based onthe works of Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann, and Schrödinger (and reviewsof D’ Agostino). Following Helmholtz, Hertz established the “Bild concept”for scientific theories. Here “Bild” (“picture”) carries the meaning “model”(mathematical). The main aim of natural sciences is construction of thecausal theoretical models (CTMs) of natural phenomena. Hertz claimed thatCTM cannot be designed solely on the basis of observational data; it typicallycontains hidden quantities. Experimental data can be described by anobservational model (OM), often at the price of acausality. CTM-OM interrelationcan be tricky. Schrödinger used the Bild concept to create CTM forquantum mechanics (QM) and QM was treated as OM. We follow him andsuggest a special CTM for QM, the so-called prequantum classical statisticalfield theory (PCSFT). QM can be considered as a PCSFT-image, but notas straightforward as in Bell’s model with hidden variables. The commoninterpretation of the violation of the Bell inequality is criticized from theperspective of the two-level structuring of scientific theories.
This chapter begins with a brief outline of some of the key motivations for considering a quantum theory: the early attempts to determine the spectral distribution of energy density of black bodies; stability of atoms and molecules; specific heats of solids; interference and diffraction of light beams; polarization of photons. The experimental foundations of wave mechanics are then presented in detail, but in a logical order quite different from its historical development: photo-emission of electrons by metallic surfaces, X- and γ-ray scattering from gases, liquids and solids, interference experiments, atomic spectra and the Bohr hypotheses, the experiment of Franck and Hertz, the Bragg experiment, diffraction of electrons by a crystal of nickel (Davisson and Germer), and measurements of position and velocity of an electron. The need for a quantum theory In the second half of the nineteenth century it seemed that the laws of classical mechanics, developed by the genius of Newton, Lagrange, Hamilton, Jacobi and Poincaré, the Maxwell theory of electromagnetic phenomena and the laws of classical statistical mechanics could account for all known physical phenomena. Still, it became gradually clear, after several decades of experimental and theoretical work, that one has to formulate a new kind of mechanics, which reduces to classical mechanics in a suitable limit, and makes it possible to obtain a consistent description of phenomena that cannot be understood within the classical framework. It is now appropriate to present a brief outline of this new class of phenomena, the systematic investigation of which is the object of the following sections and of chapters 4 and 14.
In this paper we discuss the principles of two fundamental theories of physics: mechanics and quantum mechanics. First, we consider two philosophical positions of the German physicist Heinrich Hertz. He established one of the both in the introduction of his well known Principles of Mechanics. This view - Hertz's "picture" concept - which has a long tradition in philosophy, particularly with regard to physics and later to other empirical sciences, serves as the starting point of an interpretation of the relationship between real systems and theoretical structures of modern science using the concept of fuzziness. This "fuzzy view" on philosophy of science gives particularly an interpretation of Hertz's earlier lecture on The Constitution of matter. Second we consider some principles of quantum mechanics, particularly Werner Heisenberg's uncertainty relation of subatomic object's position and momentum, and Max Born's probabilistic interpretation of the quantum mechanical wave function. These principles are parts of the so-called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Third, we argue that the "fuzzy approach" is fruitful for a "fuzzy" interpretation of quantum mechanics because fuzziness fills the gap between systems and phenomena in reality and the scientific theory of quantum mechanics - as every other scientific theory.
Abstract One can consider the developments in quantum field theory from the point of view of foundational problems posed about physical reality at both the epistemological and ontological levels, or as a ‘laboratory’ to study the actual methodology of the scientific enterprise. I shall address both of these issues in this paper. My contention is that at the foundational level there is essentially nothing new in quantum field theory that is not already present in non-relativistic quantum mechanics. This is quite different in emphasis from the view expressed by Redhead (1983a). Even in quantum mechanics most of the difficulties which arise are generated by the realist’s inclination to take the formalism too literally as representing physical reality, often in a modified or distorted classical view. More serious consideration of Bohr’s philosophical framework of complementarity may prove fruitful for coping with this problem, which is not new to quantum field theory, being already the central interpretative problem of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, as a source to illustrate how theories arc constructed and established in actual scientific practice, quantum field theory does provide a wide range of useful examples. Here too, although there are many technically fascinating topics (such as renormalization), quantum field theory is pretty much (meth odological) business as usual. Much more interesting, essentially new, methodological departures are seriously proposed (with varying degrees of credibility) by some rival or alternative developments in modern theoretical physics, such as the S-matrix programme, with its bootstrap conjecture, or cosmology, with various forms of the anthropic principle (Gale 1983) and with the inflationary universe scenario (Guth 1981 ).
We present a historical-epistemological analysis of the foundations of quantum mechanics, highlighting the relationships between quantum mechanics and scientific realism, as well as the influence of the neo-positivist philosophy of the first decades of the 20th century. The great significance of the measurement process in the context of quantum mechanics is underlined as an essential element in providing a coherent description of reality, moving from micro to macrocosm, as well as the role that the measurement apparatus and the consciousness of the observer assume during the act of measurement, the related ontological problems, the question of the objectification of the wave function, and that of the definition of discernibility. We consider also an overview of the most important alternative proposals to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (Copenhagen interpretation), with particular reference to hidden variable theories and other alternatives to standard quantum mechanics philosophical approach, that are modifying the vision of reality, such as the Everett’s many-worlds theory, the QBism and unified holistic approaches, such as the Primordial Dynamic Space.