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arXiv:1805.08172 · Quantum Information and Computation

Proposal for dimensionality testing in QPQ

Arpita Maitra, Bibhas Adhikari, Satyabrata Adhikari

Published Nov 1, 2018• 1 citation
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

Recently, dimensionality testing of a quantum state has received extensive attention (Ac{\'i}n et al. Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006, Scarani et al. Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006). Security proofs of existing quantum information processing protocols rely on the assumption about the dimension of quantum states in which logical bits are encoded. However, removing such assumption may cause security loophole. In the present paper, we show that this is indeed the case. We choose two players' quantum private query protocol by Yang et al. (Quant. Inf. Process. 2014) as an example and show how one player can gain an unfair advantage by changing the dimension of subsystem of a shared quantum system. To resist such attack we propose dimensionality testing in a different way. Our proposal is based on CHSH like game. As we exploit CHSH like game, it can be used to test if the states are product states for which the protocol becomes completely vulnerable.

DOI
10.26421/qic18.13-14-4

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Recently, dimensionality testing of a quantum state has received extensive attention (Ac{'i}n et al. Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006, Scarani et al. Phys. Rev. Letts. 2006). Security proofs of existing quantum information processing protocols rely on the assumption about the dimension of quantum states in which logical bits are encoded. However, removing such assumption may cause security loophole. In the present paper, we show that this is indeed the case. We choose two players' quantum private query protocol by Yang et al. (Quant. Inf. Process. 2014) as an example and show how one player can gain an unfair advantage by changing the dimension of subsystem of a shared quantum system. To resist such attack we propose dimensionality testing in a different way. Our proposal is based on CHSH like game. As we exploit CHSH like game, it can be used to test if the states are product states for which the protocol becomes completely vulnerable.
In a recent work by Maitra et al. (Phys. Rev. A, 2017), it was shown that the existing Quantum Private Query (QPQ) protocols fail to maintain the database security if the entangled states shared between Alice and Bob are not of a certain form. So it is necessary to certify the states a priori. In this regard, the local CHSH test was proposed. However, the proposed scheme works perfectly for the asymptotic case when we have infinite number of qubits. In this brief report, we upgrade the protocol for finite number of qubits and connect the sample size to the success probability of CHSH test. We also perform a rigorous security analysis of the proposed protocol.
Quantum Private Query (QPQ) is an unconditional secure mistrustful cryptographic primitive which is assumed to be a probabilistic version of the Oblivious Transfer (OT) schemes or an imperfect version of Symmetric Private Information Retrieval (SPIR) schemes. Recently, Maitra et al. (Phys. Rev. A, 2017) identified that the B92 QKD-based QPQ scheme proposed by Yang et al. (Quant. Inf. Process., 2014) is vulnerable whenever the devices involved in that scheme are dubious and to improve the overall security, they suggested a semi-Device Independent (DI) proposal for that QPQ scheme by introducing a local test at the server's end. In this work, we overcome the limitation of the Maitra et al. proposal by removing trustworthiness from all the (involved) devices, and suggest a full DI proposal for the Yang et al. scheme, exploiting a proper self-testing mechanism of observables along with the local version of the tilted CHSH game. We compare the performance of our proposal with a recent full DI-QPQ scheme (arxiv 1901.03042) and discuss their relative advantages. Additionally, we present a DI proposal for a modified version of the Yang et al. scheme, enabling the client to retrieve maximum raw key bits during the oblivious key generation phase. We evaluate the security of all our proposals with a formal analysis.
In quantum private query (QPQ), a client obtains values corresponding to his or her query only, and nothing else from the server, and the server does not get any information about the queries. V. Giovannetti et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 100, 230502 (2008)] gave the first QPQ protocol and since then quite a few variants and extensions have been proposed. However, none of the existing protocols are device independent; i.e., all of them assume implicitly that the entangled states supplied to the client and the server are of a certain form. In this work, we exploit the idea of a local CHSH game and connect it with the scheme of Y. G. Yang et al. [Quantum Info. Process. 13, 805 (2014)] to present the concept of a device-independent QPQ protocol.
As a kind of practical protocol, quantum-key-distribution (QKD)-based quantum private queries (QPQs) have drawn lots of attention. However, joint-measurement (JM) attack poses a noticeable threat to the database security in such protocols. That is, by JM attack a malicious user can illegally elicit many more items from the database than the average amount an honest one can obtain. Taking Jacobi et al.'s protocol as an example, by JM attack a malicious user can obtain as many as 500 bits, instead of the expected 2.44 bits, from a 104{10}^{4}104-bit database in one query. It is a noticeable security flaw in theory, and would also arise in application with the development of quantum memories. To solve this problem, we propose a QPQ protocol based on a two-way QKD scheme, which behaves much better in resisting JM attack. Concretely, the user Alice cannot get more database items by conducting JM attack on the qubits because she has to send them back to Bob (the database holder) before knowing which of them should be jointly measured. Furthermore, JM attack by both Alice and Bob would be detected with certain probability, which is quite different from previous protocols. Moreover, our protocol retains the good characters of QKD-based QPQs, e.g., it is loss tolerant and robust against quantum memory attack.
A security analysis of the recently introduced Quantum Private Query (QPQ) protocol is presented. The latter is a cheat sensitive quantum protocol to perform a private search on a classical database. It allows a user to retrieve an item from the database without revealing which item was retrieved, and at the same time it ensures data privacy of the database (the information that the user retrieves in a query is bounded). The security analysis is based on information-disturbance tradeoffs which show that whenever the provider tries to obtain information on the query, the query (encoded into a quantum system) is disturbed so that the person querying the database can detect the privacy violation. The security bounds are derived under the assumption that a unique answer corresponds to each query. To remove this assumption, some simple variants of the protocol are illustrated, and it is conjectured that analogous security bounds apply to them.