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arXiv:1801.01456 · Advances in intelligent systems and computing

Deep Random Based Key Exchange Protocol Resisting Unlimited MITM

Thibault de Valroger

Published Jan 1, 2019• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-22868-2_42

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A key exchange protocol is an important primitive in the field of information and network security and is used to exchange a common secret key among various parties. A number of key exchange protocols exist in the literature and most of them are based on the Diffie-Hellman (DH) problem. But, these DH type protocols cannot resist to the modern computing technologies like quantum computing, grid computing etc. Therefore, a more powerful non-DH type key exchange protocol is required which could resist the quantum and exponential attacks. In the year 2013, Lei and Liao, thus proposed a lattice-based key exchange protocol. Their protocol was related to the NTRU-ENCRYPT and NTRU-SIGN and so, was referred as NTRU-KE. In this paper, we identify that NTRU-KE lacks the authentication mechanism and suffers from the man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack. This attack may lead to the forging the authenticated users and exchanging the wrong key.
Summary We propose a quantum ‐resistant key exchange protocol based on hard problems of lattices using MaTRU cryptosystem as an underlying scheme. A key exchange protocol based on NTRU cryptosystem given by Lie et al is not secure against man‐in‐the‐middle (MITM) attack. To remove this failure and provide a secure protocol, our protocol uses a trusted third party (TTP). Additionally, our protocol is better than NTRU‐KE on efficiency and security point of view. In this paper, we propose key exchange protocol with TTP and without TTP, and describe the advantages and disadvantages of both schemes.