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arXiv:1712.09387 · Physical Review A

Reply to “Comment on ‘Null weak values and the past of a quantum particle”’

Quentin Duprey, A. Matzkin

Published Apr 13, 2018• 15 citations
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Abstract

We discuss the preceding Comment [D. Sokolovski, preceding Comment, Phys. Rev. A 97, 046102 (2018)] and conclude that the arguments given there against the relevance of null weak values as representing the absence of a system property are not compelling. We give an example in which the transition matrix elements that make the projector weak values vanish are the same ones that suppress detector clicks in strong measurements. Whether weak values are taken to account for the past of a quantum system or not depend on general interpretational commitments of the quantum formalism itself rather than on peculiarities of the weak measurements framework.

DOI
10.1103/physreva.97.046103

Related papers

Comment on "Does the weak trace show the past of a quantum particle?"

Quentin Duprey, A. Matzkin

In the paper "Does the weak trace show the past of a quantum particle?" [arXiv:2109.14060v2], it is argued that null weak values of the spatial projectors are inadequate to infer the presence of a quantum particle at an intermediate time between preparation and detection. This conclusion relies on two arguments - (i) the role of the disturbance induced by a weak measurement, and (ii) classical-like features like continuous paths that must purportedly be associated with a quantum particle presence. Here we first show that (i) arises from a misunderstanding of null weak values by putting forward a simple counter-example that highlights that the relevant quantities to examine are the vanishing amplitudes, not the wavefunction. Then we briefly argue that enforcing classical pre-conditions in order to account for quantum properties during unitary evolution is unlikely to lead to a consistent understanding of quantum phenomena.

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Comment on “Null weak values and the past of a quantum particle”

D. Sokolovski

In a recent paper [Phys. Rev. A 95, 032110 (2017)], Duprey and Matzkin investigated the meaning of vanishing weak values and their role in the retrodiction of the past of a preselected and postselected quantum system in the presence of interference. Here we argue that any proposition regarding the weak values should be understood as a statement about the probability amplitudes. With this in mind, we revisit some of the conclusions reached in Duprey and Matzkin's work.

arXiv:1709.02170•Physical Review A•Apr 13, 2018•20 citations

Reply to “Comment on ‘Weak values and the past of a quantum particle' ”

Jonte R. Hance, JG Rarity, J Ladyman

We here reply to a recent comment by Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 048001 (2023)] on our paper [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 023048 (2023)]. In his Comment, Vaidman first admits that he is just defining (assuming) the weak trace gives the presence of a particle—however, in this case, he should use a term other than presence, as this already has a separate, intuitive meaning other than “where a weak trace is.” Despite this admission, Vaidman then goes on to argue for this definition by appeal to ideas around an objectively existing idea of presence. We show these appeals rely on their own conclusion—that there is always a matter of fact about the location of a quantum particle.

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Reply to the Comment "Past of a quantum particle and weak measurement"

Lev Vaidman A

Misinterpretation in the preceding Comment of my recent analysis of the past of a photon is corrected. There is nothing in this analysis which is "contrary to the usual quantum expectations" but, nevertheless, it does provide "further understanding and interpretation of the system considered". In particular, it teaches us that the naive common sense argument frequently used in the literature including the Comment has to be abandoned.

arXiv:1310.1319•Oct 4, 2013•1 citation

Reply to “Comment on ‘Weak values and the past of a quantum particle' ”

Jonte R. Hance, John Rarity, James Ladyman

We here reply to a recent comment by Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 048001 (2023)] on our paper [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 023048 (2023)]. In his Comment, Vaidman first admits that he is just defining (assuming) the weak trace gives the presence of a particle---however, in this case, he should use a term other than presence, as this already has a separate, intuitive meaning other than ``where a weak trace is.'' Despite this admission, Vaidman then goes on to argue for this definition by appeal to ideas around an objectively existing idea of presence. We show these appeals rely on their own conclusion---that there is always a matter of fact about the location of a quantum particle.

arXiv:2309.07599•Physical Review Research•Nov 8, 2023•4 citations

Comment on "Association between quantum paradoxes based on weak values and a realistic interpretation of quantum measurements"

Juan José Seoane, Xabier Oianguren-Asua, Albert Solé +1 more

In their paper (arXiv:2402.09879), Aredes and Saldanha analyze several paradoxes related to weak values and present a "general argument" that aims to show that "realistic interpretations ...of weak values lead to inconsistencies". Although we agree with the identified inconsistencies for the specific weak values analyzed there, in this Comment we demonstrate that the origin of these inconsistencies is not their general argument, which is formally incorrect. We use Bohmian mechanics as a counterexample to confirm that their conclusions are not valid for all weak values and quantum theories. In particular, we show that weak values postselected in position can in fact be interpreted within Bohmian mechanics as properties of quantum systems, detached from any measuring devices, in a consistent and meaningful way.

quant-pharXiv:2603.18713•Physical Review A•Mar 20, 2026•3 citations
We discuss the preceding Comment [D. Sokolovski, preceding Comment, Phys. Rev. A 97, 046102 (2018)] and conclude that the arguments given there against the relevance of null weak values as representing the absence of a system property are not compelling. We give an example in which the transition matrix elements that make the projector weak values vanish are the same ones that suppress detector clicks in strong measurements. Whether weak values are taken to account for the past of a quantum system or not depend on general interpretational commitments of the quantum formalism itself rather than on peculiarities of the weak measurements framework.
In the paper "Does the weak trace show the past of a quantum particle?" [arXiv:2109.14060v2], it is argued that null weak values of the spatial projectors are inadequate to infer the presence of a quantum particle at an intermediate time between preparation and detection. This conclusion relies on two arguments - (i) the role of the disturbance induced by a weak measurement, and (ii) classical-like features like continuous paths that must purportedly be associated with a quantum particle presence. Here we first show that (i) arises from a misunderstanding of null weak values by putting forward a simple counter-example that highlights that the relevant quantities to examine are the vanishing amplitudes, not the wavefunction. Then we briefly argue that enforcing classical pre-conditions in order to account for quantum properties during unitary evolution is unlikely to lead to a consistent understanding of quantum phenomena.
We here reply to a recent comment by Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 048001 (2023)] on our paper [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 023048 (2023)]. In his Comment, Vaidman first admits that he is just defining (assuming) the weak trace gives the presence of a particle—however, in this case, he should use a term other than presence, as this already has a separate, intuitive meaning other than “where a weak trace is.” Despite this admission, Vaidman then goes on to argue for this definition by appeal to ideas around an objectively existing idea of presence. We show these appeals rely on their own conclusion—that there is always a matter of fact about the location of a quantum particle.
We here reply to a recent comment by Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 048001 (2023)] on our paper [Phys. Rev. Res. 5, 023048 (2023)]. In his Comment, Vaidman first admits that he is just defining (assuming) the weak trace gives the presence of a particle---however, in this case, he should use a term other than presence, as this already has a separate, intuitive meaning other than ``where a weak trace is.'' Despite this admission, Vaidman then goes on to argue for this definition by appeal to ideas around an objectively existing idea of presence. We show these appeals rely on their own conclusion---that there is always a matter of fact about the location of a quantum particle.
In their paper (arXiv:2402.09879), Aredes and Saldanha analyze several paradoxes related to weak values and present a "general argument" that aims to show that "realistic interpretations ...of weak values lead to inconsistencies". Although we agree with the identified inconsistencies for the specific weak values analyzed there, in this Comment we demonstrate that the origin of these inconsistencies is not their general argument, which is formally incorrect. We use Bohmian mechanics as a counterexample to confirm that their conclusions are not valid for all weak values and quantum theories. In particular, we show that weak values postselected in position can in fact be interpreted within Bohmian mechanics as properties of quantum systems, detached from any measuring devices, in a consistent and meaningful way.