Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Log inSign up
Challenges
Datasets
Workspaces
Papers
Discussions
Leaderboard
Blog
Job Board
Q3AS

© 2026 Aqora Quantum S.A.S.

TermsPrivacyLegal Notice

arXiv:1712.06448

All-Possible-Worlds: Unifying Many-Worlds and Copenhagen, in the Light of Quantum Contextuality

Antoine Suárez

Published Dec 15, 2017• 2 citations
arXivHTMLPDF

Abstract

"All-Possible-Worlds" is a novel interpretation of quantum physics, which results from a unified reformulation of Many-Worlds and Copenhagen ("collapse") in the light of quantum contextuality, and proposes "nonlocality at detection" as a principle ruling the whole quantum realm, including single qubit and qutrit experiments.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1712.06448

Related papers

Is the Copenhagen Interpretation Inapplicable to Quantum Cosmology?

Tatyana P. Shestakova

It is generally accepted that the Copenhagen interpretation is inapplicable to quantum cosmology, by contrast with the many worlds interpretation. I shall demonstrate that the two basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation, the principle of wholeness and the principle of complementarity, do make sense in quantum gravity, since we can judge about quantum gravitational processes in the very early Universe by their vestiges in our macroscopic Universe. I shall present the extended phase space approach to quantum gravity and show that it can be interpreted in the spirit of the Everett’s “relative states” formulation, while there is no contradiction between the “relative states” formulation and the mentioned basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation.

arXiv:1809.09554•Universe•Aug 19, 2020•6 citations

An Introduction to the Foundations and Interpretations of Quantum Mechanics

Theodore McKeever, Ahsan Nazir

This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.

quant-pharXiv:2603.09818•Mar 11, 2026•0 citations

Quantum nonlocality does not exist

Frank J. Tipler

Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences•Jul 11, 2014•78 citations

A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics (Again)

Hilary Putnam

‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science•Sep 10, 2005•95 citations

An introduction to the foundations and interpretations of quantum mechanics

Theodore McKeever, Ahsan Nazir

This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument, Bell’s theorem, and Hardy’s paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie–Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.

Canadian Journal of Physics•Jan 1, 2026•0 citations

Quantum measurement and quantum gravity: many-worlds or collapse of the wavefunction?

T. P. Singh

At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wavefunction collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes nonlinear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this nonlinear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative differential geometry, we develop such a reformulation and derive a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, which can explain collapse of the wavefunction. We also obtain an expression for the lifetime of a quantum superposition. We suggest ideas for an experimental test of this model.

arXiv:0711.3773•Journal of Physics Conference Series•Jun 1, 2009•16 citations
"All-Possible-Worlds" is a novel interpretation of quantum physics, which results from a unified reformulation of Many-Worlds and Copenhagen ("collapse") in the light of quantum contextuality, and proposes "nonlocality at detection" as a principle ruling the whole quantum realm, including single qubit and qutrit experiments.
It is generally accepted that the Copenhagen interpretation is inapplicable to quantum cosmology, by contrast with the many worlds interpretation. I shall demonstrate that the two basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation, the principle of wholeness and the principle of complementarity, do make sense in quantum gravity, since we can judge about quantum gravitational processes in the very early Universe by their vestiges in our macroscopic Universe. I shall present the extended phase space approach to quantum gravity and show that it can be interpreted in the spirit of the Everett’s “relative states” formulation, while there is no contradiction between the “relative states” formulation and the mentioned basic principles of the Copenhagen interpretation.
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument, Bell's theorem, and Hardy's paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie-Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
Quantum nonlocality is shown to be an artifact of the Copenhagen interpretation, in which each observed quantity has exactly one value at any instant. In reality, all physical systems obey quantum mechanics, which obeys no such rule. Locality is restored if observed and observer are both assumed to obey quantum mechanics, as in the many-worlds interpretation (MWI). Using the MWI, I show that the quantum side of Bell's inequality, generally believed nonlocal, is really due to a series of three measurements (not two as in the standard, oversimplified analysis), all three of which have only local effects. Thus, experiments confirming "nonlocality" are actually confirming the MWI. The mistaken interpretation of nonlocality experiments depends crucially on a question-begging version of the Born interpretation, which makes sense only in "collapse" versions of quantum theory, about the meaning of the modulus of the wave function, so I use the interpretation based on the MWI, namely that the wave function is a world density amplitude, not a probability amplitude. This view allows the Born interpretation to be derived directly from the Schrödinger equation, by applying the Schrödinger equation to both the observed and the observer.
‘A Philosopher Looks at Quantum Mechanics’ (Putnam [1965]) explained why the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a philosophical problem in detail, but with only the necessary minimum of technicalities, in the hope of making the difficulties intelligible to as wide an audience as possible. When I wrote it, I had not seen Bell ([1964]), nor (of course) had I seen Ghirardi et al. ([1986]). And I did not discuss the ‘Many Worlds’ interpretation. For all these reasons, I have decided to make a similar attempt forty years later, taking account of additional interpretations and of our knowledge concerning non-locality. (The Quantum Logical interpretation proposed in Putnam [1968] is not considered in the present paper, however, because Putnam [1994b] concluded that it was unworkable.) Rather than advocate a particular interpretation, this paper classifies the possible kinds of interpretation, subject only to the constraints of a very broadly construed scientific realism. Section 7 does, however, argue that two sorts of interpretation—ones according to which a ‘collapse’ is brought about by the measurement (e.g. the traditional ‘Copenhagen’ interpretation), and the Many Worlds interpretation or interpretations—should be ruled out. The concluding section suggests some possible morals of a cosmological character. 1. Background 2. Scientific realism is the premise of my discussion 3. What ‘quantum mechanics’ says—and some problems 4. Other interpretations of quantum mechanics 5. The problem of Einstein's bed 6. Classification of the possible kinds of interpretation 7. Which interpretations I think we can rule out 8. The ‘moral’ of this discussion
This article surveys a selection of key conceptual and interpretational developments in quantum mechanics, tracing the theory from its foundational postulates to contemporary discussions of measurement, nonlocality, and the emergence of classicality. Beginning with the structure of Hilbert space and the postulates governing state evolution and measurement, the epistemic stance of the Copenhagen interpretation and its modern reformulations are examined. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen argument, Bell’s theorem, and Hardy’s paradox are then discussed as probes of locality and realism, alongside the deterministic but explicitly nonlocal de Broglie–Bohm theory. The measurement problem and the implications of contextuality are analyzed in relation to objective collapse models, which introduce new physical dynamics to account for definite outcomes. Finally, the role of decoherence in the suppression of interference and the emergence of classical behavior is explored, together with the interpretational frameworks of many-worlds and consistent histories. This material aims to provide a coherent introductory overview of how several of the most prominent interpretations address the central concern of what quantum mechanics tells us about the nature of physical reality.
At present, there are two possible, and equally plausible, explanations for the physics of quantum measurement. The first explanation, known as the many-worlds interpretation, does not require any modification of quantum mechanics, and asserts that at the time of measurement the Universe splits into many branches, one branch for every possible alternative. The various branches do not interfere with each other because of decoherence, thus providing a picture broadly consistent with the observed Universe. The second explanation, which requires quantum mechanics to be modified from its presently known form, is that at the time of measurement the wavefunction collapses into one of the possible alternatives. The two explanations are mutually exclusive, and up until now, no theoretical reasoning has been put forward to choose one explanation over the other. In this article, we provide an argument which implies that the collapse interpretation is favored over the many-worlds interpretation. Our starting point is the assertion (which we justify) that there ought to exist a reformulation of quantum mechanics which does not refer to a classical spacetime manifold. The need for such a reformulation implies that quantum theory becomes nonlinear on the Planck mass/energy scale. Standard linear quantum mechanics is an approximation to this nonlinear theory, valid at energy scales much smaller than the Planck scale. Using ideas based on noncommutative differential geometry, we develop such a reformulation and derive a nonlinear Schrödinger equation, which can explain collapse of the wavefunction. We also obtain an expression for the lifetime of a quantum superposition. We suggest ideas for an experimental test of this model.