In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its security rests on the assumption that any attack to learn the generated key would be unpractical while the legitimate users only need to use standard equipment. We present a challenge to that assumption with a hidden probe attack in which the eavesdropper hides a weak signal in the unavoidable noise floor that appears in the laser during amplification and probes with it the configuration of one or both communication parties. We comment how this attack can compromise different proposals for ultralong laser key distribution and propose possible countermeasures.
In ultralong fiber laser key distribution, two sides use standard optical equipment to create kilometer long fiber lasers in a communication link to establish a secret key. Its security rests on the assumption that any attack to learn the generated key would be unpractical while the legitimate users only need to use standard equipment. We present a challenge to that assumption with a hidden probe attack in which the eavesdropper hides a weak signal in the unavoidable noise floor that appears in the laser during amplification and probes with it the configuration of one or both communication parties. We comment how this attack can compromise different proposals for ultralong laser key distribution and propose possible countermeasures.
The secure distribution of a secret key is the weakest point of shared-key encryption protocols. While quantum key distribution schemes could theoretically provide unconditional security, their practical implementation remains technologically challenging. Here we provide an extended analysis and present an experimental support of a concept for a classical key generation system, based on establishing laser oscillation between two parties, which is realized using standard fiber-optic components. In our Ultra-long Fiber Laser (UFL) system, each user places a randomly chosen, spectrally selective mirror at his/her end of a fiber laser, with the two-mirror choice representing a key bit. We demonstrate the ability of each user to extract the mirror choice of the other using a simple analysis of the UFL signal, while an adversary can only reconstruct a small fraction of the key. The simplicity of this system renders it a promising alternative for practical key distribution in the optical domain.
Summary form only given. The distribution of the secret key is the weakest link of many data encryption systems. Quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes provide attractive solutions [1], however their implementation remains challenging and their range and bit-rate are limited. Moreover, practical QKD systems, employ real-life components and are, therefore, vulnerable to diverse attack schemes [2]. Ultra-Long fiber lasers (UFLs) have been drawing much attention recently because of their fundamentally different properties compared to conventional lasers as well as their unique applications [3]. Here, we demonstrate a 100Bps, practically secure key distribution, over a 500km link, employing Raman gain UFL. Fig. 1(a) depicts a schematic of the UFL system. Each user has an identical set of two wavelength selective mirrors centered at l0and l1. In order to exchange a key-bit, each user independently choose one of these mirrors and introduces it as a laser reflector at their end. If both users choose identical mirrors, a clear signal develops and the bits in these cases are discarded. However if they choose complementary mirrors, (1, 0 or 0, 1 states), the UFL remains below lasing threshold and no signal evolves. In these cases, an eavesdropper can only detect noise and is unable to determine the mirror choice of the users, where the choice of mirrors represent a single key bit (e.g. Alice's choice of mirror is the key-bit). These bits are kept and added to the key. The absence of signal in the secure states faxilitates fast measurements to distinguish between the non-secure and the secure states and to determine the key-bit in the later case, Sequentially reapeating the single bit exchange protocol generate the entire keys of any desirable length.
Abstract Secure key distribution is a vital yet challenging task for most secure communication systems. Here, we demonstrate an error-free secure key distribution scheme with a decoy mechanism by establishing Raman lasing between the parties. At the transmitter port, true keys mixed with fakes keys are spectrally encoded into Raman signals at different wavelengths. A spectral manipulable feedback ring is adopted to provide weak feedback for the true signal and strong feedback for the fake one. Over the transmission link, true Raman signals are suppressed and the eavesdropper can only detect the fake ones. At the receiver port, the user can reveal the hidden true signals and identify the fake signals by turning on a magic switch. Moreover, the distributed Raman gain along the fiber can compensate for the fiber loss, thereby enabling error-free secure key distribution over 50 km. The structural simplicity, error-free property, and novel decoy mechanism render this scheme a promising alternative for long distance secure key distribution.
Secure fiber-optic communication systems are an important area of research and development in the IT industry. In this work, we report the development of a promising fiber laser system for physical-layer secure key generation and distribution. This is a pulsed ultra-long Erbium fiber laser in which pulse shaping is symmetrically split between two communicating parties (Alice and Bob). The proposed protocol for the physical-layer secure key generation and distribution is based on control of the duration of generated laser pulses. Alice and Bob contribute random binary values to the secure key generation by making independent choices of their states in the split pulse shaping every bit cycle. The key exchange is secured whenever different choices lead to the same pulse duration, thereby confusing an eavesdropper (Eve). Two strong algorithms for the transmitted data encryption at the physical layer are proposed and discussed as well. One of them uses a private key to encrypt the message entered by one of the communicating parties, and the other uses a meaningful message entered synchronously by the other party.
Abstract We propose a new approach to the generation of an alphabet for secret key exchange relying on small variations in the cavity length of an ultralong fiber laser. This new concept is supported by experimental results showing how the radiofrequency spectrum of the laser can be exploited as a carrier to exchange information. The test bench for our proof of principle is a 50-km-long fiber laser linking two users, Alice and Bob, where each user can randomly add an extra 1-km-long segment of fiber. The choice of laser length is driven by two independent random binary values, which makes such length become itself a random variable. The security of key exchange is ensured whenever the two independent random choices lead to the same laser length and, hence, to the same free spectral range.
Abstract In traditional communication systems the transmission medium is considered as a given characteristic of the channel, which does not depend on the properties of the transmitter and the receiver. Recent experimental demonstrations of the feasibility of extending the laser cavity over the whole communication link connecting the two parties, forming an ultra‐long fiber laser (UFL), have raised groundbreaking possibilities in communication and particularly in secure communications. Here, a 500 km long secure key distribution link based on Raman gain UFL is demonstrated. An error‐free distribution of a random key with an average rate of 100 bps between the users is demonstrated and the key is shown to be unrecoverable to an eavesdropper employing either time or frequency domain passive attacks.