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arXiv:1705.01356

Stop making sense of Bell's theorem and nonlocality? A reply to Stephen Boughn

Federico Laudisa

Published May 3, 2017• 1 citation
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Abstract

In a recent paper [arXiv:1703.11003] on this journal Stephen Boughn argued that quantum mechanics does not require nonlocality of any kind and that the common interpretation of Bell theorem as a nonlocality result is based on a misunderstanding. In this note I argue that the Boughn arguments, that summarize views widespread in certain areas of the foundations of quantum mechanics, are based on an incorrect reading of the presuppositions of the EPR argument and the Bell theorem and, as a consequence, are totally unfounded.

DOI
10.48550/arxiv.1705.01356

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In a recent paper [arXiv:1703.11003] on this journal Stephen Boughn argued that quantum mechanics does not require nonlocality of any kind and that the common interpretation of Bell theorem as a nonlocality result is based on a misunderstanding. In this note I argue that the Boughn arguments, that summarize views widespread in certain areas of the foundations of quantum mechanics, are based on an incorrect reading of the presuppositions of the EPR argument and the Bell theorem and, as a consequence, are totally unfounded.
The alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem. However, as we shall see, that relation is commonly incorrectly assessed. The departure from the clear line of reasoning that John Bell tried to convey has led to a polarization of part of the scientific community into radical irreconcilable positions. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's work calls for reinterpreting the usual significance given to the Bell theorem yielding a more rational perspective of the problem. Given the relevance of the Bell-type inequalities in quantum information technology and quantum foundations, further clarification of their relation to the nonlocality conundrum deserves due attention. The exposition is also of didactic value. It shows the problems arising from incorrect inferences and superfluous metaphysical ideas.
The alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem. However, as we shall see, that relation is commonly incorrectly assessed. The departure from the clear line of reasoning that John Bell tried to convey has led to a polarization of part of the scientific community into radical irreconcilable positions. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's work calls for reinterpreting the usual significance given to the Bell theorem yielding a more rational perspective of the problem. Given the present relevance of the Bell-type inequalities in quantum information technology and quantum foundations, further clarification of their relation to the nonlocality conundrum deserves due attention. The exposition is also of didactic value. It shows the problems arising from incorrect inferences and superfluous metaphysical ideas.
J.S. Bell's remarkable 1964 theorem showed that any theory sharing the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics would have to exhibit a surprising – and, from the point of view of relativity theory, very troubling – kind of nonlocality. Unfortunately, even still on this 50th anniversary, many commentators and textbook authors continue to misrepresent Bell's theorem. In particular, one continues to hear the claim that Bell's result leaves open the option of concluding either nonlocality or the failure of some unorthodox “hidden variable” (or “determinism” or “realism”) premise. This mistaken claim is often based on a failure to appreciate the role of the earlier 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in Bell's reasoning. After briefly reviewing this situation, I turn to two alternative versions of quantum theory – the “many worlds” theory of Everett and the quantum Bayesian interpretation of Fuchs, Schack, Caves, and Mermin – that purport to provide actual counterexamples to Bell's claim that nonlocality is required to account for the empirically verified quantum predictions. After analyzing each theory's grounds for claiming to explain the EPR–Bell correlations locally, however, one can see that (despite a number of fundamental differences) the two theories share a common for-all-practical-purposes (FAPP) solipsistic character. This dramatically undermines such theories’ claims to provide a local explanation of the correlations and thus, by concretizing the ridiculous philosophical lengths to which one must go to elude Bell's own conclusion, reinforces the assertion that nonlocality really is required to coherently explain the empirical data. Introduction Fifty years ago, in 1964 [1], John Stewart Bell first proved the theorem that has become widely known as “Bell's Theorem” but that Bell himself instead referred to as the “locality inequality theorem” [2]. In Bell's own view, the theorem showed that the empirical predictions of local theories will be constrained by Bell's inequality (or as Bell himself preferred to call it, the “locality inequality”). Hence, nonlocality is a necessary feature of any theory that shares the empirical predictions of standard quantum mechanics.
The alleged nonlocal character of quantum mechanics is inextricably related to the formulation of the Bell theorem. That relation, however, is commonly incorrectly assessed. The departure from the clear line of reasoning that John Bell tried to convey has led to a polarization of part of the scientific community into radical irreconcilable positions. We show how the correct appreciation of Bell's work calls for reinterpreting the usual significance given to the Bell theorem yielding a more rational perspective of the problem. We formalize the correct argument sustaining the nonlocal character of quantum mechanics and also comment on alternatives that may justify considering quantum mechanics as a local theory.
Blaylock argues that the derivation of Bell’s inequality requires a hidden assumption, counterfactual definiteness, of which Bell was unaware. A careful analysis of Bell’s argument shows that Bell presupposes only locality and the predictions of standard quantum mechanics. Counterfactual definiteness, insofar as it is required, is derived in the course of the argument rather than presumed. Bell’s theorem has no direct bearing on the many worlds interpretation not because that interpretation denies counterfactual definiteness but because it does not recover the predictions of standard quantum mechanics.